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The widespread use of performance-enhancing drugs among elite athletes is the 
most important policy problem in modern Olympic history. Although several works have 
addressed the subject (a few of which are admittedly excellent), they have been limited 
either temporally or by a lack of access to archival sources of information. Based on 
research in both American and foreign archives, this dissertation complements earlier, 
path-breaking works by tracing the evolution of Olympic doping policy from 1960 to the 
present.  
Olympic policymakers first seriously considered the subject of doping after 
suspicions arose that the death of Danish cyclist Knud Jensen at the 1960 Rome Olympic 
Games was triggered by the use of amphetamines. For most of the next decade, these 
officials attempted to define the doping problem and struggled to formulate a program for 
its solution. An international politics of doping consequently developed, under which the 
various bodies of the Olympic governance structure failed, due to their divergent interests 
and jurisdictions, to implement a coordinated plan. Until recently, administrators working 
 viii
at all levels of this organizational system tended to formulate doping policies with the 
idea of dampening the effects of public controversy. In addition, the influence of the Cold 
War on the Olympics exacerbated the situation, as national governments on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain, believing that success in the Olympic medals race was essential to their 
images abroad, condoned the use of ergogenic aids among elite competitors. It was not 
until Canadian track star Ben Johnson tested positive for an anabolic steroid after setting 
a new world record in the one-hundred meter sprint at the 1988 Seoul Games that a 
different policy direction was initiated. The involvement of national governments after 
the scandal led eventually to the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 
1999. The consolidation of regulatory authority in this agency has transformed the issue 
of doping in the Olympics from a combined political and scientific problem to one based 
more appropriately on the latter. 
 ix
Table of Contents 
Introduction..............................................................................................................1 
Chapter 1: Defining the Problem, 1960-1969........................................................14 
1964 Tokyo Olympic Games ........................................................................20 
Altitude Training as Doping .........................................................................24 
1968 Grenoble Winter Games ......................................................................37 
Gender Testing..............................................................................................40 
1968 Mexico City Olympic Games ..............................................................45 
Chapter 2: Nationalism Strikes, 1970-1979...........................................................55 
1972 Sapporo Winter Olympic Games .........................................................60 
1972 Munich Olympic Games ......................................................................65 
The Inter-Games Period................................................................................72 
1976 Montreal Olympic Games....................................................................80 
Legacy of the 1976 Montreal Games............................................................86 
Chapter 3: The Turning Point, 1980-1989.............................................................90 
1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid, New York ...........................................95 
1980 Moscow Olympic Games.....................................................................97 
Interim.........................................................................................................100 
1984 Los Angeles Games ...........................................................................103 
Legacy of the Los Angeles Games .............................................................111 
Crisis: The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.....................................................117 
The International Politics of Doping at Decade's End................................121 
Chapter 4: Towards a Unified Approach, 1990-1999 .........................................127 
The IOC Deals with East German Doping .................................................135 
Tentative Steps Towards a Global Strategy................................................138 
A New "Red" Threat ...................................................................................144 
1996 Atlanta Games....................................................................................149 
The Final Push for Unification ...................................................................152 
 x
Chapter 5: A New Century, 2000-2007 ..............................................................162 
2000 Sydney Olympic Games ....................................................................170 
Conflict in the United States .......................................................................173 
Post-Sydney Developments ........................................................................178 
2002 Salt Lake City Games ........................................................................185 
The Process of Political Unification ...........................................................191 
A New Governmental Interest in Doping ...................................................197 
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................199 
Appendix A: Doping Control for 1968 Olympic Games in Grenoble, France....203 
Appendix B: World Anti-Doping Agency 2007 Prohibited Substances List ......204 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................215 
Vita   ....................................................................................................................240 
 
 1
                                                
Introduction: 
On August 26, 1960, twenty-three year old Danish cyclist Knud Jensen, riding in 
the one-hundred kilometer team time trial in that year’s Rome Olympic Games, suddenly 
fell from his bike and fractured his skull on the pavement below. Several hours later, he 
died. The tragedy was at first attributed to a cerebral hemorrhage, thought to have been 
caused by heatstroke. The relatively mild temperatures that Friday—in the low-ninety 
degrees Fahrenheit—and the suspiciously similar collapse of two of Jensen’s teammates, 
though, raised questions among those who followed the event. Alberto Oberholzer, 
director of the hospital where the cyclists were taken for treatment, conjectured that “it 
seemed strange” that only the Danes had difficulty with the heat.1  
Others, however, were more informed regarding artificial performance-
enhancement among competitive cyclists. Michael Hiltner, an American competing in the 
race, called his mother and asserted that it was commonly known among the cyclists that 
chemical stimulants were being used by the Danish squad.2 Officials from the Olympic 
movement and the Danish cycling team at first denied such rumors. However, on Sunday 
August the 28th, Ferdinando Cocucci, Rome’s Deputy Attorney General, announced that 
an investigation would begin and that “authorities did not exclude the possibility” that the 
team had imbibed chemical substances.3 On the same day, a Danish newspaper reported 
that Oluf Jorgensen, trainer of the Danish Olympic cycling team, had admitted to 
providing the athletes with Roniacol, a peripheral vasodilator known to enhance blood 
 
1 “Inquiry to Last Several Weeks: Use of Roniacol is Blamed for Death of Knud Jensen in Olympic Bike 
Race,” New York Times, August 30, 1960. 
 
2 “L.A. Cyclist Says Other Nations Used Stimulants,” Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1960. 
 




                                                
circulation.4 Media reports of Jensen’s autopsy later asserted the presence of the drug, as 
well as an assortment of amphetamines documented to stimulate cardiac output and 
central nervous system drive.5
The use of performance-enhancing drugs was, of course, nothing new; in fact, the 
first known instance of Olympic doping occurred fifty-six years prior to Jensen’s death 
when Thomas Hicks, an American runner, ingested a mixture of strychnine, brandy, and 
raw eggs to win the marathon at the 1904 Games in St. Louis. Even then, the danger of 
drugs to the health of athletes was apparent. Hicks’s collapse at the finish line was 
described by a contemporary: “His eyes were dull, lusterless, the ashen color of his face 
and skin had deepened; his arms appeared as weights well tied down; he could scarcely 
lift his legs, while his knees were almost stiff.”6  
During the Cold War years, the imperatives of political prestige, under which the 
Olympic movement became a site of intense ideological rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, led to the development of highly sophisticated national sport 
systems.7 As part of this transformation, the science of athletic training underwent a 
 
4 “Trainer Says He Issued Cyclist Drug,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 29, 1960. 
 
5 Australian Broadcasting Corporation webpage, dated March 17, 2003: 
http://www.abc.net.au/cycling/items/s809238.htm (accessed November 21, 2006). A contemporaneous 
newspaper report disputes the findings of the autopsy: “Find No Drug in Olympics Cycling Death,” 
Chicago Daily Tribune, March 26, 1961.  The lack of substantive corroboration that Jensen ingested 
amphetamines is detailed in Verner Møller, “Knud Enemark Jensen’s Death During the 1960 Rome 
Olympics: A Search for Truth?,” Sport in History 25, no. 3 (December, 2005): 452-471. 
 
6 Charles Lucas quoted in Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games, 2nd ed. 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 27. 
 
7 For the American sport system, see Thomas M. Hunt, “Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympic 
Medals Race: The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 and American Athletics Policy Reform,” International 
Journal of the History of Sport 24 (June, 2007): 804-826; Wanda Ellen Wakefield, “Out in the Cold: 
Sliding Sports and the Amateur Sports Act of 1978,” International Journal of the History of Sport 24 (June, 
2007): 776-795; Thomas M. Hunt, “American Sport Policy and the Cultural Cold War: The Lyndon B. 
Johnson Presidential Years,” Journal of Sport History  (forthcoming, 2007). On the superpower rivalry in 
the Olympics, see Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games, 85-170; Allen Guttmann, 
“The Cold War and the Olympics,” International Journal XLIII (Autumn, 1988): 554-568; Thomas 
Michael Domer, “Sport in Cold War America, 1953-1963: The Diplomatic and Political Use of Sport in the 
 3
                                                                                                                                                
paradigm shift from prior notions of “fixed” human performance to new beliefs in terms 
of an expandable increase in athletic capacity. Over the following decades, this new 
environment, aided by chemical experiments during the Second World War, advanced to 
encompass the application of such substances as barbiturates, amphetamines, 
testosterone, and anabolic steroids to elite sport.8 By the 1960s, international athletics had 
become, as one scholar describes, a “vast, loosely coordinated experiment upon the 
human organism.”9  
Despite the pervasiveness of such experimentation, it took an event of such 
magnitude as a competitor’s death to induce Olympic policymakers to finally pay 
attention to the issue of doping, a problem that many drug-free participants in Olympic 
sport, such as American cyclist Michael Hiltner, suspected to be far larger than these 
officials wished to acknowledge. The subsequent efforts of Olympic officials in the 
1960s to deal with performance-enhancing drugs were negatively affected by four 
interrelated issues: 1) indifference among some International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
 
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Marquette University, 1976); Alfred Erich 
Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999), 83-246; Damion 
Thomas, “‘Is It Really Ever Just a Game?’” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 29, no. 3 (August, 2005): 
358-363. Connections between the Cold War and doping in sport are explored in Rob Beamish and Ian 
Ritchie, “Totalitarian Regimes and Cold War Sport: Steroid ‘Übermenschen’ and ‘Ball-Bearing Females’,” 
in East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War, ed. Stephen Wagg and David L. Andrews (New York: 
Routledge, 2007); Paul Dimeo, “Good Versus Evil?: Drugs, Sport and the Cold War,” in East Plays West: 
Sport and the Cold War, ed. Stephen Wagg and David L. Andrews (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
 
8 For a  brief, but useful history of the use of these substances in sport, see Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: 
Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, 2nd ed. (Strasbourg, Germany: Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2002), 33-59. On testosterone in particular, a good brief overview of its development 
for both sport and non-athletic purposes is found in John M. Hoberman and Charles E. Yesalis, “The 
History of Synthetic Testosterone,” Scientific American (February, 1995), 76-82. The Second World War 
also had a less direct influence on doping in terms of rumors that the Nazi regime “doped” members of the 
German military. See Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, “The Spectre of Steroids: Nazi Propaganda, Cold War 
Anxiety and Patriarchal Paternalism,” International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 5 (September, 
2005): 777-795. 
 
9 John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport (New 
York: Free Press, 1992), ix. Hoberman traces this concept from the German physician Wildor Hollmann, 
who claimed in 1986 that the past one-hundred years of Olympic sport was “a gigantic biological 
experiment carried out on the human organism” (p. 4). 
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members, 2) the scientific difficulty of detecting certain chemicals in the human body, 3) 
political problems related to the relatively uncoordinated international sport system, and 
4) ethical and scientific ambiguity as to the definition of “doping.” As a result, the use of 
dangerous ergogenic aids continued to spread while the IOC focused on regulating more 
innocuous practices such as training at high altitude.10 By the end of the decade, the 
consequent failures in Olympic doping policy would give rise to a circumstance in which, 
as stated by Sports Illustrated journalist Bil Gilbert, “The doctor and the chemist [would] 




Olympic officials knew about the use of performance-enhancing drugs in their 
competitions for at least a decade prior to Knud Jensen’s death. A 1951 issue of the 
International Olympic Committee’s regularly published Bulletin, for example, included a 
response by the International Rowing Federation to accusations that the Danish rowing 
team had used “poison” to win the 1950 European Championships. Protesting that it had 
no jurisdiction over the issue, the Federation went on to claim that the Association of 
Danish Doctors would determine whether the squad’s use of “a daily dose of three tablets 
 
10 The medical priorities of the Olympic community during this time are elaborated in Allan J. Ryan, “A 
Medical History of the Olympic Games,” Journal of the American Medical Association 205 (September 9, 
1968): 715-720. 
 
11 Quote from “Letter from the Publisher,” Sports Illustrated (June 23, 1969), 4. A more accessible source 
for this quote is Jan Todd and Terry Todd, “Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the 
Olympic Movement: 1960-1999,” in Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic 
Movement, ed. Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001), 70. See also Bil 
Gilbert, “Drugs in Sport: Problems in a Turned on World,” Sports Illustrated (June 23, 1969), 64-72; Bil 
Gilbert, “Drugs In Sport: Something Extra On the Ball,” Sports Illustrated (June 30, 1969), 31-32, 37-40; 
Bil Gilbert, “Drugs in Sport: High Time to Make Some Rules,” Sports Illustrated (July 7, 1969). 
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of Anrostin [sic] during twelve days can be considered as ‘doping’.”12 Olympic 
policymakers were by then also aware of a decision—as demonstrated by its publication 
in the Bulletin—by the International Boxing Federation to prohibit the administration 
“immediately before or during a contest of drugs or chemical substances not forming part 
of the normal diet of a boxer.”13 Rather than taking preventive action in light of these 
developments, the International Olympic Committee did nothing, and at the 1952 Winter 
Olympic Games several speedskaters became ill due to their excessive use of 
amphetamine stimulants.14 In addition, the surprisingly successful Soviet weightlifting 
team at that year’s Summer Games in Helsinki, Finland—the first in which the Soviets 
competed—prompted the dismayed American coach Bob Hoffman to publicly accuse its 
members of chemical enhancement: “I know they’re taking that hormone stuff to increase 
their strength.”15  
Hoffman’s suspicions were subsequently validated in a Viennese tavern during a 
break at the 1954 World Weightlifting Championships when a Soviet team physician 
“after a few drinks” informed his American counterpart, John Ziegler, that “some 
members of his team were using [the male hormone] testosterone” to add muscle mass. 
 
12 Gaston Mullegg and Henry Montandon, “The Danish Oarsman who took part in the European 
Championships at Milan in 1950; Were They Drugged?,” Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 
(July, 1951), 26. For this and other references to doping in the IOC Bulletin around this time, see also 
Alison Wrynn, “The Human Factor: Science, Medicine and the International Olympic Committee, 1900-
70,” Sport in Society 7, no. 2 (Summer, 2004): 217. A brief overview of early IOC doping policies is 
additionally provided in Raymond Gafner, ed., 1894-1994, The International Olympic Committee. One 
Hundred Years—The Idea—The Presidents—The Achievements, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Lausanne: International 
Olympic Committee, 1994), 165-167.  
 
13 “After the Congress of the Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur. About Boxing,” Bulletin du 
Comité International Olympique (September, 1951), 16. 
 
14 See Houlihan, Dying to Win, 34. 
 
15 Hoffman quoted in Elliott Almond, Julie Cart, and Randy Harvey, “Testing Has Not Stopped Use of 
Steroids in Athletics; Soviets Led the Way, but West Has Caught Up,” Los Angeles Times, January 29, 
1984. 
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The substance’s effects were stunning, according to Ziegler, to the point that it was 
apparent that the Soviets were “abusing the drugs heavily,” so that they were “having to 
get catheterized.”16 The episode intrigued Ziegler, and he began to experiment with 
synthetic testosterone upon his return to the United States. He took it himself and gave it 
to a small number of weightlifters in order to test its performance-enhancing effects. 
Although Ziegler soon abandoned his usage and dispensing of testosterone, his wishes for 
a new pharmacological agent were soon realized. In 1958, the CIBA pharmaceutical 
company announced the production of a new synthetic anabolic steroid, developed to 
help burn victims and geriatric patients.17 Given the trade name Dianabol, it had less 
androgenic side effects than testosterone but retained the desired anabolic benefits. Soon 
thereafter, Ziegler convinced three high-ranking U.S. weightlifters to begin using 
Dianabol, and all three experienced significant improvements in both strength and muscle 
mass. Following this success, the use of Dianabol spread rapidly among U.S. lifters and, 
from there, to other sports.18
Given the Cold War impetus for the United States to keep pace with its 
communist rivals in the Olympic medals race, a few American athletes may have joined 
their Soviet counterparts in the use of ergogenic substances. At the 1956 Summer Games 
in Melbourne (two years before the production of Dianabol), for example, it was rumored 
 
16 Ziegler quoted in John D. Fair, “Isometrics or Steroids? Exploring New Frontiers of Strength in the 
Early 1960s,” Journal of Sport History 20, no. 1 (Spring, 1993): 4. 
 
17 For these experiments, see Ibid.: 5-6. 
 
18 See Terry Todd, “A History of the Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” in Sport and Exercise Science: 
Essays in the History of Sports Medicine, ed. Jack W. Berryman and Roberta J. Park (Urbana; Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1992), 325-326. For a discussion of research regarding the removal of 
testosterone’s androgenic properties while keeping it’s anabolic benefits, see Charles D. Kochakian and 
Charles E. Yesalis, “Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids: A Historical Perspective and Definition,” in Anabolic 




                                                
among some of the competitors that several members of the United States track-and-field 
squad were using testosterone.19 Despite these reports, however, the various governing 
bodies that constituted the Olympic movement refused to take definitive steps to impede 
the proliferation of doping. Pope Pius XII, among others, condemned such practices, 
writing for the IOC Bulletin in February of 1956 that “one must deplore the error . . . of 
absorb[ing] gravely noxious substances. Such is the case when consuming highly 
stimulating drugs which . . . are looked upon as a kind of fraud by specialists.” Criticizing 
the tacit acceptance of ergogenic aids among the members of the Olympic community, 
the Pope concluded that “the responsibility of spectators, organisers and the press is very 
serious when they encourage this risky practice.”20
Although he protested after Knud Jensen’s death that “I’ve been connected with 
sports for 60 years, and I’d never considered such a thing,” IOC President Avery 
Brundage had, in fact, already been aware of the increasing use of amphetamines in elite 
athletics before its occurrence.21 In 1959, he met, at an American Medical Association 
session in Dallas, Texas, U.S. physician Dr. Henry Bercher, a professor at the prestigious 
Harvard School of Medicine. After receiving from Bercher several articles on the use of 
amphetamines by competitive athletes, Brundage, whose attention to ethical matters 
 
19 Richard W. Pound, Inside the Olympics: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the 
Glory of the Games (Etobicoke, Ont. [Canada]: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, 2004), 54-55. Pound was a 
member of the Canadian Olympic swimming team when he heard these rumors. He later became Vice-
President of the International Olympic Committee and is now President of the World Anti-Doping Agency. 
While head of the agency, Pound elaborated his moral conception of the doping problem in Dick [Richard 
W.] Pound, Inside Dope: How Drugs are the Biggest Threat to Sports, Why You Should Care, and What 
Can be Done About Them (Mississauga, Ontario [Canada]: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2006). 
 
20 H.H. Pius XII, “Let Us Condemn the Practice of Doping,” Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 
(February, 1956), 65.  For a larger analysis of doping in the 1950s, see also John Hoberman, 
“Amphetamine and the Four-Minute Mile,” Sport in History 26, no. 2 (August, 2006): 289-304. 
 
21 Brundage quoted in Paul Gardner, “Dope,” magazine clipping, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder 
“SP Medical Commission, IOC, 1966-1969,” p. 37. 
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traditionally centered on questions of amateurism rather than medical debates, responded 
by outlining the complicated international sports system that made any strategy for 
dealing with drugs nearly unmanageable. “When you inquire how we are going to solve 
this problem,” Brundage wrote in early 1960, “you pose a most difficult question. The 
initial responsibility is in the hands of the National Federations of a score or more sports 
in more than ninety countries. . . [among whom] there may be some who are 
unscrupulous.” Aggressive action, he continued, might only exacerbate the situation in 
that “if we inaugurate a campaign of education it may give ideas to the unscrupulous ones 
referred to above.”22  
While aware that pharmacological doping was occurring prior to 1960, members 
of the International Olympic Committee, believing the practice to be of relatively minor 
importance, refused to take measures against it. The drug-induced death of Knud Jensen 
in that year’s Rome Olympic Games forced Olympic leaders to revise this perspective. 
For most of the next decade, however, IOC officials avoided meaningful intervention, 
defaulting instead to restricted attempts to define and circumscribe the nature of the 
doping problem. Initiatives to create a universal policy approach for its solution were 
fundamentally lacking. Moreover, the IOC failed in asserting critical leadership 
responsibilities to mobilize the diffuse Olympic governance network to address the most 
critical policy issue in modern Olympic history. 
 
22 Avery Brundage to Henry Beecher, January 9, 1960, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP 
Medical IOC Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” The three articles that Beecher sent Brundage 
were: Allan J. Ryan, “Use of Amphetamines in Athletics (Guest Editorial),” Journal of the American 
Medical Association 170 (May 30, 1959): 562; Peter V.  Karpovich, “Effect of Amphetamine Sulfate on 
Athletic Performance,” Journal of the American Medical Association 170 (May 30, 1959): 558-561; Gene 
M. Smith and Henry K. Beecher, “Amphetamine Sulfate and Athletic Performance,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association 170 (May 30, 1959): 543-557. Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP 
Medical IOC Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” 
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The Olympic movement was (and still is) governed through a diffuse network of 
independent organizations, all of which have different interests, jurisdictions, and powers. 
While it is easy to mistake the Olympics as functioning under a hierarchical structure 
with the IOC at its apex, it is more accurate to conceptualize its governance system as a 
confederation of competing institutions.23 Until recently, administrators working at all 
levels of this organizational system tended to formulate doping policies with the idea of 
dampening the effects of public controversy. Meaningful reforms were consequently 
deferred while a series of scandals continued to plague the movement. At one time or 
another, members of nearly every organization in the international sports network were 
rumored to have participated in doping cover-ups. Due to the politicized nature of the 
movement during the Cold War, several national governments also became involved in 
the “medicalization” of the Games.  
During the 1970s, nationalist forces became an especially important factor in 
terms of the proliferation of drugs in the Olympics. The German Democratic Republic’s 
infamous Stasi secret police organization, for example, instituted a state-sponsored 
doping regime that administered dangerous performance-enhancing substances to some 
 
23 The fragmented framework under which Olympic doping policies were promulgated prior to the creation 
of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 1999 was best put by Valparaiso law professor Michael S. 
Straubel. Olympic drug regulations, as he described it, were the products of a “Byzantine and dysfunctional 
world of anti-doping control.” Quoted from Michael S. Straubel, “Doping Due Process: A Critique of the 
Doping Control Process in International Sport,” Dickinson Law Review 106 (Winter 2002): 531. The 
complex nature of the international sport system allowed this diffuse doping control system to develop. The 
Olympic governance structure with the IOC at its apex is described by Christopher R. Hill, a specialist in 
the international politics of sport, as “akin to a multinational corporation in which a great deal of work is 
left to the various national companies.” “There exists,” he continues, “a creative tension between the three 
permanent legs of the Olympic milking stool [the IOC, National Olympic Committees, and international 
federations].” Christopher R. Hill, “The Politics of the Olympic Movement,” in The Changing Politics of 
Sport, ed. Lincoln Allison (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 87, 89. For the many different 
bodies that comprise the international sport system, consult James E. Thomas and Laurence Chalip, eds., 
Sport Governance in the Global Community (Morgantown, W.Va.: Fitness Information Technology, 1996). 
See also Barrie Houlihan, Sport and International Politics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994). As its 
title would suggest, the narrower topic of politics within the Olympic movement is discussed in Christopher 
R. Hill, Olympic Politics, 2nd ed. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996). 
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10,000 East German athletes, sometimes without their knowledge. The often obvious use 
of ergogenic aids by these competitors called attention to the need for more rigorous 
doping regulations. While several progressive steps were subsequently taken during the 
decade—including the institution of anabolic steroid testing at the 1976 Montreal 
Games—Olympic officials were unable to overcome the political obstacles imposed by 
the movement’s diffuse organizational framework. Indeed, although the restricted IOC 
regulatory approach produced a number of positive drug test screenings at its events, 
efforts at reform within the elite sports establishment remained relatively ineffective until 
the late-1980s.  
What political scientists called a “focusing event” occurred, however, when 
Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson failed a screen for anabolic steroids after setting a new 
world record in the one-hundred meter sprint at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.24 An 
investigation of the episode by the Canadian national government worried Olympic 
leaders that their movement might be subjected to unwanted political intrusions unless 
meaningful steps were taken to resolve the predicament. Due perhaps only to the tangible 
threat of direct governmental involvement, momentum finally built over the course of the 
next decade for the creation of an independent agency to oversee international doping 
policy. With the assistance of both national governments and private sport bodies, the 
World Anti-Doping Agency was created in November 1999 with the aim of 
implementing a universal drug regulation strategy. In order to maintain its autonomy 
from the IOC and the other members of the Olympic community, the new agency 
undertook a difficult process of consolidating power over the subject for most of the next 
decade. Although challenges remain, the approach has been modestly successful in 
 
24 An excellent description of focusing events is provided in John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and 
Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 94-100. 
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initiating a change in the nature of the policy dilemma. Having historically been a 
combined scientific, ethical, and political dilemma, obstacles to the elimination of doping 
in the Olympics are becoming less restrained by organizational inertia. 
As I sought to understand the nature of this policy problem, my research indicated 
that no comprehensive, archival source-based history of the evolution of Olympic doping 
policy had been undertaken. The first scholarly assessment of doping in athletics was 
provided by Terry Todd in a 1987 article that appeared in the Journal of Sport History. 
Entitled, “Anabolic Steroids: The Gremlins of Sport,” this assessment called attention to 
the early development of performance-enhancing substances and their subsequent 
incorporation into competitive athletics.25 In 1992, conceptions of modern sport were 
deeply affected by the publication of John Hoberman’s Mortal Engines. In that volume, 
Hoberman argued that although it was considered by many as a “pure” exception to 
everyday life, contemporary athletics had in fact embraced the high-performance values 
of the larger society in which it was situated.26 Eleven years later, Hoberman continued 
his analysis in Testosterone Dreams, which demonstrated the degree to which 
pharmacological innovations have been embraced by humanity as means to enhance 
physical and mental functioning.27 In narrower studies, Charles E. Yesalis provided a 
wealth of information to scholars with regard to the range of issues associated with 
doping in sport, including their physiological effects and the technology of drug testing.28 
 
25 Terry Todd, “Anabolic Steroids: The Gremlins of Sport,” Journal of Sport History 14, no. 1 (Spring, 
1987): 87-107. See also Todd, “A History of the Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport.” 
 
26 Hoberman, Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport. 
 
27 John M. Hoberman, Testosterone Dreams: Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005). 
 
28 Charles E. Yesalis, ed., Anabolic Steroids in Sport and Exercise, 2nd ed. (Champaign, IL: Human 




                                                
Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse’s 2001 edited collection, Doping in Elite Sport, 
included several insightful articles concerning drugs in the Olympics; among these, a 
historical timeline compiled by Jan and Terry Todd—which included references to the 
most significant events in the evolution of Olympic doping regulation—is especially 
deserving of praise.29 All of these works, though, do not systematically incorporate 
archival research into their analyses. The literature on drugs in athletics, while thus 
excellent in some cases, has been limited temporally or by a lack of access to important 
archival sources of information with respect to the development of doping policies in the 
Olympic movement. This dissertation documents the course of that history since 1960, 
integrating available archival records. It thus complements the earlier, path-breaking 
works that collectively provided the intellectual stimulation for this study.  
Appreciating the opportunities that the gaps in the existing historiography 
afforded, I initiated a research strategy that took me to documentary collections located 
both within the United States and abroad. These included the International Olympic 
Committee’s Library and Archives in Lausanne, Switzerland, the United States Olympic 
Committee Library in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and the Todd-McLean Physical 
Culture Collection and the personal research archive of Professor John Hoberman at the 
University of Texas at Austin. The first of these also provided access to microfilm copies 
of the Avery Brundage Collection, the actual documents of which are held at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Finally, the Foundation Board of the World 
Anti-Doping Agency provided an enormous gift to researchers when it decided to publish 
online the meeting minutes of the new agency. 
 
29 Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse, eds., Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic 
Movement (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001); Todd and Todd, “Significant Events in the History of 
Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement,” 65-128.  
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The originality of this work is thus at least partially due to its integration of under-
utilized documentary records within the existing body of scholarship that concerns 
doping in the Olympics. Accordingly, this study sheds fresh light on the fragmented 
Olympic governance structure that hampered efforts to deal with the problem, and the 
delays induced by organizational failure to assume the leadership required for its 
resolution. Nevertheless, like most attempts at history, my efforts to elucidate the course 
of Olympic doping policy over the last five decades fall short of providing a definitive, 
complete analysis. Despite my access to a substantial body of primary archival 
information, there are gaps in the historical record that are unlikely to be filled anytime 
soon. What I hope to have produced, then, is the fullest account possible with the 
information that is available. I look forward to reading further contributions to the subject 
written by scholars with additional resources made accessible at some future point.
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Ch. 1: Defining the Problem, 1960-1969 
By February 1960, the problem of exogenous performance-enhancement had 
become so acute that IOC President Avery Brundage felt it necessary to address the issue 
in an International Olympic Committee meeting in San Francisco. He related the 
disturbing “use in certain sport circles” of a pharmacological agent called “Amphetamine 
Sulfate,” which, he continued, “is nothing else but a dope or a drug.”1 IOC delegate Bo 
Ecklund suggested a rigorous scientific investigation of the issue. However, the 
committee ignored the recommendation in favor of a more modest proposal. The IOC’s 
decision on the question of doping was thus that the members of the committee, few of 
whom had any medical training, should “speak of this matter in their respective 
countries”; no further actions were specified.2  
After Danish cyclist Knud Jensen’s death on August 26, 1960, in the Rome 
Olympics, however, the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee 
became slightly more attentive to the danger posed by unregulated doping. Meeting in 
Rome fifteen days after the cyclist’s collapse, members of the group asserted that the 
Olympic movement “deplores deeply the death of a Danish cyclist competing in the 
 
1 Minutes of the 56th General Session of the International Olympic Committee, February 1960, San 
Francisco, California, International Olympic Committee Library, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter IOCL), 
p. 9. For the point concerning Brundage’s focus on amateurism rather than doping, see Allen Guttmann, 
The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984), 123. 
 
2 Jan Todd and Terry Todd, “Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic 
Movement: 1960-1999,” in Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, ed. 
Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001), 66. The Todds mention that 
IOC member Bo Eklund proposed a rigorious investigation in their study. This is based on Wolf Lyberg (a 
former IOC member), The IOC Sessions: 1956-1988, Volume 2—A Study Made by Wolf Lyberg, Former 
Secretary General of the NOC of Sweden, n.d., p. 46. The official minutes of the meeting, however, do not 
mention this claim. The IOC’s request is articulated in Minutes of the 56th General Session of the 
International Olympic Committee, February 1960, San Francisco, California, International Olympic 
Committee Library, Lausanne, Switzerland, p. 9. 
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present Games.” Perhaps more importantly, they also worried about the effects of the 
fatality on the prestige of the Olympic movement. Brundage was particularly displeased 
by the public relations dilemma that ensued after Jensen was posthumously awarded a 
gold medal.3 The Board, attempting to make up for this lapse in judgment, therefore 
called for punitive measures (notably by some other, undefined organization) because 
“the responsible parties ought to be penalized.” As for the International Olympic 
Committee, the Board simply asked its Danish national counterpart for a report on the 
situation so that a definitive decision could be made sometime in the future.4 Beyond this 
limited response, however, nothing else was done to address the growing problem of 
doping in 1960. This lack of meaningful action was, in fact, to become a familiar pattern 
in the IOC’s approach to doping over the next five decades. 
Over a year later, convening in Athens in June of 1961, the Executive Board 
finally revisited the problem when Comte Jean de Beaumont, an International Olympic 
Committee delegate from France, argued that the Olympic movement needed some form 
of policy toward performance-enhancing drugs so that future deaths among its athletes 
could be prevented. The Board accordingly agreed to submit to the upcoming General 
Session of the International Olympic Committee the question of whether a doping control 
system should be established.5 In that meeting, President Brundage again referred to the 
seriousness of the situation, and asserted that “sanctions should be applied.” However, in 
a statement that would foreshadow much of the future debate on the issue, he further 
argued that the International Olympic Committee should first decide exactly what 
 
3 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, November 10, 1960, referenced in Alison Wrynn, “The Human Factor: 
Science, Medicine and the International Olympic Committee, 1900-70,” Sport in Society 7, no. 2 (Summer, 
2004): 218. 
 
4 Minutes of the Meetings of the I.O.C. Executive Board, September 10, 1960, Rome, Italy, IOCL, p. 3. 
 
5 Minutes of the Executive Board, June 15, 1961, Athens, Greece, IOCL, p. 2. 
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“constitutes a doping.”6 In January 1962, believing that he needed help from medical 
experts to resolve confusion over the definition, he wrote to International Olympic 
Committee Chancellor Otto Mayer that “the problem of ‘doping’ is not a simple one and 
we must have professional advice on where to draw the line. This is a difficult problem. I 
shall appoint a subcommittee of doctors . . . to deal with the subject.”7
Brundage’s decision to seek help from the scientific community was prudent; a 
successful businessman with extensive experience in Olympic governance, he 
nevertheless lacked the medical training requisite to a knowledgeable stance on doping 
issues. As for his moral compass regarding the subject, Brundage was deeply committed 
to the transnational ideals of the Olympic movement. For him, the Olympics were akin to 
a universal religion through which international peace could be accomplished by means 
of athletic competition. This conviction that inclusion in the movement was essential to 
global harmony even led him to oppose the U.S. campaign to boycott the 1936 “Nazi 
Olympics” while head of the American Olympic Association.8 Brundage’s philosophical 
rigidity combined with an interpersonal style that many thought to be overbearing, 
though, begged an important question: would the IOC President understand the ethical 
threat of doping to his cherished movement? The result of these attributes was that 
Brundage failed to appreciate the saliency of the doping issue relative to other 
organizational and political issues that he perceived as requiring more immediate 
attention. As a consequence, he in effect pushed doping regulation downward in the 
 
6 Minutes of the General Session of the International Olympic Committee, June 1961, Athens, Greece, 
IOCL, p. 3. 
 
7 Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, January 8, 1962, quoted in Wrynn, “The Human Factor: Science, 
Medicine and the International Olympic Committee, 1900-70,” 218. 
 
8 For Brundage’s involvement in the American debate over a 1936 boycott, consult Carolyn Marvin, 
“Avery Brundage and American Participation in the 1936 Olympic Games,” Journal of American Studies 
16, no. 1 (April, 1982): 81-105. 
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diffuse Olympic governance structure at the expense of a meaningful, centrally-initiated 
IOC regulatory approach.9
In March 1962, the International Olympic Committee agreed to create a new 
doping subcommittee, with Dr. Arthur Porritt, then President of the Royal College of 
Surgeons of England, as its head. The group, it was suggested, would coordinate its 
activities with the Fédération Internationale Médicine Sportive (FIMS), a body with 
which the IOC had remained loosely affiliated since it had been “officially recognized” 
by the Olympics in 1952.10 The choice of Porritt was, however, deeply flawed; at the 
IOC session in St. Moritz in 1948, he had argued against any involvement by the IOC 
with questions of a medical or scientific nature. “Any direct action in this connection,” he 
believed, “would but lead the Committee into spheres where it is neither justified nor 
equipped to enter. . . . As a corporate body we have neither the right nor the machinery to 
play any direct or practical part.”11 In addition, the subcommittee initially received little 
organizational support from the IOC, causing Chancellor Mayer, writing to two of its 
members, to warn that “there will be some difficulties for you to meet as you all live in 
different parts of the world.”12  
Porritt, in one of his few accomplishments as part of the committee, responded by 
appointing to the group Dr. Pierre Krieg, who as a resident of the Olympic movement’s 
 
9 The best biography of Brundage is Guttmann, The Games Must Go On. This work provides particularly 
excellent discussions of his philosophy regarding sport. 
 
10 Original in French. Proces-Verbal de la réunion de la Commission Exécutive du C.I.O avec la 
Commission d’Amateurisme, March, 3, 1962, Lausanne, Switzerland, IOCL, p. 3. For more on the IOC’s 
relationship with the FIMS, see Wrynn, “The Human Factor: Science, Medicine and the International 
Olympic Committee, 1900-70,” 213. 
 
11 Arthur Porritt, “Report on a Proposed Scientific Congress Regarding Medical Sporting Questions,” IOC 
General Session, January 1948, St. Moritz, Switzerland, quoted in Ibid. 
 
12 Otto Mayer to Kyotaro Asuma and Arthur Porritt, March 12, 1962, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, 
Folder “SP Medical IOC Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” 
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home city of Lausanne, Switzerland, would allow him to “keep a closer contact with the 
chancellery of the I.O.C.”13 Even this modest act, however, indirectly served to 
demonstrate Porritt’s weakness. IOC Chancellor Mayer had actually initiated the 
appointment by suggesting to the British physician that Krieg might be useful for this 
role. “I can assure you that he is a clever man,” Mayer wrote, “and he might do a good 
work [sic].” “He [rather than you,] could report straight to us and it would give a stronger 
contact between the IOC, and your commission.”14 Mayer was also dismayed by Porritt’s 
decision to skip the IOC General Session in June of 1962, writing to him, “As you are not 
coming to Moscow, it is of no use to call a meeting there.” The Chancellor, in addition, 
conflated Porritt’s individual indifference with two other components of the IOC’s 
enervated approach to doping in the 1960s: a perception of the issue as one of image 
management rather than of a medical or ethical problem, and a preference that other 
organizations should bear most of the responsibility for its curtailment. “Something must 
be done as quickly as possible so that we can show to the World . . . that the I.O.C. does 
something,” he said. “It will be also a great help to the International Federations” in 
formulating policies for the use of performance-enhancing drugs among their athletes.15  
Porritt’s ambivalence towards doping was further demonstrated when he missed 
the IOC General Session in Moscow; a colleague of his on the doping subcommittee, Dr. 
Ferreira Santos, took his place in submitting a report to the body.16 Porritt’s subsequent 
 
13 Otto Mayer to the Members of the Commission of Doping, April 21, 1962, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 
99, Folder “SP Medical IOC Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.”  
 
14 Mayer to Porritt, April 12, 1962, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical IOC 
Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” 
 
15 Mayer to Porritt, April 3, 1962, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical IOC 
Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” 
 
16 Minutes of the General Session of the International Olympic Committee, June 1962, Moscow, Soviet 
Union, IOCL, p. 4. 
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inactivity did little to further persuade Olympic policymakers of his commitment. Mayer 
wrote angrily on September 27, 1962, “Since our Moscow Session where we have elected 
a special commission on Doping, of which you are President, we have not heard 
anything! Would you kindly let me know when you expect to send us a report from the 
Commission.”17 In late October—nearly a month later—Porritt meekly responded, “Here 
I am, at last, with many apologies . . . but I have just returned” from two extensive tours 
of Africa and the United States. “This is the sort of thing,” he continued, “that has made it 
quite impossible for me to do much about the Doping Commission.” Despite these 
limitations, however, Porritt was willing, though reluctant, to “do what I can as soon as I 
can, but I really have very little spare time these days.” He therefore suggested that a 
colleague on the commission, Dr. Agustín Sosa, “who seems to have shown some 
interest,” should take his place as chairman and that the IOC should “see what he can 
do.”18
The continuing inaction on the part of Porritt caused some dissonance among the 
IOC leadership, which had wanted something done before the 1964 Games began in 
Tokyo to define the concept of doping. Brundage wrote Porritt that “inasmuch as Dr. 
Santos has already assembled some material and brought in a partial report I think we 
should ask him to head the Commission.”19 The President’s willingness to seek a 
 
17 Otto Mayer to Sir Arthur Porritt, September 27, 1962, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP 
Medical IOC Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” 
 
18 Porritt to Mayer, October, 23, 1962, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical IOC 
Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” Referring again to his commitment to other concerns, 
Porritt later wrote to Brundage that “it is good of you to let me off my Chairmanship of the Doping 
Commission but I really have tried to find time to do this but, at the moment, am just stymied.” Porritt to 
Brundage, November 5, 1962, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical IOC Amphetamines 
Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” Given Porritt’s stance to scientific questions and Brundage’s reluctance to 
deal with doping issues, one wonders whether the IOC president chose Porritt for the chairmanship of the 
new commission in order to slow policy development on the subject. 
 
19 Avery Brundage to Porritt, November 1, 1962, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical 
IOC Amphetamines Used in Athletics, 1937-1969.” 
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replacement seemed justified when a conclusive report by the doping commission finally 
appeared in a 1963 issue of the IOC Bulletin under Santos’s name rather than Porritt’s. 
Despite the shortcomings of the British physician, though, the article provided a starting-
point for coming to grips with the problem; doping, according to the report, could be 
defined as:  
 
An illegal procedure used by certain athletes, in the form of drugs; physical means 
and exceptional measures which are used by small groups in a sporting 
community in order to alter positively or negatively the physical or physiological 
capacity of a living creature, man or animal in competitive sport.20
 
Of course, the inclusion of performance-inhibition as well as enhancement, in 
addition to vague terminology with regard to “physical means” and “exceptional 
measures,” left substantial room for interpretation. Most importantly, the definition was 
not tied to a formal regulatory policy under the auspices of the IOC. 
 
1964 TOKYO OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
Nearly simultaneous with the report’s publication, Brundage again argued that the 
international federations that governed the various sports in the Olympic movement—and 
not the IOC—should hold primary responsibility for promulgating doping policies. This 
philosophy of dispersed responsibility for doping regulation exemplified Brundage’s 
powerful influence over IOC decision-making during his twenty-year term as president of 
the body. Writing to Mayer, he urged the IOC leadership that “it would be better for us to 
 
 
20 J. Ferreira Santos and Mario de Carvalho Pini, “Doping,” Bulletin du Comité International Olympique 
(February, 1963), 56. 
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cooperate with organizations more competent to treat on the subject of ‘doping’ than we 
are.”21 This went against recommendations issued by the European Council on Doping 
and the Biological Preparation of the Athlete Taking Part in Competitive Sports. In 
January 1963, this latter assembly of biologists, lawyers, sports leaders, athletes, 
physicians, pharmacists, and journalists, convening in the casino of Uriage, France, 
developed what it felt was a “reasonable and realistic anti-doping plan of battle.” Calling 
first for the creation of an “International Commission” on doping, the Council insisted 
that “it is urgent and vital that an international body should examine the matter 
thoroughly and standardize the rules governing sport in the different countries.” The use 
of performance-enhancing drugs, furthermore, constituted “an infringement of rights or 
offence in sport,” which could, despite a few contrary opinions, be successfully curtailed 
in that “there are efficacious means of detecting the use of artificial stimulants.”22
Nevertheless, the International Olympic Committee continued to insist upon its 
lack of jurisdiction and to argue that the international and national sports federations were 
the only organizations that could address the issue. In November of 1963, the Committee 
pronounced that “the main struggle is only just beginning, and it will intensify . . . by 
reason of the comprehension and the severity of the sporting federations.”23 However, 
several months later, and increasingly aware that this posture was doing little to help the 
image of the Games, IOC members again deliberated the matter in Innsbruck, Austria, at 
their sixty-first General Session. Bo Ekelund, again framing the problem as a public 
 
21 Brundage to Mayer, February 26, 1963, quoted in Wrynn, “The Human Factor: Science, Medicine and 
the International Olympic Committee, 1900-70,” 218. 
 
22 “The Anti-Doping Battle is Making Good Progress,” Bulletin du Comité International Olympique (May, 
1963), 43-44.  See also Todd and Todd, “Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the 
Olympic Movement,” 67. 
 
23 “Doping, the International Olympic Committee and the Press,” Bulletin du Comité International 
Olympique (November, 1963), 60. 
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relations issue, suggested that “in order to stop Press reports about athletes doping, blood 
tests could be taken in suspicious cases.” With Santos’s death, the doping sub-committee, 
once again hindered by the ineffectual leadership of Porritt, had, however, not done 
enough work to submit even a partial report on its progress. Chairman Porritt instead 
stated that “it was a little too soon to comment on the question. Probably the next year 
there would be great benefits forthcoming from proved medical advice.”24
This attitude of non-urgency by the sub-committee on doping led, of course, to 
little policy development on the issue of ergogenic aids prior to the 1964 Tokyo Games. 
A limited number of chemical analyses were conducted in the cycling events at those 
Games so that Porritt and the International Olympic Committee Executive Board could—
somewhat to their own surprise—claim that “it seems that tests have been made in 
Tokyo.”25 These tests, as later explained by American track and field star Harold 
Connolly, though, were ineffective in curtailing doping at the Games. In a 1973 Senate 
hearing, he recalled that his roommate on the squad brought his own drugs, which were 
“boldly presented . . . to the medical staff of the team, they placed the drug in their 
refrigerator and the team nurse gave him the injections. . . . [O]ur Olympic medical staff 
were really not very concerned with what he was receiving.”26
Still, however tentative it may have been, this was the first instance of concrete 
action taken to combat doping in the Olympic movement. The choice of cycling for 
targeted tests, it should be mentioned, was even quite perceptive in that the sport was 
 
24 Minutes of the IOC General Session, January 1964, Innsbruck, Austria, IOCL, p. 12-13. 
 
25 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, October 16, 
1964, Tokyo, Japan, IOCL, p. 1. 
 
26 United States Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 56, Section 12. Investigative Hearings on the Proper and Improper 
Use of Drugs by Athletes, Ninety Third Congress, First Session, June 18, July 12, 13, 1973 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 274. 
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perhaps the Olympic sport most overrun by performance-enhancing drugs in this era. The 
International Cycling Union and its head, President Rodini, were, of course displeased 
with the protocol, and a series of complaints were quickly fired off to Brundage.27 The 
surprisingly confident head of the IOC, however, reminded the Executive Board of the 
perils of doping in terms of “the degradation of sport,” and asserted that “any degrated 
[sic] sport would be expelled from the Games.”28
At the accompanying IOC General Session in Tokyo, Porritt exhibited greater 
attention to the matter. He suggested that the delegates should construct and implement 
four interconnected policies: it should, first, issue a formal declaration denouncing the 
use of any performance-enhancing drug; second, create regulations that would allow 
“sanctions against any [National Olympic Committee] or any person who directly or 
indirectly promoted the use of drugs”; third, insist that those committees require their 
athletes to submit to “an examination at any time”; and finally, append to the application 
forms for Olympic participation the clause, “I do not use drugs, and hereby declare that I 
am prepared to submit to any examination that may be thought necessary.” After further 
declaring his belief that a team of medical practitioners should attend future Games “to 
carry out very precise and very rapid examinations,” Porritt, in a slight departure from 
previous statements by Brundage calling for their sole power over the topic, suggested 
that “the International Federations should also be asked for their support.” The attendees 
thereafter unanimously condemned the practice of doping, and called for the Executive 
 
27 See Wrynn, “The Human Factor: Science, Medicine and the International Olympic Committee, 1900-
70,” 219. 
 
28 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, October 16, 
1964, Tokyo, Japan, IOCL, p. 1. 
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Board to incorporate their decision into “a more precise text for the rules of eligibility” 
for participation in the Olympics.29
 
ALTITUDE TRAINING AS DOPING 
 
By the 1964 General Session in Tokyo, an additional factor had been added to the 
debate on medical ethics within the Olympic movement: high-altitude physiology.30 At 
an IOC meeting the previous year, questions were asked about the potential difficulties 
that athletes might face should Mexico City, situated nearly 7,500 feet above sea level, be 
awarded the 1968 Summer Olympic Games. The Mexican delegation attempted to allay 
such concerns by questioning their scientific basis and by promising to reimburse athletes 
for the expenses of acclimatization.31 In Tokyo, General José de J. Clark Flores, 
chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Mexico City Olympic Games, again 
criticized those who argued that altitude would impede the Games, claiming that their 
worries were “just a question of prejudice.” “No accidents had ever been recorded” 
among those performing at high altitudes, the General argued, and, in the unlikely event 
 
29 Minutes of the 62nd International Olympic Committee General Session, October 1964, Tokyo, Japan, 
IOCL, p. 11. 
 
30 For a monograph on the subject, see Alison M. Wrynn, “‘A Debt Was Paid Off in Tears’: Science, IOC 
Politics and the Debate about High Altitude in the 1968 Mexico City Olympics,” International Journal of 
the History of Sport 23, no. 7 (November, 2006): 1152-1172. Ethicists, physicians, and policymakers 
continue to debate the connection between altitude training and doping, especially after “artificial” hypoxic 
environments began to be used. For a medical argument against defining their use as doping, see Benjamin 
D. Levine, “[Editorial] Should ‘Artificial’ High Altitude Environments be Considered Doping?,” 
Scandanavian Journal of Medicine and Science in Sports 16, no. 5 (October, 2006): 297-301. For a recent 
review of how altitude training increases athletic performance, see Aurelie Gaudard et al., “[Review 
Article] Drugs for Increasing Oxygen Transport and Their Potential Use in Doping: A Review,” Sports 
Medicine 33, no. 32003): 191-193. For a philosophical argument against altitude training—or any other 
technique—as doping, see J. Salvulescu, B. Foddy, and M. Clayton, “Why We Should Allow Performance 
Enhancing Drugs in Sport,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 38, no. 6 (December, 2004): 666-670. 
 
31 Minutes of the 60th International Olympic Committee General Session, October 1963, Lausanne, 
Switzerland, IOCL, p. 6. 
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that they did become sick, “after a few days, athletes were [and would be] perfectly 
alright.”32
The other contenders for the Games—Lyon, France; Detroit; and Buenos Aires, 
Argentina—were, like Mexico City, asked a series of questions relating to “size, 
population, climate, [and] altitude.” In response, Buenos Aires emphasized that it was 
conveniently situated at sea level.33 Taking a firm stance against this implied criticism, 
the Mexicans argued in their own Bid Book that the elevation of their proposed site for 
the athletic competitions would pose only a “harmless effect . . . on the athlete’s 
cardiopulmonary capacity, even though they come from lower altitudes.”34 When the 
time came for a decision as to whom would host the XIXth Olympiad, General Clark 
again assured the IOC delegates that Mexico City’s altitude would pose little problem 
and that the city would pay any expense associated with acclimatization. In the end, Clark 
was successful in his efforts, and at the 60th IOC General Session in Baden-Baden, 
Germany, the Mexican capital was awarded the rights to the Games after receiving thirty 
out of a possible fifty-eight votes.35
American sport officials remained worried, however, about the potential 
detrimental effects of Mexico City’s altitude upon the performance of their athletes. Jim 
Swarts, a delegate of the United States Olympic Committee from the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, believed that in terms of the application of medicine and science to 
sports, “the foreign nations apparently are quite a step ahead of us in this regard.” He 
 
32 Minutes of the 62nd International Olympic Committee General Session, October 1964, Tokyo, Japan, 
IOCL, p. 11. 
 
33 Wrynn, “‘A Debt Was Paid Off in Tears’: Science, IOC Politics and the Debate about High Altitude in 
the 1968 Mexico City Olympics,” 1156. 
 
34 Quoted in Ibid. 
 
35 Minutes of the 60 th International Olympic Committee General Session, October 1963, Baden-Baden, 
Germany, IOCL, p. 6. 
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therefore recommended that the committee consult a certain physician who, he explained, 
“is an expert on the effects of altitude on athletes, and has the science down to the point, 
he can predict who is going to win.”36 Later, Harry McPhee, a physician who, according 
to USOC President Kenneth L. Wilson, “guided us with great skill through a number of 
Olympiads,” warned that “I don’t know whether you gentlemen understand the problem 
we will have there is one of oxygen and oxygen is the one element which the body can’t 
store.”37 After one delegate concluded that “it seems to be mandatory that we do 
everything we can to in [sic] further experiments and research under conditions most 
closely similar to those . . . in Mexico City,” a number of alternatives were discussed.38 
These included involvement with a number of projects concerning sports medicine then 
underway; as put by Swarts, “when it comes to the research side of it in todays [sic] 
situation you might as well argue against motherhood and the American flag.”39
As for the relationship of high-altitude training with doping, the USOC leadership 
asked one of its delegates, physician Daniel Hanley, about “any medicine available that 
will facilitate adaption [sic]” to altitude. Responding that “there is one that may, as a 
matter of fact,” Hanley cautioned against over-optimism with regard to such an approach 
because “this part of the adaptation would be this much [a small part] in the total scheme 
. . . and we have not [yet] translated the use of these drugs into the human blood.”40 In 
 
36 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States Olympic Committee, May 3-4, 
1964, New York City, United States Olympic Committee Library and Archives (hereafter USOCLA), pp. 
55, 54. 
 
37 Wilson and McPhee quoted in Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States 
Olympic Committee, March 22-23, 1965, New York, USOCLA, p. 73. 
 
38 Mr. Sober quoted in Ibid., p. 82. 
 
39 Minutes of the USOC Board of Directors, May 8, 1965, no location given, USOCLA, p. 98. 
 
40 Minutes of the USOC Board of Directors, October 25-26, New York, USOCLA, p. 66. 
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addition, IOC officials, who were increasingly wary of the chemical and scientific steps 
being proposed to accommodate to Mexico City’s location, devised a policy that 
restricted such efforts. At an IOC meeting in Rome, Lord David Burghley, the Marquess 
of Exeter, proposed a rule stating that “in order to achieve fairness as far as possible 
between competitors, no athletes other than those who normally live at such heights, shall 
train specially at high altitudes more than 6 weeks up to the start of their event, in the last 
three months before the Games.” “To break this rule,” Burghley continued in a statement 
of incredible naiveté, “would be a gross breach of good sportsmanship and it is sure that 
no-one . . . would wish in any way to be guilty of taking an unfair advantage over other 
competitors.”41  
In light of the apparent connection between altitude physiology and medicine, it 
was somewhat odd, however, that the IOC leadership chose to address altitude training as 
an issue of amateurism rather than as a medical problem; the doping sub-committee, 
observing simply that “the Commission notes with interest this decision,” had nothing to 
do with the topic.42 Under the Olympic regulations in force at the time, no athlete could 
leave work to train for more than four weeks a year and still compete in the Games. 
Seeing some sense in applying this standard to the question of high-altitude preparation, 
IOC delegates, meeting in Rome during the spring of 1966, revised Burghley’s rule and 
announced that Olympians could train at altitude for only one month prior to the Mexico 
 
41 Proposal signed by Marquess of Exeter, Box 82: IOC Meetings, 1966, Folder “Proposal by Marquess of 
Exeter: Training at High Altitudes, 1966,” Avery Brundage Papers. 
 
42 Agenda of the Meeting of the IOC Medical Commission, December 20, 1967, Lausanne, Switzerland, 
quoted in Wrynn, “The Human Factor: Science, Medicine and the International Olympic Committee, 1900-
70,” 221. There was, it should be mentioned, one exception to this generalization: a February 1967 article 
by Medical Commission member Albert Dirix addressed high-altitude physiology. Albert Dirix, “The 
Problems of Altitude and Doping in Mexico,” Bulletin du Comité International Olympique (February, 
1967), 43-46. 
 28
                                                
City Games.43 His enthusiasm for intensive altitude training thus somewhat dampened, 
Douglas Roby, after replacing Wilson as the USOC president, disappointedly stated that 
the rule “moulds or somewhat shapes our thinking as to what we are going to do in 
preparation for the Mexico City Games.”44 Still, he said later, “I don’t think there is 
going to be any policing on this. . . . I don’t think anybody will be penalized.”45
Given the context of the Olympics within the larger international environment of 
the Cold War, western countries also became increasingly suspicious that communist-
bloc scientists were seeking the type of physiological edge that the Marquess of Exeter 
was trying to combat. In April of 1967, the London Observer reported that despite 
official pronouncements to the contrary by Konstantin Andranov, president of the 
national Olympic committee of the USSR, the Soviets were running a high altitude 
training facility deep within the Tien Shan Mountains in Western Kyrgyzstan. Directed 
by Leningrad’s Central Institute of Physical Culture, psychologists, physiologists, and, 
most ominously, pharmacologists worked to determine an optimal system of high-altitude 
preparation. Performance-enhancing drugs, it seems, were a central part of its operation. 
As revealed by Felix Talyshev, Secretary of the Institute, “We must,” in addition to 
normal athletic training, “also pay attention to pharmacological preparations.” A Russian 
newspaper was also cited as stating that “there lies a grain of truth in the saying that 
Mexico will be the scientists’ and not the athletes’ Olympic Games.” It was thus 
concluded by the Observer that the Soviets “might be experimenting with various forms 
 
43 “Acclimatization at the Mexico Altitude,” Annex no. 4 of Minutes of 64th International Olympic 
Committee General Session, April 1966, Rome, Italy, IOCL. 
 
44 Minutes of the USOC Board of Directors, May 22, 1966, Washington D.C., USOCLA, p. 153. 
 
45 Minutes of the USOC Board of Directors, February, 25-26, 1967, Chicago, Illinois, USOCLA, p. 235-
236. 
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of doping, either to overcome the effects of altitude, [or] to improve performance 
generally.”46
In the end, and after much criticism by other members of the Olympic 
establishment, Brundage and Burghley relented and allowed an extra two weeks of 
training. Again conflating the subjects of amateurism and altitude physiology, a final—
though complicated—decision was released by the IOC in August of 1967. First 
providing that “we want to make it plain that, although it is not prohibited, the general 
operation of special training camps is not in accordance with the spirit of amateur sport,” 
the regulation went on to elaborate upon the committee’s reasoning. As “there has been 
so much misinformation circulated on the effect on performance of high altitude such as 
that of Mexico City we have decided to make a special allowance for the year 1968 only 
of two weeks.” However, the rule continued, “In our eligibility code, it is provided that 
participation for special training in a camp for more than four weeks in any one calendar 
year is not permitted.” To resolve this conflict, “This means that six weeks in special 
training camps during the year 1968 will be permitted but no more than four of these 
weeks shall be during the three months preceding the opening of the Games in October 
1968.”47
 
THE DOPING CRISIS CONTINUES 
 
 
46 Roland Huntford, “Olympic Training: Inside Russia’s Non-existent Camp,” London Observer, April 9, 
1967. Clipping found in Avery Brundage Papers, Box 177, Folder “Games of XIX Olympiad – Mexico – 
Medical Board – Altitude, etc, 1964-68.” On Soviet high-altitude camps, see also “Soviet Olympic Body in 
Study,” New York Times, March 13, 1965; Wrynn, “‘A Debt Was Paid Off in Tears’: Science, IOC Politics 
and the Debate about High Altitude in the 1968 Mexico City Olympics,” 1159. 
 
47 “Training Camps,” Circular Letter to the National Olympic Committees, August 11, 1967, quoted in 
Wrynn, “‘A Debt Was Paid Off in Tears’: Science, IOC Politics and the Debate about High Altitude in the 
1968 Mexico City Olympics,” 1164. 
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The USOC’s response to high-altitude training revealed the deeper problem of 
doping among its athletes. One of the physicians in attendance at the American high-
altitude training camp at South Lake Tahoe, H. Kay Dooley, who was also Director of the 
Wood Memorial Clinic in Pomona, California, openly supported the use of performance-
enhancing drugs by athletes. “I don’t think it is possible for a weight man to compete 
internationally without using anabolic steroids,” he argued. Although he refused to admit 
to prescribing steroids at the camp, Dooley nevertheless acknowledged that “I also did 
not inquire what the boys were doing on their own. I did not want to be forced into a 
position of having to report them for use of a banned drug. A physician involved in sports 
must keep the respect and confidence of the athletes with whom he is working.” As for 
any moral dilemma posed by the adoption of such a position, Dooley remained unmoved. 
“I see no reason not to make it available to an athlete,” he asserted. “I can’t see any 
ethical difference between giving a drug to improve performance and wrapping an ankle 
or handing out a salt pill for the same purpose.”48 This outlook led to a situation at the 
camp where, according to a later estimate by Tom Waddell, a decathlete training there, a 
full one-third of the American track-and-field squad was using anabolic steroids.49
Dooley’s attitude may seem less remarkable when one considers the social 
context of the 1960s. The mass production of pharmaceutical products meant that 
Americans were much more likely than their parents or grandparents had been to turn to 
prescription drugs for amelioration of a variety of ills that would have gone untreated in 
earlier decades. Indeed, more than thirty types of pharmacological agents could be found 
 
48 Dooley quoted in Bil Gilbert, “Drugs in Sport: Problems in a Turned on World,” Sports Illustrated (June 
23, 1969), 66, 68. 
 
49 Jack Scott, “It’s Not How You Play the Game, But What Pill You Take,” New York Times, October 17, 
1971; Jack Scott, “Drugs in Sports,” Chicago Tribune, October 24, 1971; Terry Todd, “A History of the 
Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” in Sport and Exercise Science: Essays in the History of Sports 
Medicine, ed. Jack W. Berryman and Roberta J. Park (Urbana; Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 
327; Todd and Todd, “Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement,” 69. 
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in the average American home during the 1960s.50 Another contributing factor to both 
Dooley’s sanguine attitude to doping and the IOC’s scant concern was the growth of 
recreational drug use among young people throughout the Western World—including 
Olympic athletes. Marijuana, LSD, hallucinogens, and, of course, amphetamines were 
widely available in youth circles, leading millions of young people to experiment with 
various drugs associated with the counter-culture.51 By the late-1960s, recreational drug 
use was as much a part of the world of elite sport as it was in an average American 
community.52  
The widespread incorporation of performance-enhancing drugs into the training 
regimens of elite athletes within this environment caused a difficult policy dilemma for 
the IOC leadership. While meeting in Lausanne in July of 1965, the IOC Executive Board 
was informed that “a medical check [at the 1964 Tokyo Games] has proved that certain 
athletes had been given shots and that some teams had drugs and artificial stimulants with 
them.” Several policies were therefore proposed. “We ought to have a rule obliging the 
athletes to submit to a medical examination,” the committee concluded. As for the 
implementation of specific punitive measures, it declared that “if drugs and artificial 
stimulants have been used, the athlete or the team should be disqualified.”53 Later that 
year, President Brundage, who was concerned with the interpretation of such a rule, 
 
50 See Terry Todd, “Anabolic Steroids: The Gremlins of Sport,” Journal of Sport History 14, no. 1 (Spring, 
1987): 95. 
 
51 See Ibid. 
 
52 Not surprisingly, when the IOC finally created a list of banned drugs in 1967, Cannabis was included, 
even though no one could argue that it was a performance-enhancer. See Minutes of the 65th IOC General 
Session, May 3-9, 1967, Tehran, Annex XIa, IOCL. It should be mentioned, though, that Cannabis was not 
included on the IOC’s list of substances that would be tested for at the 1968 Winter Olympics in Grenoble, 
France. See “Medical Commission,” [IOC] Newsletter (February, 1968), 71. 
 
53 Minutes of the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, July 9-10, 1965, Paris, France, 
IOCL, p. 4. 
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argued that the Board would need to “study the question to know if the whole team must 
be disqualified when one of its members is convicted of using drugs . . . if this question 
ought to figure in our Rules and if sanctions ought to be considered.”54
Departing slightly from his prior statements, Brundage also announced to the 
international federations that the IOC “would take our [own] precautions against the use 
of drugs . . . and penalize those who are guilty of their use.”55 In April 1966, Porritt and 
the doping sub-commission, in addition, presented a report that included a preliminary 
list of substances that would be prohibited at the Mexico City Games. “Whilst it is fully 
realised that the problem of doping can be met only by a long-term education policy 
stressing the physical and moral aspects of the subject,” the report began, it 
recommended a series of stop-gap measures. First the National Olympic Committees 
should “stimulate general education on the subject” and incorporate a promise to refrain 
from doping within their entry forms. The international federations should, furthermore, 
write their own rules barring the use of performance-enhancing drugs. As for the IOC, it 
should issue a statement against doping, “be given powers to establish sanctions against 
either N.O.Cs [sic] or individuals adjudged to be guilty,” and make arrangements for 
medical tests at the Games. Control of these drugs would be especially important 
“because the athletes will not be accustomed to the high altitude” of the event. Finally, it 
was conclusively established that the entire team “of an athlete convicted of doping will 
be disqualified for the sport concerned.”56
 
54 Minutes of the 63rd International Olympic Committee General Session, October 1965, Madrid, Spain, 
IOCL, p. 18. 
 
55 Minutes of the 64th International Olympic Committee General Session, April 1966, Rome, IOCL, p. 3. 
 
56 Minutes of the 64th International Olympic Committee General Session, April 1966, Rome, IOCL, p. 21, 
Annex no. 11. The report on doping, dated March 3, 1966, is contained in this annex. It is also available in 
Avery Brundage Papers, Box Box 82, Folder “RS Report by Committee on Doping, 1966.” 
 
 33
                                                
This new, albeit modestly more aggressive stance against drugs by the IOC was 
followed several months later by Porritt’s announcement of his resignation from the 
doping sub-commission so that he could become the new Governor General of New 
Zealand. A new organizational model was subsequently proposed after it was realized 
that most of the other members of the commission were, either by death or termination of 
service, no longer part of the Olympic movement.57 This evolution in the Olympic 
medical structure would take some time, however, as Brundage and the balance of the 
IOC leadership deliberated on how best to address the situation. Seeking clarification in 
light of rumors that Porritt would remain with the body, IOC Secretary General J.W. 
Westerhoff wrote to him in March 1967. Stating that if Porritt wished to resign, “then a 
new chairman has to be appointed for the sub-committee for doping, and I should very 
much appreciate your suggestion as to who should be your successor.” In conclusion, 
Westerhoff expressed his preference that Prince Alexandre de Merode, “who, although 
being no medecin [sic], has shown much interest into the matter,” assume the position.58
In the meantime, President Brundage and the Executive Board again attempted to 
transfer responsibility over doping controls to the other organizations in the international 
sport system. At a Board meeting in late October 1966, a “full discussion” over a possible 
Medical Congress at the 1968 Games revealed that “many of the athletes would not be 
prepared to undergo medical tests” at the competitions. Not wishing to bear the full brunt 
of the public outcry that was sure to attend the number of positive results should a 
comprehensive IOC testing protocol be implemented, the issue, in the Executive Board’s 
 
57 See Wrynn, “The Human Factor: Science, Medicine and the International Olympic Committee, 1900-
70,” 220. 
 
58 J.W. Westerhoff to Porritt, March 7, 1967, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical 
Commission, IOC, 1966-1969.” 
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estimation, should be “left to the Organizing Committee to decide.” 59 Shortly after the 
meeting, Porritt, who remained an advisor, thus wrote to Brundage, “As we recognize the 
Fédération Internationale [de] Médicale Sportive as our official medical body, it would 
seem that the responsibility of arranging for possible tests during the Games should be 
put in their hands.”60 Nevertheless, a drug memorandum distributed to the Executive 
Board by Prince de Merode, then a member of the doping sub-committee, led to a 
decision that mandatory testing should be put on the agenda of the upcoming May 1967 
IOC General Session in Tehran, Iran.61  
At the Tehran meeting, it was conclusively decided that Prince de Merode would 
take Porritt’s place as chairman of the new medical committee.62 As a Belgian aristocrat, 
de Merode assumed the notion that the Olympic movement was the preserve of the well-
bred and financially secure social elite. Feeling an element of fatherly responsibility for 
Olympic competitors, he shied away from punitive measures that he felt were overly-
harsh. “Cheating will go until the end of the world,” he later asserted, “but our job must 
be as much to expose the health dangers of depression, of glandular and cardiovascular 
 
59 Minutes of the International Olympic Committee Executive Board, October 22, 1966, Mexico City, 
IOCL, p.11. 
 
60 Italics added. Porritt to Avery Brundage, November 8, 1966, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder 
“SP Medical Commission, IOC, 1966-1969. 
 
61 Minutes of the International Olympic Committee Executive Board, October 22, 1966, Mexico City, 
IOCL, p.11. 
 
62 Minutes of the 65th General Session of the International Olympic Committee, May 1967, Tehran, Iran, 
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damage, as to ban people.”63 Under his guidance, the IOC Medical Commission would 
therefore do its best to avoid the imposition of suspensions whenever possible.64
Equally important in Tehran, a list of the drugs for which there would be testing 
was also finalized; while not comprehensive, it included alcohol, cocaine, vasodilators, 
opiates, amphetamines, ephedrine, and cannabis. Although anabolic steroids were 
specifically referenced as “constitute[ing] ‘doping’ from the Olympic viewpoint,” they 
were excluded from the index. This absence was quite remarkable as a report on their 
properties, including their known side-effects, was appended to the minutes of the 
session. Because anabolic steroids could, according to the statement, cause jaundice, 
increased blood pressure, impotence, and reduced sperm counts in men, menstrual 
problems and hirsutism [abnormal hair growth] in women, and stunt adolescent bone 
growth, the conclusion that “detection . . . is theoretically not impossible” was, in 
hindsight, quite damning.65
With the 1968 Games approaching, the IOC leadership began to press the other 
groups in the international sports system to address the problem. On August, 31, 1967, 
for instance, IOC Secretary General J.W. Westerhoff wrote to Dr. Eduardo Hay, Director 
General of Mexico City’s Olympic Sports Center, “Recently, specially in connection with 
doping affaires during European and World Championships here, many disastrous things 
 
63 Emphasis from original. This quote (p. 151) as well as the biographical information upon which this 
paragraph is based come from David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Biography of Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, Revised ed. (London: Pavilion, 1996). 
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offenses. Minutes of the 95th IOC Session, August 30 – September 1, 1989, Puerto Rico, p. 12, copy on file 
at the Todd McLean Physical Culture Collection, University of Texas at Austin. 
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have happened, even death, and I do think we have to . . . [be] quite diligent in this 
matter.”66 Within the IOC itself, the transfer of authority from the doping sub-committee 
to the new Medical Commission was concluded in late September 1967. The new group, 
which had an expanded area of jurisdiction, met for the first time on the 25th and 26th of 
that month in Lausanne to consider new ways to handle the problem.67 The results of that 
meeting, however, were far from fresh, as it recommended many of the same steps that its 
predecessor had been advocating for the last several years: revision of the athletes’ entry 
forms to include a promise to submit to medical examination, random drug tests, and 
close consultations with the international federations over the allowable time lapse for the 
athletes between their events and specimen deposits. In its sole original contribution, the 
Commission did, it should be noted, take “great care to lay down a procedure for these 
tests,” including a protocol that detailed “point by point all the various stages which must 
be followed from the moment a sample is taken to the moment that a laboratory has 
carried out its analysis.”68  
 
 
66 J.W. Westerhoff to Eduardo Hay, August 30, 1967, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 177, Folder “Games of 
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1968 GRENOBLE WINTER GAMES 
 
The Medical Commission later tried to exclude the other members of the Olympic 
movement from the issue of doping, including the remainder of the IOC, by establishing 
itself as the sole authority on the use of performance-enhancing drugs. It proposed that 
the results of the conceptualized multi-layered system, which included thin-layer 
chromatography, gas chromatography, “plus any other methods which could prove to be 
necessary. . . . will be given to the IOC Medical Commission only who will decide on 
any possible further action.” Moreover, after two samples had been tested, “no protests 
will be considered.” As for the set of penalties that would be applied in the event of a 
positive test, the Commission concluded that in individual sports, athletes found to be 
using performance-enhancing substances should be removed from the Games while in 
team sports, the entire squad “of an athlete who has been shown to have used doping is 
excluded, if the team can benefit from this usage.”69
Once the national Olympic committees and international federations were 
informed of the steps to be taken, however, a significant problem arose in terms of 
understanding the commission’s definition of doping. Although alcohol use was 
classified as such, the athlete’s entry sheet required a prospective Olympian to declare 
“that he has never indulged in an alcoholic drink, nor does he have the intention of so 
doing.”70 “This . . . [would be] utterly untrue and makes the competitors’ Declaration 
Form suspect,” complained British Olympic Association officer Sandy Duncan. 
 
69 Minutes of the International Olympic Committee Medical Commission, December 20, 1967, Lausanne, 
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Moreover, he continued, “Although details of Olympic Amateurism are set out on the 
reverse side of the Declaration Form, there are no details of ‘dope’ so the competitor 
really doesn’t know precisely what he is signing. . . . The signing of it in its present form 
is really making the competitor sign an untruth.”71 USOC physician Daniel Hanley added 
that while we “are in accord with your commission that ‘doping’ is bad. . . . it would be 
most helpful to us if the Medical Commission . . . would state specifically what tests are 
to be used and how they are to be done.” These should include “scientific descriptions so 
that all nations may then standardize and to [sic] the tests the same way . . . including 
what levels are to be considered positive.”72
This request for standardization of a testing protocol under the aegis of the 
Medical Commission was, however, overly-ambitious. In July, Pedro Ramirez Vasquez, 
an officer of the Organizing Committee of the Mexico City Games, wrote to Brundage, 
informing him that he had received the IOC doping resolutions. Vasquez, therefore, 
“wish[ed] to inform you [Brundage] that this Organizing Committee will be glad to take 
steps to put in force all the necessary . . . doping control measures referred to in the 
[regulations].”73 By late October 1967, though, the IOC had returned to its belief that the 
international federations should have an active role in the development of doping 
policies. Writing to these bodies, J.W. Westerhoff, Secretary General of the committee, 
explained that “we are convinced that only through close co-operation with the 
International Federations will it be possible for us to find reasonable solutions to these 
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very controversial problems.” The IOC, he went on, “would therefore like to ask you to 
aid us through your experience and inform us if your Federation has any rules on this 
subject, and if so, what methods you employ. . . . We would be very happy to know under 
what conditions you have worked and what results were obtained.”74 Whether this 
change in approach was an acknowledgement of the political realities of the Olympic 
governance structure at this time, or a re-imposition of Brundage’s antipathy towards 
centralized control of doping policies in the IOC, remains uncertain. 
As for the 1968 Winter Olympic Games in Grenoble, France, de Merode 
delineated the testing procedures that were to be used at an IOC Executive Board meeting 
in January of that year; in his report on the substances that were prohibited, however, he 
again excluded anabolic steroids.75 The international federations were, in addition, only 
provided clarification as to the penalties to be imposed at an IOC General Session held 
just prior to the opening of the Games.76 President Brundage later recalled that the 
federations strongly objected to this measure and “hinted that this was a technical matter 
that should be in their hands.77 In any event, of the samples taken, according to a post-
Games report by Dr. Jacques Thiebault, not one prohibited substance was detected.78 As 
the year went on, it became apparent that the IOC’s reluctance to take action stemmed 
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from fear of the repercussions that could come from a vigorous and efficacious testing 
system. At an Executive Board meeting in September 1968, Brundage made it clear that 
the limited steps he had taken with regard to the issue were “with the aim of protecting 
the Medical Commission and the IOC legally.” Furthermore, it was agreed that the 
Medical Commission should only “go on with its work of supervising but not operating 





During the 1960s, worries over the performance-enhancing drugs were strangely 
coupled with longstanding fears concerning non-females competing as women at the 
Games.80 The catalyst for this combination occurred at the 1936 “Nazi” Olympic Games 
when German officials, having been prompted by a set of Polish journalists, did a “sex 
check” (which was passed) on the American sprinter Helen Stevens. During the Cold 
War, paranoia over “sex cheating” exploded when a German man named Herman Ratjen 
disclosed that Nazi officials had forced him to compete as a woman at the 1936 Games, 
where he placed fourth in the high jump; “Dora,” as he was called, later set a women’s 
world record in the event.81  
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As for the relationship between drugs and sex, a 1961 issue of the IOC Bulletin 
proclaimed that although doping was beginning to be addressed, “no mention was [made] 
of a particularly revolting form of doping that of women athletes who take male 
hormones which lead to castration of the functional cycle of women and amount 
sometimes to an atrophy of the ovaries which may cause a chronic disease in the long run 
[sic].”82 Building on this point, Monique Berlioux, then an editor of IOC publications, 
claimed that gender doping was occurring through certain techniques whereby “the 
woman’s menstruation is stopped by means of medicinal substances. In addition, 
injections of male hormones are given and these have the twofold effect of increasing 
physical resistance and of fortifying the muscular tones.” Although such steps could not, 
according to Berlioux, change one’s gender, “from then on,” she warned, “certain 
secondary masculine characteristics may begin to appear.”83  
The IOC Executive Board discussed gender verification at their October 1966 
meeting in Mexico City. It was decided that delegates at the impending Olympic General 
Session should contemplate, as with drug analyses, the possibility of administering sex 
tests which, notably, had already been implemented by the International Association for 
Athletics Federations (IAAF), the world governing body for track and field.84 Brundage 
thus wrote to Porritt, “In view of the sex developments at the recent European 
Championships in Budapest and the action of the I.A.A.F., should we not have something 
in our rules on this subject[?] Will you be good enough to prepare a suggestion for the 
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coming Session in Teheran[?]”85 Porritt, however, was nonplussed, arguing that “I can 
see difficulties in trying to make this comprehensive for all sports. As for a rule on the 
subject, even with my medical knowledge I would find this a little difficult to compose!” 
Falling back on the IOC’s traditional penchant for avoiding responsibility in scientific 
matters, he therefore proposed that “it would seem that such individual Federations as 
had an interest in the subject might follow the good example of the I.A.A.F. and that the 
I.O.C. might reasonably keep out of this very contentious field.”86 Several of the 
federations, however, were equally apathetic; IOC member Lord Killanin (a future 
president of the committee) later recalled that the International Amateur Swimming 
Federation pragmatically “stood out for a long time against tests, asserting that swimsuits 
clearly disclose the sex of the competitor.”87
In Tehran, Porritt, having been pressed to do so, maintained that “the problems of 
doping, sex tests and anabolic steroids” required “that contacts should be taken up with 
the Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games so as to make sure that medical 
machinery to cope with these problems would be available.”88 As for the Grenoble 
Winter Olympics, the Medical Commission, “bearing in mind the high cost of these tests 
and the facilities of the laboratories,” as well as hoping to avoid a public relations 
catastrophe, “suggested testing one female athlete in five, in such a way as to assure 
 
85 Brundage to Porritt, November 1, 1966, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical 
Commission, IOC, 1966-1969.” 
 
86 Porritt to Brundage, November 8, 1966, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical 
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ourselves of these facts and avoid unnecessary scandal.”89 Due to the media’s framing of 
the issue as an alarming threat to the purity of sport, athletics policymakers worried, as 
they did with doping, that inaction could ignite a storm of public criticism. Writing to 
Prince de Merode, the USOC’s chief medical officer, American physician Daniel Hanley 
asserted that “like you, we feel that the publicity which has been given to both of these 
programs [doping and gender cheating] is unfortunate and we appreciate your efforts to 
help prevent future sensational stories about them.” Furthermore, Hanley was unclear as 
to the IOC’s understanding of gender orientation; he therefore requested “that the 
Medical Commission state clearly and in advance their definition of a ‘female’ and of a 
‘male’. . . . The interpretation of these studies is subject to human error and the Buccal 
smear techniques [to be used] are not the most accurate.”90  
Given the highly personal nature of sex testing, the commission was, in addition, 
concerned with the well-being of the athletes, some of whom, it was felt, may have been 
unaware of their true gender orientation. It therefore proposed that “in the event of some 
irregularity being found, the result of the control will be given only to the responsible 
medical officer of the team concerned, and to the President of the IOC Medical 
Commission or his representative.”91 Prince Alexandre de Merode, as chairman of the 
commission, clarified that “in view of the expense involved, only fifty out of two hundred 
and fifty female athletes would be tested.” As such, he “asked [successfully] for the 
support of the Executive Board in trying to persuade the Organizing Committee [of the 
 
89 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Medical Commission, December 20, 1967, Lausanne, Avery 
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Games] to have more athletes tested, if possible all of them.” Aware of the delicate nature 
of the issue, the IOC membership therefore resolved that each female Olympian would be 
tested through chromosomal analysis of buccal smears and concluded that “the control 
will be carried out before the Games in such a way as to preserve secrecy and avoid all 
embarrassment.”92 In buccal examinations, scrapes are taken from an individual’s inner 
cheek, which are then scrutinized through a microscope to determine the competitors’s 
chromosome orientation.93 For their part, the international federations asked that no sex 
tests be administered in their respective sports without their prior approval.94  
At the conclusion of the Winter Olympics in Grenoble, Dr. Thiebault presented a 
report describing the activities of the Medical Commission. Although no abnormalities 
had been detected among the women who were examined, several moral and practical 
issues arose which required the IOC’s consideration. The competition, according to him, 
was “the first time that such steps were carried out within the framework of the Olympic 
Games, which explains certain shortcomings when they were put into practice.” 
However, Thiebault naively went on, “these should be easily rectified in the future.” In 
fact, the medical officer had argued before the Games against gender testing out of a 
belief that “these people are to be pitied, for throughout their lives they will be inadapted 
[sic] and thanks to sport, they probably tried to achieve a difficult assimilation into an 
often hostile, and even stupid society.” “These examinations,” he continued, “must be 
carried out in the most absolute medical secrecy, and the more or less radical sporting 
 
92 Minutes of the International Olympic Committee Executive Board, January 26-27, 1968, in Lausanne, 
and 29-30, 1968, in Grenoble, France, IOCL, p.2, Annex III. 
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measures which may follow must be based on the wish, not to harm, but rather to help. 
Our idea will therefore never be that of punishing, but always that of dissuasion.”95  
Equally important in terms of the image of the Olympic movement, Thiebault also 
asserted that “it is useless to discuss at great length the reasons which crystallized this 
question; most of the press and unfortu[n]ately the scandal-rags, have for a large part 
made themselves the echo of these so-called women, built like navvies and breaking 
records.” “Already at the European Athletics Championships the Federation carried out 
checks which were rewarded by a public scandal,” Thiebault continued, “which proves 
that in this sort of thing, discretion is at least as important as examination techniques.”96 
As such, the “scandal[s] ensuing from the discovery of a false sex [at the Olympic 
Games] would inevitably have given rise to a host of juicy headlines and bad taste in the 
international scandal-rags.”97 Although careful to distinguish his points concerning sex 
testing from rules prohibiting the use of performance-enhancing drugs, which were, 
according to Thiebault, “evident attempt[s] at fraud,” this mindset became a fixture of 
Olympic doping policy. 
 
1968 MEXICO CITY OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
After the 1968 Winter Games, a power struggle ensued within the IOC that pitted 
President Brundage and his followers against the Medical Commission, few of whose 
 
95 Report by Doctor Thiebault on the Grenoble Games, n.d., Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP 
Medical Commission, IOC, 1966-69,” p. 1-2.  
 
96 Emphasis added. Report by Doctor Thiebault on the Grenoble Games, n.d., Avery Brundage Papers, Box 
99, Folder “SP Medical Commission, IOC, 1966-69,” p. 1. 
 
97 Report by Doctor Thiebault on the Grenoble Games, n.d., Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP 
Medical Commission, IOC, 1966-69,” p. 1. 
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members were attached to the IOC, over the development of doping policy. By 
attempting to bypass Brundage’s view that the Medical Commission should have only 
secondary responsibility over the matter in comparison to the international federations, de 
Merode challenged the IOC’s longstanding avoidance of the issue. Writing to General 
Clark at the Mexico City Organizing Committee, Brundage countered that despite the 
Medical Commission’s assumptions, “it has never been our idea that the IOC would take 
permanent charge of the actual testing. This is a technical requirement that rests with the 
International Federations and is not our province.” “It was never the intention of the 
IOC,” he pointedly concluded, “to assume permanently the duty of carrying out these 
tests anymore than it handles the starting or the timing of the races. The actual testing 
must remain in the hands of the International Federations.”98  
The piqued President also contacted de Merode to assert that “I have been dealing 
with this matter for twenty years and I am positive that the IOC had never had any 
intention whatsoever of undertaking such an enormous task.” “Our responsibility,” 
Brundage emphasized, “is to have intelligent regulations, to see that the adequate 
facilities are provided, and that correct methods are used, and that is all. I am sorry that 
you were not properly informed.”99 In a similar, tedious analysis of the Olympic medical 
structure and priorities, the President absolved the IOC of even these limited duties. “You 
will note,” he asserted, “that the testing is to be made by the medical authorities of the 
Organizing Committee with the assistance of officials of the F.I.M.S.” Brundage 
emphatically added, “It was never, never, never intended that the IOC itself should take 
responsibility for testing. . . . We are not equipped for that sort of an operation, ignoring 
 
98 Avery Brundage to General José de J. Clark, August 9, 1968, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder 
“SP Medical Commission, IOC, 1966-69.” 
 
99 Emphasis in original. Avery Brundage to Prince Alexandre de Merode, August [illegible], 1968, Avery 
Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder “SP Medical Commission, IOC, 1966-69.”  
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the expense involved.”100 Soon thereafter, Brundage released a circular letter to the 
various organizations of the Olympic movement outlining the IOC’s stance toward 
testing: “this is a technical matter that must be handled by the International Federations 
and the National Olympic Committees . . . in co-operation with the Organizing 
Committee.” The IOC and its Medical Commission, in contrast, played only consultative 
roles in that they “are ready to advise any [of the aforementioned organizations] . . . 
which may desire, in pursuing this subject, the benefit of their studies and their 
experience.”101
Committed to a stronger position, de Merode replied that “the absolute confusion 
that this statement has caused in everybody’s minds is a serious blow to the work we are 
trying to achieve. This change of opinion brings us back to the question of how much we 
can depend on the decisions of the I.O.C.” Brundage’s meddling with previous decisions 
regarding the Medical Commission’s power should therefore be considered “an abuse of 
authority and would be a serious mortgage on the work we would have liked to foresee in 
the future.” “I must also add,” de Merode continued, “that these extremely delicate 
matters concern the moral responsibility of the I.O.C. and go far beyond technical 
questions, if we still wish to remain loyal to the fundamental principles of the Olympic 
spirit.” In the interests of the Olympic movement, however, de Merode hoped that he and 
Brundage could patch their relationship, concluding that “I am sure that our next talks in 
 
100 Brundage to Prince Alexandre de Merode and members of the IOC Executive Board, August 29, 1968, 
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Mexico will help to smooth out these differences of opinion which are certainly only on 
the surface.”102
As this conflict trickled down to the other organizations in the Olympic system of 
governance, confusion ensued as to how the drug tests in Mexico City would be 
conducted. General Jose De J. Clark wrote to Brundage complaining of Medical 
Commission member Dr. Eduardo Hay’s insistence that the IOC controlled the doping 
protocol. “I have tried to explain to him,” Clark stated, “that matters of a technical nature, 
such as the use of dope by the athletes or the sex tests, are beyond the competence of the 
IOC. On the contrary, these problems are completely in the line of the International 
Federations’ concern.” In terms of a specific procedure, Clark continued that “these tests 
would be effected upon request from the International Federations themselves whose 
demands, as we know, are quite varied and differ a lot one from another.”103 Writing to 
Pedro Vásquez, chairman of the Mexico City Games Organizing Committee, Brundage 
confirmed that “this testing will not be done by the International Olympic Committee 
directly. Facilities would have to be provided by the Organizing Committee. . . . [while] 
[t]he actual testing will be under control of the International Federations concerned.”104
Aware of the potential for internal IOC division to erode the effectiveness and 
prestige of the Olympic movement, Brundage, though still insistent that the committee 
keep a low profile with regard to doping, later sought to dampen the friction between de 
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Merode and himself. Cabling the Prince, who was then in Brussels, Belgium, he, in a rare 
admission of fault, expressed “regret [over the] misunderstanding on Medical 
Commission. Perhaps I did not make myself clear.” Brundage, however, misrepresenting 
his prior statements on the issue, providing that he could not “understand confusion since 
all testing in Mexico must be done under its [the Medical Commission’s] supervision as 
planned before[.] The only difference is testing will be done only at the written request of 
the International Federations.”105 Later that day, Brundage penned an even more 
conciliatory letter, stating that “there has been no intention whatsoever on my part to 
undermine the Medical Commission, which everyone has agreed has accomplished its 
task with outstanding success.” As for the protocol at the Games, he assured de Merode 
that although the international federations must request drugs tests, “if there is any testing 
in Mexico, it will be done under the supervision of this Commission and according to its 
regulations and procedures.”106  
The international federations, of course, were no more eager to assume control 
over the drug tests than Brundage. On September 16, 1968, Brundage received a telegram 
from a group of European national Olympic committees and international federations 
congratulating the Medical Commission on the successful drug regime in Grenoble and 
expressed their great “hope that the I.O.C. will give it full powers to continue these tests 
in collaboration with the International Federations at the Olympic Games.”107 The 
Olympic drug control efforts during the 1960s were thus developed within an 
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environment whereby no entity, except the Medical Commission, wished to assume a 
position of leadership. Nevertheless, de Merode accepted Brundage’s apology, promised 
to work closely with the international federations on technical matters, and assured him 
that the Commission sought only “to carry out resolutely adaptable and humanely 
acceptable tests which are in accordance with the dignity of the Olympic Games.” He did 
warn Brundage, however, that future avoidance of the issue was unacceptable in that “by 
tolerating exceptions or only partially putting legislation into force, we would risk being 
accused of biased opinions and it would seem a flagrant injustice” to the athletes.”108
With the power struggle thus ameliorated, Brundage allowed Dr. Hay, as a 
member of the Medical Commission, to direct the gender verification and drug testing 
procedures at the Games. The IOC President’s previous insistence upon the international 
federations’ primary responsibility for implementing such activities derived, according to 
the minutes of a pre-Games IOC Executive Board meeting, from concerns that the 
committee should distance itself from policies that could result in damaging litigation. At 
an IOC Executive Board meeting in Mexico City, he thus asserted that his position “was 
with the aim of protecting the Medical Commission and the IOC legally.” De Merode 
subsequently explained that the thorny nature of the doping issue required extensive 
involvement by the Medical Commission. “It goes without saying,” he argued, “that such 
a complicated mechanism could not be left to different individual Sports Federations and 
therefore it has been centralized.”109  
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As such, a specific effort was made at the Games to harmonize the different 
international sport organizations in terms of execution of the testing protocol; the Medical 
Commission met regularly with officials from the international federations and national 
Olympic committees at the hotel housing the IOC delegation. “This arrangement,” 
according to a post-Games report by Hay, “greatly facilitated the coordination and the 
completion of the work.” A total of 803 female Olympians submitted to buccal scrapings, 
which were examined to determine their sex chromatin orientations. Only two required 
clarification by a “Modified Guard Method”; all were confirmed as females. Once the 
athletes’ female orientations were confirmed, they received a certificate absolving them 
of any responsibility to submit to additional verifications at future events sponsored by 
the IOC.110
Hay and the Medical Commission also directed the doping control procedures, 
sending “brigades” of technicians out to the individual events to collect urine and blood 
specimens. In each situation, however, the athletes were provided “notice to report to the 
office in which the specimens were to be taken,” providing in one case, “several hours 
before the athlete was able to provide the specimen.” In all, 670 urine samples were 
examined for various stimulants through a dual-layered technique that included both 
chromatography in gaseous phase and chromatography on paper; in addition, forty-eight 
analyses for alcohol were conducted through blood samples.111  
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Despite the fact that only two confirmed positive indications of amphetamines 
were found, Dr. Hay reported that a disturbing number of unknown chemicals were found 
in the examinations. “It was evident in the analyses,” he explained, “that a large number 
of the samples analyzed contained abnormal products. Analytically, they produce results 
very similar to some of the drugs commonly used but whose chemical make-up . . . does 
not correspond to that of the products classified [as prohibited substances].”112 
Remarking upon this problem, an anonymous American weightlifter at the Games wryly 
asserted regarding the efficacy of the doping control system: “What ban? Everyone used 
a new one [performance-enhancing drug] from West Germany. They couldn’t pick it up 
in the test they were using. When they get a test for that one, we’ll find something else. 
It’s like cops and robbers.”113 Concerned about this dilemma, Hay concluded that “if a 
technique . . . is established as official, it is relatively easy to administer drugs that cannot 
be identified.” He therefore recommended that rather than focusing on specific 
substances, the IOC should concentrate on a broader definition of doping so that “a 
positive result may be obtained even though the chemical product is not specified, but 




The failure of Olympic doping policy during the 1960s thus resulted from several 
factors that collectively prevented the implementation of an effective drug control 
system. When combined with the chemical smorgasbord that characterized the decade, 
 
112 The positive tests were reported in “General Report Presented by Dr. Eduardo Hay . . .” p. 12-13. Hay is 
quoted on p. 15. 
 
113 Quoted in Gilbert, “Drugs in Sport: Problems in a Turned on World,” 66. 
 
114 “General Report Presented by Dr. Eduardo Hay . . .” p. 15. 
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the use of performance-enhancing drugs by athletes exploded. The modest steps that were 
taken, which were catalyzed by Knud Jensen’s death, were weakened by a “pass-the-
buck” mentality among most policymakers involved in elite athletics. Officials at the 
International Olympic Committee, which sat at the pinnacle of the international sport 
governance structure, approached doping as either a public relations problem or, worse 
still, as someone else’s responsibility. President Brundage, in particular, set a strong tone 
of restraint in the assumption of centralized responsibility for doping policy creation and 
execution by the IOC, rationalizing this avoidance of responsibility by the stated 
objective of protecting the IOC from the organizational, financial, and legal 
consequences of such a role. Presidential reluctance during the decade was too strong a 
force for newly-emergent elements within the IOC structure, particularly the Medical 
Commission, to overcome.  
The international federations, national Olympic committees, and organizing 
committees for the individual competitions, thus endowed with the responsibility to 
develop doping controls, were either indifferent or actually encouraged the use of drugs. 
Within the United States and its communist rivals, a “sportive nationalism” blinded sport 
officials to the urgency of the problem.115 Indeed, a transfer of America’s “containment 
doctrine” to the private realm—including the Olympics, under which a victory for the 
Soviets signaled an inversely-related loss for the free world, required that its athletes and 
physicians keep up with the Eastern-bloc’s chemical innovations. 
The proliferation of drugs at the Games caused significant concern over the future 
of the Olympic movement. The ethical dilemma posed by doping even called into 
question conventional notions of sport as a “pure” exception to the compromising 
 
115 “Sportive nationalism” is a concept borrowed from John Hoberman. See especially John M. Hoberman, 




                                                
realities of everyday life.116 As put by Sports Illustrated columnist Bil Gilbert in 1969, 
who looked back with dismay over the decade, “The use of drugs—legal drugs—by 
athletes is far from new, but the increase in drug usage in the last 10 years is startling. It 
could, indeed, menace the tradition and structure of sport itself.”117 While such a 
pessimistic—and, in hindsight, prescient—analysis should have captivated the attention 
of officials involved in the Olympics, it, in the end, failed to do so. As will be shown, the 
situation at the end of the 1970s would be little better than the state of Olympic doping 
policy at the time of Gilbert’s article.
 
116 For Americans’ interpretation of athletics as a “pure” exception to everyday life, see Michael 
Mandelbaum, The Meaning of Sports: Why Americans Watch Baseball, Football, and Basketball, and What 
They See When They Do (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 4-9. 
 
117 Gilbert, “Drugs in Sport: Problems in a Turned on World,” 64. 
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Ch. 2: Nationalism Strikes, 1970-1979 
Although many of the same issues affecting Olympic doping policy during the 
previous decade continued to play important roles in the 1970s, an additional element 
was added in the form of a broadening of nationalist forces that became endemic to the 
Olympic movement. Since its inception in the late-nineteenth century, the Olympic 
movement has been marked by a curious intermingling of such elements alongside a 
broader internationalist mission.1 The father of the Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, 
believed, for instance, that a moderate form of munificent patriotism within a global 
institution of athletics could act as an agent of world peace.2 Nevertheless, Coubertin 
warned that moderate nationalism in sport might lead to jingoism, which, in his words, 
would “[open] the door to all kinds of dangerous misunderstandings and illusions.”3 Over 
the years, events gave substance to this warning as ultra-nationalist, politically motivated 
manipulations of international sport became increasingly apparent features of the 
 
1 For an insightful interpretation of Olympic internationalism, see John Hoberman, “Toward a Theory of 
Olympic Internationalism,” Journal of Sport History 22, no. 1 (Spring, 1995): 1-37. See also John M. 
Hoberman, The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics, and the Moral Order (New Rochelle, NY: A.D. Caratzas, 
1986). A wonderful recent analysis of the tension between nationalism and internationalism in athletics 
prior to the Second World War is provided in Barbara J. Keys, Globalizing Sports: National Rivalry and 
International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). For additional 
monographs by the same author on the subject, see Barbara Keys, “The Internationalization of Sport, 1890-
1939,” in The Cultural Turn: Essays in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, ed. Frank A. Ninkovich and 
Liping Bu (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2001), 201-220; Barbara Keys, “Spreading Peace, Democracy, 
and Coca-Cola: Sport and American Cultural Expansion in the 1930s,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 2 (April, 
2004): 165-196. 
 
2 “Sincere” internationalism was Coubertin’s term for this environment. See William J. Morgan, 
“Cosmopolitanism, Olympism, and Nationalism: A Critical Interpretation of Coubertin’s Ideal of 
International Sporting Life,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies IV (1995): 81. 
 
3 Coubertin quoted in Hoberman, The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics, and the Moral Order, 51. Coubertin 
also asserted in the wake of the First World War that “ulterior motives of a nationalistic or a religious 
character . . . would only upset the whole [Olympic] movement in the end.” Pierre de Coubertin, Olympic 
Memoirs (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1997), 185. The best biography of Coubertin is 
John J. MacAloon, This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
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Olympic movement. Governmentally sponsored doping was an important element in 
these developments. 
By 1970, of course, the International Olympic Committee realized that the 
widespread use of performance-enhancing substances at the Games was evolving into a 
dangerous, and increasingly public, ethical crisis. The minutes of an IOC General Session 
in May of that year thus declared that in the 1968 Games and in “more recent cases of 
deviations from the regulations and moral standards, the question of doping raises the 
need for energetic and more organised steps in this sensitive sphere of sport and 
humanism.”4 Medical Commission Chairman Alexandre de Merode, recognizing that 
“the intensity of international competitions had grown in all Olympic sports,” accordingly 
called for “[a] well organised and systemical [sic] doping control . . .  for the Olympic 
Games.”5 Nevertheless, the regulatory efforts of Olympic policymakers during the 1970s 
failed to come to terms with the connection between doping and intensified nationalist 
forces. Officials in the United States Olympic Committee, for instance, sought to 
circumvent doping regulations after what they felt was an unfair suspension of American 
swimmer Rick DeMont for using asthma medication approved by a team doctor. More 
dangerously, the German Democratic Republic, committed to success in elite 
international sport as an indicator of national vitality, implemented a pervasive, state-
sponsored doping system in 1975 that would eventually force some 10,000 athletes—
many against their will or without their knowledge—to ingest or otherwise absorb 
quantities of potentially harmful performance-enhancing drugs.6  
 
4 Minutes of the 69th IOC General Session, May 1970, Amsterdam, IOCL, p. 112. 
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The tension between nationalism and internationalism during the 1970s was at 
first secondary to internal IOC friction in terms of importance for the direction of 
Olympic doping policy. The Executive Board of the IOC, although unanimous that the 
efforts of the Medical Commission in Mexico City should be applauded, “considered [in 
1969] that it [and its jurisdiction] should be limited to the period immediately preceeding 
[sic] and following the Olympic Games.”7 The international federations, likewise wary of 
the issue’s potential for embarrassment, supported this position so that they, as stated by 
French IOC delegate Comte Jean de Beaumont, could “have the responsibility of carrying 
out these tests.”8 The Executive Board, thus having returned to Brundage’s restrictive 
position of the 1960s regarding IOC doping authority, declared that the Medical 
Commission would thereafter be limited to a supervisory role while the “IFs 
[International Federations] [would be] responsible for carrying out their own dope, 
alcohol and sex tests. . . . [and] [t]he Organizing Committees will provide all facilities.”9 
This retreat from any evolving vestiges of centralized responsibility would prove critical 
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discounts the country’s use of performance-enhancing substances is provided in Doug Gilbert, The Miracle 
Machine (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1980). 
 
7 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, March 22-23, 1969, Lausanne, Switzerland, IOCL, p. 6. 
 
8 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, March 22-23, 1969, Lausanne, Switzerland, IOCL, p. 7. 
 
9 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, June 5-9, 1969, Warsaw, Poland, IOCL, p. 5. “IFs” in this quotation 
refers to international federations. 
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in the 1970s as nationalistic forces overwhelmed the capacities of a de facto leaderless, 
diffused Olympic policy response. 
Brundage, still engaged in a somewhat prickly relationship with de Merode, 
continued to express hostility towards a robust regulatory response by the IOC. Writing 
to the medical chairman in early May 1971, he suggested that “it would be wise for your 
Commission to make a contact [sic] with the Federations which have had the most 
experience with the necessity for [drug] control.” Referring to the set of doping 
regulations to be implemented at the upcoming 1972 Munich Olympic Games, he 
continued, “If they approve the regulations that you finally adopt, it will add strength and 
power to them.”10 Brundage’s concern for the Olympic movement’s economic stability 
also dampened his enthusiasm for the commission’s work. Having been informed by IOC 
Information Director Monique Berlioux of two Medical Commission conferences for 
which the expenses would be “tremendous,” Brundage responded that “there is no use 
wasting a lot of money on these superfluous meetings if we can avoid it.”11 After 
learning that the Munich Games Organizing Committee would pay the costs of the 
sessions, Brundage, in a somewhat sarcastic note to de Merode, underscored his 
conviction that the foundation of IOC doping policy should center on delegation of 
responsibility. He accordingly wrote, “It is a little embarrassing to have others pay the 
expenses . . . but probably in this instance it is not out of order seeing that it is one of the 
obligations of the Organizing Committee to prepare for the medical tests.”12                              
 
10 Brundage to de Merode, May 2, 1971, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder Medical Commission, 
1970-73. 
 
11 Berlioux to Brundage, March 24, 1971, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder Medical Commission, 
1970-73; Brundage to Berlioux, April 20, 1971, Avery Brundage Papers, Box 99, Folder Medical 
Commission, 1970-73.  
 




                                                
At the July 29, 1971, Medical Commission meeting, discussions focused on a new 
doping control brochure, four thousand copies of which were to be distributed to the 
various members of the Olympic establishment. De Merode was quite optimistic before 
the IOC leadership about the benefits of the document in terms of a conviction held by 
the Commission “that the application of these presented methods of control, and their 
publication, will have a positive effect in the immediate decrease and future elimination 
of the danger of doping in modern sport.”13 As for the actual distribution of authority 
over drug controls, the international federations were given the actual “technical 
responsibility for sports matters (number of checks, persons to be examined, times)” 
while the Medical Commission was relegated to “moral responsibility for the different 
kinds of controls and will supervise their organization.” In terms of the enforcement 
mechanism, guilty athletes could only be “eliminated from the Olympic Games by the 
International Federation concerned following the proposal of the IOC Medical 
Commission.”14 The international federations, wary of the issue’s potential for 
embarrassment, later tried to avoid Brundage’s position, according to a 1972 report, by 
asserting that it was “generally agreed that it should be the Medical Commission who 
carried out the control.”15
Although this was seen as a useful first step, President Brundage, having heard 
that methods to identify anabolic steroids were under development, expressed interest in 
 
13 Minutes of the Meeting of the Working Group of the IOC Medical Commission, July 29, 1971, Avery 
Brundage Papers, Folder Medical Commission, 1970-73; de Merode remarks in 71st General Session of the 
International Olympic Committee, Luxemburg, September 11-18, 1971, Annex 17, p. 33, IOCL. 
 
14 International Olympic Committee brochure, “Doping” (Lausanne, 1972), p. 4, International Olympic 
Committee, Medical Commission Records, Folder: Commission médicale: correspondence et cas de 
dopage, 1972 à 1973, IOCL.  
 
15 Minutes of the Meetings of the I.O.C. Medical Commission, Sapporo, January 29-30, and February 3, 
1972, Avery Brundage Collection, Box 99, Folder: Medical Commission, 1970-73. 
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whether the Commission “had found any [definitive] method of detecting [such] 
hormones,” which were quickly replacing amphetamines as elite athletes’ drugs of 
choice.16 Such tests, he was told, were problematic in that they were untraceable if the 
athlete ceased their administration several weeks prior to the Games.17 This made the 
IOC Executive Board’s limitation of the Medical Commission’s authority to the “period 
immediately preceeding [sic] and following the Olympic Games” all the more curious.18 
In any event, the world’s leading expert on the subject, Dr. Arnold Beckett of Great 
Britain, “had not gone far enough in his research,” de Merode explained, “for the Medical 
Commission to use any control in this field.”19 The early years of the 1970s were thus 
marked by IOC deferral, and Medical Commission restriction (and even truncation in the 
case of steroid testing), of authority. These failures made Olympic regulatory policies 
unnecessarily vulnerable to the emerging, unrestrained nationalistic forces of the decade.              
 
1972 SAPPORO WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
Some national Olympic committees were dissatisfied with the status quo 
regarding doping regulation, however. The Belgian national committee, for example, 
 
16 Brundage to de Merode, November 1, 1971, Avery Brundage Collection, Box 99, Folder: Medical 
Commission, 1970-73; Report of the Medical Commission, 71st General Session of the International 
Olympic Committee, Luxemburg, September 11-18, 1971, p. 23, IOCL. 
 
17 Report of the Medical Commission, 71st General Session of the International Olympic Committee, 
Luxemburg, September 11-18, 1971, p. 23, IOCL. De Merode later explained that “there had been 
considerable progress in the field of hormones and steroids but it was not possible at this point to control 
these substances. As the Commission had to be certain before carrying out tests, these products were not on 
the list of prohibited products.” 72nd General Session of the International Olympic Committee, January-
February, 1972, Sapporo, Japan, P. 28, IOCL. 
 
18 Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, March 22-23, 1969, Lausanne, Switzerland, IOCL, p. 6. 
 
19 Report of the Medical Commission, 71st General Session of the International Olympic Committee, 
Luxemburg, September 11-18, 1971, p. 23, IOCL. 
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submitted a proposal, which was subsequently rejected by the IOC, “to entrust a [new] 
Commission to study the drafting of some simple rules, which could be applied in all 
cases, for every sportsman and every sportswoman and of which they can avail 
themselves in every country, for every sport.”20 The United States Olympic Committee 
likewise—and to its credit—wished to take additional steps apart from the IOC. In 
October 1971, Dr. Daniel Hanley, chief medical officer of the body, thus declared, “Dope 
control is becoming a very strong issue, and I think we should formulate some policy. . . . 
I think we can ignore it, if you want to . . . but, more and more, many individuals and 
some important segments of our society, like the press, are looking to you for 
direction.”21 The problem was particularly acute, as described by U.S. Olympian Harold 
Connoly, in that “the overwhelming majority of the international track and field athletes I 
have known would take anything and do anything short of killing themselves to improve 
their athletic performance.”22
The USOC’s progressive rhetoric did not reflect its pre-Games policies toward 
performance-enhancing drugs, however. After the 1971 Pan-American Games, during 
which he won a gold medal in the super-heavyweight weightlifting contest, U.S. lifter 
Ken Patera asserted his eagerness for a rematch with the Soviet Union’s Vasily Alexeyev, 
who had defeated him in the previous year’s World Championships in Columbus, Ohio. 
In relating his optimism for the 1972 Munich Games, he claimed, “Last year, the only 
 
20 Proposal of the Belgian Olympic Committee, Minutes of the International Olympic Committee 
Executive Board, May 27-30, 1972, Lausanne, Switzerland, p. 13, IOCL. 
 
21 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States Olympic Committee, October 11-
12, 1971, New York, p. 92, USOCLA. 
 
22 United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 
Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 56, Section 12. Investigative Hearings on the Proper and Improper Use of 
Drugs by Athletes, Ninety Third Congress, First Session, June 18, July 12, 13, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 274. 
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difference between me and him was that I couldn’t afford his drug bill. Now I can. When 
I hit Munich next year, I’ll weight in at about 340, maybe 350 [pounds]. Then we’ll see 
which are better—his steroids or mine.”23 As for any response by American sport 
officials, Patera later recalled that he “didn’t hear a peep out of anyone from the U.S. 
Olympic Committee.”24 Although Patera was not reprimanded by the body, he was a 
topic of discussion in its deliberations. Dr. Hanley, speaking in October 1971 before the 
USOC Board of Directors, apologized “for that mental pigmy we had aboard, who 
sounded off and shot his mouth off, afterward, about subjects he knew absolutely nothing 
about.”25 In hindsight, however, one wonders who could have known more about 
Patera’s use of drugs than himself. 
At the 1972 Winter Olympic Games in Sapporo, Japan, tests were administered to 
211 athletes. These tests detected only one instance of doping (a West German hockey 
player named Alois Schloder), an astonishingly low number given such public 
testimonials as that of Patera.26 Despite the dearth of positive tests due in significant 
measure to the absence of steroid screening, several new issues resulted from the 
competition that would have significant effects for the IOC’s medical policies. Schloder’s 
position in a team sport sparked significant controversy in terms of how to address 
 
23 Patera quoted in Jack Scott, “It’s Not How You Play the Game, But What Pill You Take,” New York 
Times, October 17, 1971. 
 
24 Terry Todd telephone interview with Ken Patera, May 16, 1986, quoted in Terry Todd, “Anabolic 
Steroids: The Gremlins of Sport,” Journal of Sport History 14, no. 1 (Spring, 1987): 95. 
 
25 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States Olympic Committee, October 11-
12, 1971, New York, p. 89, USOCLA. 
 
26 Jan Todd and Terry Todd, “Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic 
Movement: 1960-1999,” in Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, ed. 
Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001), 70. Schloder was identified in 
International Olympic Committee Press Release, February 11, 1972, Sapporo, International Olympic 
Committee Medical Commission Records, Folder: Dopage aux Jeux Olympiques d’Hiver de Sapporo 1972: 
rapports d’analyse, résultets et correspondence, 1972, IOCL. 
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instances in which doping affected more than an individual. The relevant IOC regulation 
in effect at the time stated that “if the athlete belongs to a team, the game or competition 
in question shall be forfeited by that team,” and, it continued, “a team in which one or 
more members have been found guilty of doping may be disqualified from the Olympic 
Games.”27 In a post-Games IOC meeting, however, de Merode explained “that this rule 
had not been applied in Sapporo because of technical reasons and the Commission had 
decided that the rule should not be applied in the future.”28 The West German squad was 
thus allowed to continue at the games, where it eventually finished seventh. 
In addition, a scientific argument ensued in the aftermath of the Sapporo Games 
when Danish researchers publicly questioned the efficacy of the Olympic gender 
verification regime based on the identification of an individual’s chromosomal—rather 
than somatic and/or psychosocial—sex.29 Prior to the Games, Dr. Ingborg Bausenwein, a 
physician who worked with female athletes on the West German Olympic team, argued 
that prior to the test’s implementation in 1968, “five out of 11 women’s world records [in 
track-and-field] were held by hermaphrodites.”30 The Danish scientists countered that 
“the decision of the international [O]lympic committee to demand that all female 
competitors at the Olympic games should be ‘sex-tested’ with the aim of excluding sex 
 
27 International Olympic Committee brochure, “Doping” (Lausanne, 1972), p. 45, International Olympic 
Committee, Medical Commission Records, Folder: Commission médicale: correspondence et cas de 
dopage, 1972 à 1973, IOCL. 
 
28 Minutes of the 73rd General Session of the International Olympic Committee, August 21-24, September 
5, 1972, Munich, p. 32, IOCL. 
 
29 Erik Strömgren, Johannes Nielsen, Mogens Ingerslov, Gert Bruun Petersen, and A.J. Therkelsen, “A 
Memorandum on the Use of Sex Chromatin Investigation of Competitors in Women’s Divisions of the 
Olympic Games,” February 3, 1972, Avery Brundage Collection, Box 99, Folder: Medical Commission, 
1970-73. 
 
30 “Those Exempted Have ‘Passes’,” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1972. 
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chromatin negative individuals from competing with females is open to criticism for 
scientific as well as for medical and ethical reasons.”31  
Several months later, Brundage sought the opinion of the IOC Medical 
Commission, writing to de Merode that “I am happy I didn’t realise [sic] all the 
complications when I was 25, but seriously this is very disquieting and must have the 
attention of your committee.” In a notable display of humor from the usually acerbic IOC 
president, Brundage lightly concluded, “Maybe the eye of a 25 year old would be 
better.”32 The problem concerning these early chromatin tests centered on the fact that 
they threatened to shatter the lives of numerous women, most of whom held no 
significant physiological advantage over their fellow competitors.33 In the end, the 
chromatin tests were retained and an alternative system was not put in effect until the 
1992 Albertville Winter Olympic Games.34 Explaining this decision, de Merode pointed 
out that the IOC’s “practical” concerns outweighed the researchers’ “scientific side.” 
Brundage agreed, stating that “the problem of the Danish doctors being purely theoretical 
was very different from that of the IOC’s which was practical.”35
 
31 Erik Strömgren et al., “A Memorandum on the Use of Sex Chromatin Investigation of Competitors in 
Women’s Divisions of the Olympic Games,” February 3, 1972, Avery Brundage Collection, Box 99, 
Folder: Medical Commission, 1970-73. 
 
32 Brundage to de Merode, April 24, 1972, Avery Brundage Collection, Box 99, Folder: Medical 
Commission, 1970-73. 
 
33 A[lbert] de la Chapelle, “The Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin Screening for ‘Gender Identification’ of 
Female Athletes,” Journal of the American Medical Association 256, no. 14 (October 10, 1986): 1920-
1923. 
 
34 At the Albertville Games, the IOC replaced chromatin tests with testing for “Y-specific loci using 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification of DNA extracted from nucleated buccal cells.” Louis J. 
Elasas et al., “[Review] Gender Verification of Female Athletes,” Genetics in Medicine 2, no. 4 
(July/August, 2000): 251. 
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1972 MUNICH OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
As for the Summer Olympics, the organizing committee for the Munich Games 
was confident about the steps—estimated to cost $669,195—that it was taking with 
regard to the curtailment of doping at its competitions. In a report to the IOC in early 
1972, the Munich Organizing Committee asserted that “there was good co-operation with 
the International Federations” in developing a rigorous control system through “uniform 
guidelines . . . drawn up on a sound scientific basis.” Furthermore, the committee (quite 
mistakenly in light of future events) claimed that “the entire question of doping control in 
Munich has been very well thought out so that mistakes and protest are virtually 
impossible.”36 The complex regulatory system of the Olympics, in which the IOC, 
organizing committees, and international federations each played important roles, 
however, led to confusion as to possible situations in which drug treatments might be 
allowable. A 1968 report from the medical board of the International Cycling Union 
circulated to IOC members prior to the 1972 Games, for instance, concluded that “a 
certain tolerance may be admitted . . . concerning the tune of administration, the used 
dosis [sic], and the therapeutic goals” of selected classes of tranquillizers, sedatives, 
ephedrine, ether, caffeine, and hormones.37
 
36 Report of the Munich Organizing Committee, 72nd General Session of the International Olympic 
Committee, January-February, 1972, Sapporo, Japan, Annex 5, p. 56-57, IOCL. 
 
37 Dr. R. Marlier, “Report of the Medical Commission of the ‘International Cycling Union’,” January 13, 
1968, attached to Artur Takac [IOC Technical Director] to Suat Erler [Secretary General, Turkish Olympic 
Committee, September 24, 1971, International Olympic Committee, Medical Commission Records, Box 
SD 1: Comm. Méd.: Rapp. Sessions, CE 1968-1984, IOCL. 
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Such ambiguity led eventually to an environment in which, according to an 
unofficial poll of all track and field competitors in Munich by U.S. squad member Jay 
Sylvester, sixty-eight percent of the men used some type of anabolic steroid prior to the 
competitions.38 Pat O’Shea, the American weightlifting team physiologist, likewise 
claimed that every member of the squad was using some sort of performance-enhancing 
drug.39 The problem had even become acute enough to cause Dr. John Zeigler, a U.S. 
team physician during the 1960s, to quit. “I found some of the athletes were taking 20 
times the recommended dosage [of various ergogenic drugs],” he asserted. “I lost interest 
in fooling with IQ’s of that caliber. Now it’s about as widespread among these idiots as 
marijuana.”40  
While such public claims should have been cause for alarm among American 
sport officials, no such calls for reform occurred. Rather, a response in the shape of a 
vehement, nationalistic protest by the USOC only ensued after a sixteen year old 
American swimmer named Rick DeMont—who may very well have been innocent—
tested positive for a prohibited stimulant after winning the four-hundred meter freestyle 
competition.41 DeMont later explained that he had awoken early in the morning of 
September 1, 1972, “wheezing,” after which he took three tablets of Marax over 
 
38 Terry Todd, “A History of the Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” in Sport and Exercise Science: Essays 
in the History of Sports Medicine, ed. Jack W. Berryman and Roberta J. Park (Urbana; Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 1992), 330. 
 
39 “Team Physiologist Claims Nearly All U.S. Weightlifters on Steroids,” Los Angeles Times, July 16, 




41 See Sharon Robb, “Burned: At the Munich Olympics of 1972, a Young Swimmer Named Rick DeMont 
was stripped of his Gold Medal due to a Bureaucratic Error. Thank that Sounds Like an Easy Fix? Not 
Even Close,” Splash: The Official Newsletter of United States Swimming (April/May, 2001), 8-9. 
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approximately the next several hours.42 Although DeMont had cleared his use of the 
asthma medication containing the banned substance ephedrine with U.S. team physicians, 
they made no effort to inform examiners in Munich. After the swimmer was stripped of 
his medal, U.S. Head Team Physician Winston Rhiel wrote to the IOC that DeMont “has 
a history of bronchial asthma and allergy. . . . [and] Mr. DeMont has taken this medicine 
[called Marax] on his own at infrequent intervals to control the symptoms.” Dr. Rhiel 
argued that “considering all of the above we do not feel that this young athlete has used 
any medication for the pruposes [sic] of enhancing his performance.”43 The USOC Chief 
de Mission in Munich, Clifford Buck, went a step further in arguing that “it would be 
inordinately cruel and undeserving [sic] if this young man is punished for following his 
doctor’s instructions in order that he may stay alive. This 16-year-old boy, because he 
loves his sport, has by persevering will and grueling training, overcome a physical 
handicap to excel in his sport.”44
However, the IOC Medical Commission took a different position. Although 
initially recommending that DeMont be allowed to keep his medal, de Merode later 
reversed direction, urging the IOC Executive Board to consider stripping DeMont of the 
award. De Merode, in addition, declared that DeMont would not be permitted to 
participate in additional competitions in Munich, including the 1,500-meter freestyle 
swim in which he already held the world record. Furthermore, he argued that “the persons 
accompanying the athlete [U.S. team officials] should be punished according to the 
 
42 DeMont to de Merode, September 4, 1972, Avery Brundage Collection, Box 185, Folder: XXth 
Olympiad, Status of Rick DeMont’s Gold Medal. 
 
43 Winston P. Rhiel to Alexandre de Merode, September 3, 1972, International Olympic Committee 
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recommendation of the IOC Medical Commission, since they were clearly co-responsible 
for the incident.”45 After the Board confirmed DeMont’s suspension, Brundage 
accordingly asked USOC President Clifford Buck to coordinate the return of DeMont’s 
medal and informed him of the IOC’s additional conclusion that “much of the 
responsibility for this disqualification rests on your team medical authorities, who are 
severely reprimanded.”46 This did little to stimulate future American compliance with 
regard to doping regulations. 
In addition, a doping scandal involving the Union Internationale de Moderne 
Pentathlon et Biathlon (UIPMB) likewise eroded the enthusiasm of both the international 
federations and national Olympic committees. On August 22, 1972, in Munich’s Hilton 
Hotel, UIPMB Secretary General Wille Grut was directed by representatives of 20 
national Olympic committees to seek the addition of tranquilizers on the IOC’s list of 
prohibited substances.47 The following day, Grut met with de Merode, representatives of 
the Munich Games Organizing Committee, and the chief lab technician for doping tests 
 
45 De Merode’s initial advocation that DeMont keep his medal is contained in Minutes of the Executive 
Board of the International Olympic Committee, August 18-22, & September 1, 6-8, 10-11, 1972, p. 41, 
IOCL. The Medical Commission’s subsequent position is outlined in both these minutes and in a letter: de 
Merode to Brundage, September 4, 1972, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission Records, 
Folder: Cas de dopage: PV organization du contrôle de dopage athlátisme, basketball, boxe, cyclisme, etc, 
1972 à 1972, IOCL. De Merode’s statements in this paragraph are quoted from this document. 
 
46 Brundage to Clifford Buck, September 8, 1972, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission 
Records, Folder: Dopage: Rick DeMont (USA Swimming) et Patrick James (American Basketball Team), 
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to officially submit this proposal.48 As the international federations held jurisdiction over 
such matters at the time, the Medical Commission agreed to the addition of tranquilizers 
after it was concluded that the laboratory had enough capacity and the Organizing 
Committee promised to pay for the additional tests.49 Grut accordingly wrote to Dieter 
Krickow, the Organizing Committee member responsible for the Modern Pentathlon, to 
confirm the tests, after which Krickow informed the individual teams.50
UIPMB officials began to regret their progressive actions, however, when 
fourteen positive cases of drug use were found through the doping checks.51 Grut 
accordingly denied the request for the tests and UIPMB President Sven Thofelt declared 
that the proposal was done without authorization and that the federation had never been 
informed of any such decision.52 After the UIPMB representatives were presented with 
evidence of the events, Grut pled negligence, explaining that “UIPMB did not ever 
officially ask the IOC Medical Commission to add ‘tranquilizers’. . . . I should not have 
allowed a non[-]competent meeting of team captains to charge me to forward their 
 
48 Press Release from the IOC Medical Commission, September 8, 1972, International Olympic Committee 
Medical Commission Records, Folder: Cas de dopage: PV organization du contrôle de dopage athlétisme, 
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opinion.” “I now feel,” he concluded, “that this task has not been one for which I am 
properly trained. . . . I very much regret the loss of time and money I seem to have caused 
your commission.”53 After receiving a query from Brundage asking for the rationale 
concerning the lack of sanctions, de Merode released a statement declaring that “the 
Medical Commission of the IOC must not interfere in the internal affairs of an 
International Federation and has therefore suspended all further action for the time 
being.”54
American sports officials were infuriated, perceiving the excuses as an intolerable 
slap in the face after they were publicly castigated by the IOC for their negligence 
concerning DeMont’s medication. USOC President Clifford Buck wrote to IOC member 
Lord Killanin, who would succeed Brundage as IOC president in 1972, that “it seems 
most inconsistent that prompt severe action was taken on Mr. DeMont in swimming as 
well as others and then not take disqualifying action against fourteen found guilty of 
doping in Modern Pentathlon.” DeMont is a sixteen year old boy,” he continued, “who 
was taking his normal prescribed medication for a chronic problem and not to enhance 
his performance, whereas the guilty pentathletes are mature individuals who knowingly 
and deliberately took a banned drug to improve their performance in competition in 
violation of a rule of which they were aware.” Buck therefore finished, “In the interest of 
justice, fair play, the honor and integrity of the Olympic Games, and for all athletes who 
did not indulge in taking forbidden drugs during the shooting event of Modern 
 
53 Evidence presented in Minutes of the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, August 
18-22, & September 1, 6-8, 10-11, 1972, p. 40, IOCL. Grut quoted in Grut to “IOC Medical Commission, 
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Pentathlon, it is respectfully requested that the IOC Executive Board reconsider the 
decision.”55 Even Brundage noted that the incident was leading to “tremendous 
opposition” and that in the future “some distinction would have to be made between 
medicine and doping.”56
Two additional occurrences also highlighted the problems caused by the 
inconsistent penalties that derived from ambiguous standards. Although the IOC had 
decided at the Sapporo Games not to suspend national teams after doping was found 
among individual squad members, the ruling was contradictorily applied in Munich. 
Tests confirmed drug use by a Puerto Rican basketball player, although the analyses had 
taken so long as to allow the team to continue play throughout the course of the 
tournament. While the player was disqualified, the team was not, and its victories were 
consequently upheld. The Dutch cycling team’s bronze medal, on the other hand, was 
rescinded after one of its riders tested positive for Coramine, a substance prohibited by 
the IOC, but not by the International Cycling Union. During the IOC Executive Board’s 
deliberations, William Jones, Secretary General of the Federation Internationale de 
Basketball Amateur, pointed out that while one set of rules “stated that teams were 
disqualified [only] if the team had benefited from an athlete taking dope . . . the doping 
brochure . . . said that the team would be disqualified [automatically] if one of the players 
was found guilty.”57  
 
55 Buck to Lord Killanin, September 27, 1972, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission 
Records, Folder: Cas de dopage: PV organization du contrôle de dopage athlétisme, basketball, boxe, 
cyclisme, etc., 1972 à 1972, IOCL.  
 
56 Minutes of the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, August 18-22, & September 1, 
6-8, 10-11, 1972, p. 46, IOCL. 
 
57 Minutes of the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, August 18-22, & September 1, 
6-8, 10-11, 1972, pp. 41-47, IOCL. The response from the national Olympic committee of The Netherlands 
is provided in Annex 14 of this document. Jones’s statement can be found on p. 43. 
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THE INTER-GAMES PERIOD 
 
The inconsistent application of doping regulations acted in conjunction with the 
Black September terrorist attacks—during which thirteen Israeli Olympians were 
killed—to cause significant introspection among Olympic policymakers in the aftermath 
of the Munich Games. Due to the perceived need for a fresh start among the Olympic 
constituency, the 1972 Games marked the last of Brundage’s twenty-year presidency. 
Having ruled with an iron-grip with little regard for the concerns of the other members of 
the Olympic community, Brundage retired with the prediction that the movement would 
not survive in his absence.58 Hoping for a less dictatorial leader, the IOC elected Lord 
Killanin, a mild-mannered Irishman, as its new president. “He was the key element,” as 
later put by sports administrator Alain Coupat, “in the evolution from this totally closed 
organization under Brundage to the open regime of Samaranch [who succeeded Killanin 
in 1980].” Yet, Killanin’s mental composition was unsuited to effective leadership 
pertaining to the doping subject. “He was indecisive,” Coupat continued, “in the sense of 
not having the will to make decisions.”59 The fact that Killanin was regarded as a 
transition figure within the movement bode poorly for the future direction of Olympic 
doping policy.  
In February of 1973, de Merode argued that “there should be some changes in the 
IOC rules.” “The experience in Munich,” he explained, “had shown the need of having 
strict regulations and many IFs [International Federations] had expressed the wish that 
 
58 For Brundage’s arrogant prediction, see David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Biography of Juan 
Antonio Samaranch, Revised ed. (London: Pavilion, 1996), 11. 
 
59 Coupat quoted in Ibid. 
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the IOC should take a stand.” As for the longstanding directive that only competition 
medalists should be investigated, de Merode argued that “the control of the first three in 
any event was insufficient.” The discrepancy between the treatment of the Puerto Rican 
basketball team and the Dutch cycling squad moreover suggested the need for a uniform 
policy, stating that “if any member of a team was found guilty of doping, the whole team 
had to be disqualified.”60 Within the USOC, deliberations likewise concentrated on the 
problems caused by the decentralized doping control system in which each sport operated 
under a different set of rules. At an early 1973 committee meeting, one official explained 
that “you’ve got five conflicting sports. . . . [and] [t]here has been no attempt to effect 
doping control, [sic] for riding, for fencing, for shooting, for swimming.”61
In addition, reports began to circulate that athletes were beginning to take 
advantage of loopholes within the IOC’s list of banned substances by finding new, 
equally effective compounds to ingest. At a 1973 Senate hearing, former U.S. Olympian 
Phillip Shinnick asserted that “like in many areas in our society new ways to beat the 
system are devised once new precautions are taken.”62 Rumors swirled that communist-
bloc nations had developed a performance-enhancing formula that combined several 
vitamins with caffeine and nicotinamide, which were unlisted chemicals. Researching the 
effects of the formulation on volunteers after the Games, Swiss chemist David James, 
formerly an American elite sprinter, concluded that the subjects of his study benefited in 
several ways: “actions were more rapid, it seemed to delay fatigue, their reaction was 
diminished, their motor activity was better.” Although not covered under current IOC 
 
60 Minutes of the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, February 2-5, 1973, Lausanne, 
p. 12, IOCL. 
 
61 General Hains quoted in Proceedings of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States 
Olympic Committee, January 3-4, 1973, p. 232, USOCLA. 
 
62 U.S. Senate, Investigative Hearings on the Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes, 150. 
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rules, a tablespoon of the drug, he concluded, could potentially have as much impact as a 
standard dose of amphetamine sulfate.63  
A link between nationalism and doping was obvious in these developments. 
Shinnick, for instance, described an episode during his time as a manager for the U.S. 
team at a previous World University Games in Budapest, Hungary. American 
government officials traveling with the squad constantly reminded the athletes of the 
need “to win so that we could beat the ‘Commies’.” Shinnick recalled that “implicit in 
this value [was] the assumption that the world has one winner and all the rest losers in 
each event. This type of pressure leads toward drug abuse as clearly as the need for the 
coach to win to retain his job.”64 Within the Olympic governance structure, these 
pressures resulted in conflicts-of-interest among IOC medical officers. The experience 
with American officials over DeMont’s treatment (Daniel Hanley was a member of both 
the USOC and the IOC Medical Commission) led to a regulation that “no member of the 
commission could be a team doctor.”65
Nationalism’s greatest effect, though, came in the form of a clandestine state-
sponsored doping regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) run by that 
country’s Ministry of State Security—the notorious secret police popularly known as the 
Stasi. Although its constitution expressly incorporated a right to athletic opportunities for 
 
63 Neil Amdur, “Use of Caffeine Cited: Drugs Played an Olympic Role,” International Herald Tribune, 
November 15, 1972. 
 
64 U.S. Senate, Investigative Hearings on the Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes, 151. 
 
65 This was successfully proposed by Lord Killanin in Minutes of the Executive Board of the International 
Olympic Committee, February 2-5, 1973, Lausanne, IOCL. For the connection between American protests 
and the decision to bar team physicians from membership on the IOC Medical Commission, see Minutes of 
the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, September 29-30 and October 2, 1973, p. 28, 
IOCL. In that document, de Merode stated, “The experience in Munich of the team doctor attached to the 
US team was sufficient evidence of this” need for “the decision that doctors of teams at the Olympic 
Games should not be members of the Medical Commission.”  
 
 75
                                                
all East Germans, government officials in the GDR discovered that successes in 
international sport competitions offered unique opportunities to gain prestige on a global 
stage.66 With a total population of only seventeen million, the country became an athletic 
superpower with the aid of many of its top scientists. The Cold War context of this 
development was later explained by IOC official Dick Pound. GDR leaders, he stated: 
 
viewed them [East German athletes] as cold warriors. They were at the Olympics 
to demonstrate the superiority of their political system. They were servants of the 
state, with no other purpose. They had been identified and trained at the expense 
of the state and with all of the resources of the state, and they were expected to 
perform accordingly. And they were expendable warriors.67
 
A 1973 Stasi report that surfaced in the 1990s documented an “on-off” analysis of 
Oral-Turinabol (a type of anabolic steroid) in terms of its performance-enhancing effects 
on forty track-and-field athletes.68 At the 1968 Mexico City Games, the head of the 
GDR’s doping system, Dr. Manfred Höppner, utilized a protocol that allowed Margitta 
Gummel to set a new world record in the shot put by throwing 19.61 meters. A fellow 
contestant, Brigitte Berendonk, later described Gummel at the event: “She was huge. She 
had massive shoulders and arms. Her body had transformed since the last time we 
competed. She was clearly a she-man.”69 In Munich—only the third Summer Games in 
 
66 Article 18 of the East German Constitution provided, “Physical culture, sport and outdoor pursuits 
promote, as elements of socialist culture, the all-round physical and mental development of the individual.” 
Quoted in Günter Witt, “Mass Participation and Top Performance in One: Physical Culture and Sport in the 
German Democratic Republic,” Journal of Popular Culture 18, no. 3 (Winter, 1984): 171. 
 
67 Dick [Richard W.] Pound, Inside Dope: How Drugs are the Biggest Threat to Sports, Why You Should 
Care, and What Can be Done About Them (Mississauga, Ontario [Canada]: John Wiley & Sons Canada, 
Ltd., 2006), 54. 
 
68 See Franke and Berendonk, “Hormonal Doping and Androgenization of Athletes: A Secret Program of 
the German Democratic Republic Government,” 1264. 
 
69 Quoted in Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold, 146. 
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which they competed as a separate team, the East Germans built on this initial success, 
winning a total of sixty-six medals, third best among the competing nations.70  
East German athletes under the age of eighteen were told that the “little blue pills” 
they were being given were “vitamins”; those who were older were required to take an 
oath of silence concerning what were termed “performance-enhancing supplements.”71 
The effects of the drugs were stunning; in March 1977, Höppner informed Stasi officials 
that: 
 
At present anabolic steroids are applied in all Olympic sporting events . . . and by 
all national teams. The application takes place according to approved basic plans, 
in which special situations of individual athletes are also considered. The positive 
value of anabolic steroids for the development of a top performance is undoubted. 
. . . From our experience made so far it can be concluded that women have the 
greatest advantage from treatments with anabolic hormones. . . . Especially high is 
the performance-supporting effect following the first administration of anabolic 
hormones, especially with junior athletes.72
 
For the athletes, however, anabolic steroids had dangerous side-effects. Nevertheless, Dr. 
Ulrich Sunder, Chief of the Sports Medical Service, “was told by [his] medical superiors 
that the deep voice and the hair and the virilization would reverse after the women 
stopped taking them, so we did not worry about long-term consequences.” After all, he 
concluded, everyone was using drugs, including the Western states, “so why should we 
not compete on that level playing field?”73
 
70 The medal count for the Games is provided on the website of the International Olympic Committee: 
www.olympics.org (accessed December 5, 2006). 
 
71 Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold, 88. 
 
72 Quoted in Franke and Berendonk, “Hormonal Doping and Androgenization of Athletes: A Secret 
Program of the German Democratic Republic Government,” 1264. 
 
73 Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold, 107. 
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Unaware of the extent of the GDR’s doping regime, the IOC leadership focused 
on modest steps to improve its doping control system. Dissatisfied with a procedure 
under which medals were handed out before the results of the drug tests were known, 
IOC member Comte de Beaumont asked if the order could be reversed at a February 
1973 Executive Board meeting. De Merode explained that implementation of the 
proposal was impossible in that “unless there was a lapse of two or three days before the 
awarding of medals, this would be out of the question.” As a compromise, the Medical 
Commission chairman agreed that both the initial and confirmation samples could be 
analyzed at the same time instead of sequentially. He moreover argued that the IOC’s list 
of banned substances should be reconciled with those of the international federations. “It 
was unfortunate what had happened in the cycling cases,” he explained with regard to the 
suspension of the Dutch cycling team in Munich, “but the Federation should have 
adhered to the IOC list.” He consequently called for a meeting between IOC and 
federation officials before the 1976 Montreal Games to “make sure that all agreed the 
IOC prohibited list.”74 In addition, de Merode, asserting the authority of his commission, 
made it clear that the international federations should adhere to the IOC’s list rather than 
the other way around, which was the traditional point of departure under the Brundage 
leadership.75
By May 1975, many of these policies had been studied and put into effect by the 
Medical Commission. More importantly, the IOC’s list of banned substances was finally 
updated to include anabolic steroids. This was made possible through the development of 
several tests reported by scientists in the British medical literature that could detect such 
 
74 Minutes of the International Olympic Committee Executive Board, February 2-5, 1973, p. 12-13, IOCL. 
 
75 Minutes of the International Olympic Committee Executive Board, September 29-39 and October 2, 
1973, p. 14, IOCL. 
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chemicals in the human body. As articulated by de Merode, “The reason for this is that 
the progress of the scientific work proposed gives a complete guarantee as to the 
accuracy of the results that can be obtained.”76 In July of that year, several articles 
appeared in a special issue of the British Journal of Sports Medicine outlining alternative 
analytical techniques. One described the use of radioimmunoassay and another 
recommended a combination of gas chromatography and mass spectrometry.77 Seeking 
the broadest possible solution, the IOC adopted both; unfortunately, though, Olympic 
officials stilled lacked an accurate test for synthetic anabolic steroids’ natural counterpart, 
testosterone.78 This provided a significant loophole for unscrupulous competitors. Dr. 
Arnold Beckett, member of the IOC Medical Commission, explained that “some people 
and some countries are at present overcoming this disadvantage of having to stop 
[anabolic steroid treatments] before an event by injecting the male hormone testosterone; 
although this drug can be detected, the fact that this is also an endogenous material means 
at present we cannot act.”79
Although IOC President Lord Killanin lauded the effort as “good news indeed,” 
the new tests failed to solve several problems.80 Many performance-enhancing drugs, 
 
76 “Prince de Merode’s Report to the Session – May 1975,” International Olympic Committee Medical 
Commission Documents, Folder: SD 1: Comm. Méd.: Rapp. Sessions, CE 1968-1984, IOCL. 
 
77 R.V. Brooks, R.G. Firth, and N.A. Sumner, “Detection of Anabolic Steroids by Radioimmunoassay,” 
British Journal of Sports Medicine 9, no. 2 (July, 1975): 89-92; R.J. Ward, C.H. Shackleton, and A.M. 
Lawson, “Gas Chromatographic-Mass Spectrometric Methods for the Detection and Identification of 
Anabolic Steroid Drugs,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 9, no. 2 (July, 1975): 93-97. See also Todd, 
“A History of the Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” 330. 
 
78 The IOC announced steroid tests for the 1976 Montreal Games in Minutes of the 75th General Session of 
the International Olympic Committee, October 21-24, 1974, Vienna, Austria, p. 19, IOCL. For the way by 
which the two procedures were used, see A.H. Beckett, “Misuse of Drugs in Sport,” British Journal of 
Sports Medicine 12 (January, 1979): 189. 
 
79 See Ibid.: 191. 
 
80 Lord Killanin quoted in “British Find Method to Detect Steroids,” Los Angeles Times, November 1, 
1973. 
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including anabolic steroids, could be used by athletes during training, and then stopped 
shortly before competition to avoid their detection.81 In announcing the 
radioimmunoassay procedure as head of the British Sports Council, Dr. Roger Bannister, 
the world’s first sub-four minute miler, suggested that a successful policy would also 
feature “snap checks” in which specimens would be collected without prior notice at 
variable intervals. “Giving these sort of details of timing,” he continued, “would be 
against the interests of what we are trying to do.”82 Nevertheless, de Merode and the 
Medical Commission remained rooted to the notion that doping analyses should only take 
place during the Olympic competitions. This was at least partially understandable given 
the fact that few facilities were equipped to run the tests, which were, consequently, 
expensive.83 Referring to the 1976 Montreal Games, he explained to IOC officials that 
“the steroids could be detected, provided the last dosage was taken within three weeks 
before the test. If dosages had been administered more than three weeks before the test, 
then this could not be detected.” De Merode did not address, however, Dr. Bannister’s 
recommendation for a more effective “out-of-competition” testing regimen.84
Before the Montreal Games, the new tests for anabolic steroids were used in trial 
runs at the 1974 British Commonwealth Games in Auckland, New Zealand, and in that 
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year’s European Track and Field Championships.85 In Auckland, nine samples tested 
positive for anabolic steroids, but no athletes were disqualified, or even named. At the 
European Championships, Adrian Paulen, president of the European Amateur Athletic 
Federation, asserted prior to the meet that no punishments would be handed out in that 
the procedures were for research purposes only.86 British shot-putter Geoff Capes 
described the resulting satisfaction among the athletes: “you could hear the sigh of relief 
as it echoed round the team hostels that the tests would not disqualify us.”87 However, at 
the 1975 European [Track-and-Field] Cup, which was held later, two athletes were 
disqualified from the contest and then suspended by their governing body after tests 
confirmed their use of anabolic steroids.88
 
1976 MONTREAL OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
The issues concerning anabolic steroids led the IOC Medical Commission to 
appointment a sub-committee to investigate implementation of the new tests at its July 
14, 1976, meeting, which was held only a few days before the official opening of the 
Games. Several days later, the group issued a report with a description of the problem, 
alternative courses of action, and a comprehensive set of recommendations.89 Chief 
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September 9, 1974. 
 
88 See Todd, “A History of the Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” 330. 
 
89 “Anabolic Steroid Control,” July 16, 1976, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission 
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among their concerns was the IOC’s preference that the analyses should be conducted, 
and their results announced, prior to the events so that athletes who tested positive would 
not be allowed to compete.90 The sub-committee first demonstrated that “no sample 
received after the 18th of July 1976 can be analyzed (and rechecked) before the end of 
the Games”; this was particularly problematic in that although “many samples have 
already been submitted for analyses. . . . [and] it is probable that some . . . designated 
athletes will not be sampled before the above deadline.”  
An ideal pre-competition testing regime was therefore impossible given the time 
constraints involved. However, the sub-committee circumvented this dilemma by 
pointing out that “no mention is made in the Medical Commission regulations that results 
have to be made available during the Games. . . . It is important to realize that taking 
action on definitive results from analysis done after the end of the Games is already 
accepted for regular doping control [involving tests for drugs other than anabolic 
steroids].” The sub-committee thus suggested that the IOC implement the procedures 
with the understanding that post-competition sanctions could be applied. This was the 
“only action which constitutes a deterrent to competitors against their own foolishness 
and doctors or coaches against irresponsible actions not in the best interest of 
competitors.”91 In terms of the accuracy of the new tests, de Merode explained to his 
counterparts in the IOC that “the Medical Commission would only propose sanctions on 
 
 
90 This position was put forward at an IOC meeting held the previous year. “The list of banned substances 
now included anabolic steroids, which were to be checked before the Games began.” Emphasis underlined 
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athletes if it was absolutely certain. . . . If any doubt existed at all, no decision would be 
taken.”92
The lack of pre-Games tests at the national level was a problematic aspect of the 
Olympic doping control framework as reports began to leak out that many athletes were 
using performance-enhancing substances to qualify for the Games. Twenty-three 
American competitors failed the drug control tests at the U.S. Olympic track and field 
trials in Eugene, Oregon; none were punished.93 After qualifying in the discus, Jay 
Silvester, who had competed in three previous Olympic Games, stated, “I can’t ethically 
accept the use of steroids. But I would have to say that 98 to 99 per cent, no, 100 per cent 
of the international caliber throwers are taking them.” Although claiming that “I don’t 
like to talk about it,” Silvester went on to assert that “it would have been a disadvantage 
to have the control at this meet. None of the European athletes have such a control, so we 
would have been at a disadvantage.”94  
The tests served several purposes for the United States Olympic Committee, 
however. Some officials sincerely believed that they could help dampen the use of 
performance-enhancing substances by their competitors. For others, the analyses allowed 
American athletes to learn the ins and outs of the Olympic testing protocol. As stated by 
USOC member Bob Giegenbach, “It has been widely advertised and agreed upon that, in 
the final Olympic trails for men and women in Track and Field, that [sic] we will 
duplicate the doping procedure to be used at Montreal.”95 A letter to USOC physician 
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Montreal, p. 41, IOCL. 
 
93 “Effect of Drugs to Aid Athletes Studied by U.S,” New York Times, August 22, 1976. 
 
94 “Olympian Says Drug Use Heavy,” Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1976. 
 
95 These points can be found in Proceedings of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States 
Olympic Committee, June 5, 1976, New York, pp. 99-114, USOCLA. Giegenback quote from p. 100. 
 
 83
                                                
Daniel Hanley regarding American swimmers informed him of an extraordinarily high 
number of positives in pre-competition testing. It was therefore suggested to Hanley that 
“all competitors in future competition be similarly advised on . . . detection 
procedures.”96
During the Games, a total of 1,800 urine specimens were collected in 
“conventional” testing procedures for prohibited drugs; three positive drug indications 
were obtained. In the new anabolic steroid screens, eight instances of anabolic steroid use 
were identified among the 275 tests for such substances; this ratio was thirty times greater 
than the combined positive results of all other prohibited drugs.97 Among those testing 
positive for anabolic steroids were two American weightlifters, Mark Cameron and Phil 
Grippaldi, both of whom were suspended.98 Remembering their experience over DeMont, 
USOC officials protested that they were “shocked and appalled in having to learn of 
penalties enforced by the [IOC] Medical Commission in the case of Mark Cameron.”99 
They were, in addition, infuriated by what they perceived to be several mistakes within 
the drug control procedures. USOC President Philip Krumm argued first that “we 
seriously question the validity of the procedures used and the random selection of 
subjects which resulted in inequities in the pre-competition testing for steroids.” Taking 
issue with the inability of his athletes to recognize the loopholes within the procedures, 
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he complained that the controls “were not clearly enunciated prior to the Games, or prior 
to the arrival of the various squads.” Equally shocking, Krumm continued, was the fact 
that the penalties were released to the public before the USOC was informed.100
American sport officials were not alone in such criticisms. Boleslaw Kapitan, 
President of the Polish Olympic Committee, wrote to Killanin that “we deplore the fact 
that the medical tests were so prolonged.” Kapitan claimed that his federation learned of 
the positive test result for Zbigniew Kaczmarek, one of its weightlifters, seven days after 
the closing ceremonies and three weeks after he had received a gold medal. More 
importantly, Kapitan asserted, “The publication of the results of the medical tests in the 
international press before the IOC had announced its decision and probably contrary to 
your intentions, is prejudicial to the essential interests of sport.” As for the validity of the 
procedures that were used, Kapitan’s medical consultants informed him that several of 
the seals used in the specimen containers were defective in that they could easily be 
opened and their contents changed. “Under these circumstances, since our athlete 
categorically denies having used Dianabol and as the identification of the contents of the 
bottles is extremely dubious,” he declared that “we feel obliged to deny the regularity of 
the way in which the medical tests were carried out.”101
Warned by IOC doping expert Arnold Beckett that “some countries may 
endeavour to make a political issue of this and challenge the efficacy of the tests,” IOC 
President Killanin sought to dispel such questions concerning the validity of the doping 
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protocols by authorizing an article in the IOC Review.102 Concerned also by the 
premature release of information concerning the test results, he wrote that “[I] am most 
interested to know the first ‘leak’. . . . I am interested to know whether at any time an 
‘IOC Spokesman’ was referred to in the [press] cuttings.”103 Several days later, the 
Medical Commission tried to limit the damage from the problem by releasing a statement 
that it “deplores the publication of names of competitors before analysis of the second 
samples of urines had confirmed the presence of a steroid. The information concerning 
names and countries involved was not released by the commission.”104 After the Games, 
de Merode blamed other members of the international sport community by speculating 
that the “leakage might have come from the then Secretary General of the [International 
Weightlifting Federation].”105 Further outlining the validity of the suspensions, the IOC 
Medical Commission firmly announced that “while points of protest were heard about the 
procedure. . . . [a]fter due consideration, we reject these protests on the ground that the 
agreed procedure had been followed and there was no evidence of violation of 
security.”106
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LEGACY OF THE 1976 MONTREAL GAMES 
 
American competitors were angered by the fact that not a single athlete from the 
GDR competing at the Games was included on the list of disqualified individuals. 
Watching the women’s swimming events, Rod Strachan, the gold medalist in the 400-
meter individual medley, described the incredible physical discrepancy between the 
American and East German female competitors. “If you look at the East Germans,” he 
asserted, “they don’t look exactly like they’re girls. They’re quite a bit bigger than most 
of the men on the American team. They could go out for football at U.S.C. They’ve got 
some big guys there.”107 Five-time U.S. long-jumper Willye White continued that “if 
they [are] around, the only way you can tell it’s a woman is by their bust.” Future 
American success, according to White, therefore required a cynical incorporation of East 
German methods: “If we’re going to compete against synthetic athletes, we must become 
syntheti[c] athletes.”108
Ironically, given their condemnation of the GDR doping regime, this is exactly 
the strategy that USOC leaders chose to adopt. Shortly after the conclusion of the 
Montreal Games, USOC officials approved the formation of a panel, headed by 
cardiovascular surgeon Irving Dardik, to study the application of scientific and medical 
advances to athletics. “We want to develop methods and modalities for working with 
 
Carroll A. Laurin, August 23, 1976, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission Records, 
Folder: Dopage en haltérophilie aux Jeux Olympiques de Montréal 1976, 1976 à 1977, IOCL. 
 
107 Strachan is quoted in “E. German Women’s Success Stirs U.S. Anger,” New York Times, August 1, 
1976. 
 
108 White quoted in Ibid. 
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athletes that would enhance their performances,” Dardik explained. As part of this effort, 
the panel would even “look into areas considered taboo” among members of the public; 
these would include the possible uses of performance-enhancing drugs.”109 Privately, 
Dardik tried to mollify concerns by asserting that while the “ultimate function . . . of the 
Olympic Sports medicine Committee is to provide . . . scientific and technological 
assistance for maintenance and improvement in athletic performance,” the panel would 
“draw the line where sports medical aid stops and physical manipulation begins.”110 As a 
long-jumper who had to compete with the East Germans, Willye White exclaimed that 
“this is the kind of program we’ve needed for a long time. If the U.S.O.C. lets Dardik 
operate, there’s no telling how far we could go.”111 While most American officials never 
adopted such a broad interpretation, this was the sort of attitude that characterized the 
connections within the Olympic movement between nationalist forces and the increasing 




Olympic drug control policies during the 1970s were thus beset by many of the 
same issues apparent in the previous decade. The various components of the international 
sport system, including the IOC, its counterparts at the national level, international 
federations, and organizing committees for the Games, were at odds over both the 
 
109 Dardik quoted in “Effect of Drugs to Aid Athletes Studied by U.S.” 
 
110 “Dr. Dardik’s Sports Medicine Presentation, Athletes Advisory Council Meeting, Squaw Valley, 
California, April 2, 1977, appended as Exhibit “A” in Proceedings of the Quadrennial Meeting of the 
United States Olympic Committee, General Business Session, April 29, 1977, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 
Vol. 1, USOCLA. 
 
111 White quoted in “Effect of Drugs to Aid Athletes Studied by U.S.” 
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regulations that should be enacted and how they should be enforced. Nationalistic forces 
became an especially important component of this environment as countries increasingly 
perceived the Olympics as a tool for the promotion of their images abroad. The German 
Democratic Republic, what with its extensive doping regime, was the most culpable (and 
successful) individual country in terms of applying performance-enhancing techniques in 
the pursuit of this goal. Failing to acknowledge these developments, Olympic 
policymakers were consequently slow to take advantage of the latest drug detection 
methods. As a result, a multitude of athletes, many of whom were unaware as to the 
substances they were being forced to take, suffered severe—and at times, life-
threatening—side-effects.112
While these developments should have been cause for public concern, unrelated 
events took attention away from the issue. The dramatic terrorist attacks by the Black 
September organization at the 1972 Munich Games, in which thirteen Israeli athletes lost 
their lives, received (quite appropriately) the overwhelming attention of Olympic 
administrators, media outlets, and government officials. Less justifiable was the relatively 
anemic response to widespread rumors that East German swimmers were dominating the 
1976 Games through their extensive use of performance-enhancing drugs. Although 
several meaningful changes were made, Olympic officials, still largely approaching the 
matter through the lens of image management, preferred to downplay the real magnitude 
of the doping crisis rather than engage in a difficult and expensive process of reform. The 
IOC leadership continued to assert a restrictive stance towards central IOC regulatory 
responsibility at the inopportune time when extreme nationalistic forces emerged to 
overwhelm a vulnerable, internally-conflicted policy framework. The stage was thus set 
 
112 The effects of the GDR doping system for East German athletes are catalogued in Ungerleider, Faust’s 
Gold. 
 89
for the 1980s, in which a series of doping scandals would finally force the IOC to pursue 
a new direction.
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Ch. 3: The Turning Point, 1980-1989 
In the last decade of the Cold War, the perceived ideological importance of the 
Olympic movement led to its continuation as a proxy in the political rivalry between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. While their respective boycotts of the 1980 Moscow 
Games and the 1984 Los Angeles Games threatened the future viability of the Olympic 
movement, the superpowers also had important influences on the direction of doping 
control policy.1 Deferring to the wishes of Soviet sport administrators and distracted by 
the American boycott, IOC leaders failed to fulfill hopes for an effective testing regimen 
in 1980. As a consequence, the Moscow Games, deceptively portrayed by de Merode at 
the time as the “purest” in the history of the movement, produced not a single positive 
indication of drug use, although unofficial tests later identified a potpourri of 
performance-enhancing substances.2 American officials, responding to the athletic 
successes of the communist world, weakened their own policies to keep pace in the 
Olympic medals race. The Los Angeles Organizing Committee for the 1984 Games, 
motivated by a concern for economic efficiency, was particularly influential in blocking 
expensive testing initiatives. Other members of the international sports community also 
 
1 The 1980 Moscow Games are covered in Christopher Booker, The Games War: A Moscow Journal 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1981); Barukh Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982). The boycott by an American-led coalition is analyzed in 
Derick L. Hulme, The Political Olympics: Moscow, Afghanistan, and the 1980 U.S. Boycott (New York: 
Praeger, 1990). The Soviet Union’s retaliation with a similar boycott in 1984 has received less attention. 
For a starting point, see Harold E. Wilson, Jr., “The Golden Opportunity: Romania’s Political Manipulation 
of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies 3 
(1994): 83-97. An overview of the state of doping in sport at the beginning of the decade is provided in 
E.C. Percy, “Chemical Warfare: Drugs in Sports,” Western Journal of Medicine 133, no. 6 (December, 
1980): 478-484. 
 
2 “Purest” is the term used by IOC Medical Commission chairman Alexandre de Merode. He is quoted in 
The Organising Committee for the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, “Doping Control at the Games of the 
XXIInd Olympiad,” February 1981, p. 28, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission 
Records, Folder: Affairs Medicale aux Jeux Olmpiques de Moscou 1980: controles du dopage et de 
feminale 1980, 1980-1987, IOCL. 
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played critical roles in relaxing doping regulations; at different times during the decade, 
for example, the IOC Medical Commission, the International Association of Athletics 
Federations, and the USOC suppressed test results that would have otherwise rendered 
their athletes ineligible. 
While most of the decade was marked by alternating improvements and relapses 
in regulatory development, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games served as a turning point in 
the history of doping control policy.3 Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson’s positive test for 
the anabolic steroid stanozolol in the wake of a world record-setting one-hundred meter 
sprint focused public attention on the issue in a profound way. Government officials, 
taking note of this response, initiated investigations into the conduct of the movement, 
thereby pressuring Olympic officials to reform their policies. Describing the 
consequences of these events, IOC member Dick Pound later recalled that “when the 
definitive history of doping in sport . . . is written, the Ben Jonson disqualification will be 
one of the key dates. This was a definitive statement by the IOC that it would not cover 
up cheating, even by one of the leading athletes.”4 Although it would take several years 
 
3 While the 1980 Games demonstrated the continuing weakness of Olympic doping policy and the 1984 
Los Angeles Games witnessed a doping “cover-up,” testosterone was finally added to the IOC’s list of 
banned substances in 1982. See Jan Todd and Terry Todd, “Significant Events in the History of Drug 
Testing and the Olympic Movement: 1960-1999,” in Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the 
Olympic Movement, ed. Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001), 78; 
Philip Hage, “Caffeine, Testosterone Banned for Olympians,” Physician and Sportsmedicine 10, no. 7 
(July, 1982): 15-17. The implications of the Johnson scandal for doping policy in international athletics is 
discussed in Judith Blackwell, “Discourses on Drug Use: The Social Construction of a Steroid Scandal,” 
Journal of Drug Issues 21, no. 1 (Winter, 1991): 147-164. See also Bruce Kidd, Robert Edelman, and 
Susan Brownell, “Comparative Analysis of Doping Scandals: Canada, Russia, and China,” in Doping in 
Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, ed. Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse 
(Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001), 155-161. 
 
4 Richard W. Pound, Inside the Olympics: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the 
Glory of the Games (Etobicoke, Ont. [Canada]: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, 2004), 53. 
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to be implemented, the agenda was thus set for a gradual expansion and consolidation of 




In the aftermath of a silver medal performance in the 1976 Olympic marathon, 
U.S runner Frank Shorter was asked whether he planned to compete in the upcoming 
Moscow Games scheduled for the summer of 1980. His response highlighted the degree 
to which performance-enhancing drugs had become necessary components to success in 
elite international sport. “Yeah,” he affirmed, so long as “I find some good doctors.”6 
Policymakers in the Olympics were even more critical. The chief American physician at 
the 1976 Games, John Anderson, asserted a belief that “you’ll see much more of a 
problem in doping control [in Moscow], particularly in the area of anabolic steroids.” 
“The majority of the I.O.C. members,” he claimed, “are looking at the trees, not the 
whole picture.”  The committee was, for example, developing expensive testing 
equipment while concurrently legalizing known stimulants such as the asthma medication 
terbutaline. The overly-legalistic nature of the IOC’s approach ignored the potential of an 
educational campaign to redirect athletes’ moral orientations concerning the use of 
performance-enhancing substances. Unless rectified, these deficiencies, Anderson 
argued, were likely to cause a doping catastrophe in Moscow on such a scale as to 
threaten the future of the movement. “I think in 1980,” he concluded, “it will become 
evident to the world in general and the athlete in particular that man has gone a bit too far 
 
5 The interaction of private sports organizations and national governments on doping issues during the 
1980s is briefly discussed in Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-
Doping Policy, 2nd ed. (Strasbourg, Germany: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), 160. 
 
6 Shorter quoted in “Effect of Drugs to Aid Athletes Studied by U.S,” New York Times, August 22, 1976. 
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in manipulating individuals, and it would seem to this observer that 1984 indeed will 
come [and go] without the Olympic Games.”7
Despite such cynicisms, several sport administrators continued to claim that a 
slight retooling of the medical controls would successfully curtail the use of ergogenic 
aids. Victor Rogozhin, chairman of the Moscow Games Organizing Committee’s anti-
doping panel, asserted prior to the event’s opening that “we have conducted important 
research on improving methods of detecting steroid hormones and reducing the time 
necessary for the test. This will make it possible not only to increase the number of tests 
for this group of drugs, but also to carry them out according to the regulations established 
. . . by the Medical Commission of the [IOC].”8 Even American officials seemed to 
agree; USOC physician Daniel Hanley admitted that “the capacity of the labs in Moscow 
seems to be perfectly adequate, and the testing will be carefully overseen by the Medical 
Commission.”9  
Nevertheless, athletes and unscrupulous administrators on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain busied themselves with identifying loopholes in the testing procedures, which 
allowed them to develop precise estimates as to the last doses they could take before their 
competitions. In order for their athletes to avoid detection, East German scientists 
implemented a protocol whereby administrations of detectable synthetic anabolic steroids 
were replaced with injections of Testosterone-Depot and other similar compounds in the 
final weeks before competitions. As “natural” substances, these testosterone doses could 
not be differentiated through ordinary urinalysis from hormones normally found in the 
 
7 Anderson quoted in Neil Amdur, “Wider Olympic Drug Abuse is Seen,” New York Times, January 30, 
1977. 
 
8 Rogozhin quoted in Barry Lorge, “IOC Gears Up to Detect Drugs, Ingenious Cheating in Moscow,” 
Washington Post, June 1, 1979. 
 
9 Hanley quoted in Ibid. 
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human body.10 Describing this new “testosterone loophole,” an anonymous USOC 
medical staff member remarked that the “athletes seem to have the timing down to the 
minute as to how soon they have to ‘get off’ a drug to avoid detection.” A larger 
infrastructure was, of course, a component of this “cat-and-mouse-game.” “You’d also 
swear,” the staff member thus continued, “they had Ph.D. pharmacologists working for 
them to figure out how to beat tests almost faster than the antidoping [sic] scientists can 
make them more sensitive.”11  
Fuel to these suspicions was provided by the defection of an East Germany 
sprinter, Renate Neufeld, who brought along the pills and powders that her coaches had 
required her to use; chemical analyses later determined they were anabolic steroids. “The 
trainer told me the pills would make me stronger and faster and that there were no side 
effects,” she explained. Describing the extent of the state-sponsored program, Neufeld 
declared, “We all lived the same way, the general approach is the same.”12 “You don’t 
know what is being tried out,” corroborated elite East German swimmer—and fellow 
defector—Renate Vogel, as to “what ingredients there are in the food, what is being 
injected. You cannot take a stand against it.”13
 
10 See Steven Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold: Inside the East German Doping Machine (New York: Thomas 
Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 37-38. For a contemporaneous journalistic depiction, see Pete 
Axthelm and Frederick Kempe, “The East German Machine,” Newsweek (July 14, 1980), 50. 
 
11 Quoted in Lorge, “IOC Gears Up to Detect Drugs, Ingenious Cheating in Moscow.” 
 
12 Neufeld quoted in John Vinocur, “East German Tale of Tyranny,” New York Times, January 11, 1979. 
Several other defectors from the GDR provided similar information. These included shot-putter Ilona 
Slupianek and Dr. Alois Marder, a former East German sports physician.  See Michael Getler, “E. 
Germans, Drugs: Hard Facts Missing,” Washington Post, May 27, 1979. 
 
13 Vogel quoted in “Sporting Scene,” National Review 31, no. 41 (October 12, 1979): 1280. This article 
also cites a claim by Vogel that she had experienced medical difficulties due to the fact that she had been 
subjected to compulsory doping since age fourteen. 
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Despite their 1976 proposal to merely study the potential of performance-
enhancing drugs in an expanded medical program, American officials took a more 
progressive stance in the run-up to the Moscow Games.14 In November of 1978, a new 
USOC medical taskforce recommended the implementation of comprehensive drug tests 
at all national championships. Describing the proposal as “a positive step,” USOC 
Executive Director Don Miller asserted that “we have to identify where drugs are being 
used to centralize our effort. The only way you can do this is through an effective drug 
testing program.”15 Other Western nations also enacted more rigorous protocols. 
However, the diffuse international sport system, in which its individual components were 
free to enact their own preferences, reduced the likelihood that a global Olympic doping 
strategy could be created. IOC Medical Commission member Dr. Arnold Becket thus 
complained that “one of the troubles is that there are no totally universal controls. For 
instance, the United Kingdom and Denmark are quite strict [with doping]. . . . But the 
Soviets will pull their teams out of a competition with testing. And some Americans 
won’t show up, either.”16
 
1980 WINTER GAMES IN LAKE PLACID, NEW YORK 
 
The 1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid, New York, benefited, according to some 
officials, from a greatly enhanced drug testing protocol. Dr. Robert Dugal, co-director of 
the competition’s doping control effort asserted that “the system we’re using is more 
sophisticated now. It can separate drugs more precisely and isolate the compounds.” His 
 
14 The 1976 program is outlined in “Effect of Drugs to Aid Athletes Studied by U.S.” 
 
15 Neil Amdur, “Mounting Drug Use Afflicts World Sports,” New York Times, November 20, 1978. 
 
16 Ken Denlinger, “Warfare on Drugs Increases,” Washington Post, February 12, 1980. 
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colleague, Dr. Michel Bertrand, went further; “The equipment acts with the precision of 
radar,” he claimed. “We are confident it will be a deterrent, because athletes who think 
they can risk trying us will be making a mistake.”17 The head physician for the American 
team, Anthony Daley, likewise stated that “the old saying was the lab could tell you what 
kind of lettuce you ate for lunch two days before. Now, I think they could tell you how 
old the lettuce was. The tests are that sensitive.”18
Other members of the Olympic medical establishment were less hopeful. Dr. 
Beckett of the IOC Medical Commission described the struggle between drug-dependent 
athletes and doping authorities as “a warfare” in which actions were “ruthless.” Asked 
whether his commission was prevailing, he replied, “No. We can only prevent the more 
serious aspects of the problem. We win some; we lose some. The war goes on.” He 
perceived a particular danger from the involvement of unscrupulous physicians and sport 
administrators that either explicitly or implicitly supported the use of ergogenic aids; 
“Not all the blame should be put on the athletes,” Beckett explained. “It goes much 
further up. The people behind them should be kicked out.” As for the integrity of the 
Games, he asserted that “the competition should be between individual athletes, not 
doctors and pharmacologists. We don’t want sports people used as guinea pigs to boost 
the doctors behind them.”19 In the end, Beckett’s pessimism was proved valid, as the 
protocol employed at the 1980 Winter Olympic Games in Lake Placid produced not a 
single positive indication of drug use among the 790 doping tests administered.20  
 
17 Dugal and Bertrand quoted in Steve Cady, “Drug Testers Stiffen Olympic Procedures,” New York Times, 
December 7, 1979. 
 
18 Daley quoted in Denlinger, “Warfare on Drugs Increases.” 
 
19 Beckett quoted in Ibid. 
 
20 There were 440 tests for stimulants and 350 tests for anabolic steroids. See “Olympic Athletes Cleared,” 
Washington Post, February 25, 1980. 
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The dangerous combination of new doping techniques and political machinations 
at the Games alarmed several other IOC officials. Having been asked about her 
perceptions regarding the movement’s greatest challenges in the period between the Lake 
Placid Games and the Moscow Summer Olympics, IOC secretary Monique Berlioux 
answered that it was “the growing influence of politics in sport and the manipulation of 
athletes with drugs and the fabrication of an artificial human being.”21 Despite such 
apparent attention to the dilemma, problems related to drugs in the Olympics would not 
be clarified in Russia. 
 
1980 MOSCOW OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
In terms of Olympic medical policy, Moscow was a peculiar choice for the 
Summer Games of the XXII Olympiad. Although less notorious than the East German 
doping regime, it was widely believed that the Soviets sponsored a similar program. 
Confirmation of systematic doping by the Soviet Union came in 2003 when Dr. Michael 
Kalinski, former chair of the sport biochemistry department at the State University of 
Physical Education and Sport in Kiev, Ukraine, released a 1972 document detailing a 
clandestine Soviet project that concerned the administration of anabolic steroids to elite 
athletes.22 As the 1980 Games neared, however, Soviet sport officials assured the IOC 
leadership that their regulations would be strictly applied. Indeed, Soviet efforts 
 
21 Berlioux quoted in Bill Starr, “Steroid Madness: Drugs and the Olympics,” August 1980, p. 65, 
magazine clipping in International Olympic Committee Medical Commission Records, Folder: Los 
Angeles ‘84 Medical Matters, 1978-1983, IOCL. 
 
22 Andrew Nynka, “Ukrainian Scientist Details Secret Soviet Research Project on Steroids,” Ukrainian 
Weekly, November 9, 2003. The article was accessed online at 
http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2003/450319.shtml on December 22, 2006.  
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impressed Medical Commission chairman Alexandre de Merode during an October 1979 
tour of the laboratory facilities in Moscow, which he described as “well-equipped.”23 The 
accuracy of the chairman’s observations was later called into question, however. Dr. 
Robert Voy, who became chief medical officer of the USOC in 1984, for example, 
argued that “after seeing their testing facilities in Moscow firsthand and after realizing 
the Soviets’ willingness to play these types of games, I simply cannot believe that [de 
Merode’s] claim.”24
Whatever the progressiveness regarding the level of equipment, something was 
deeply flawed in Moscow’s doping preparations. Observers of the competitions, for 
example, became suspicions of drug usage after seeing the well-developed physiques of 
the athletes.25 However, of the 6,868 gas chromatography tests, 2,493 
radioimmunoassays, 220 mass spectrometry analyses, and forty-three alcohol tests, no 
positive results were reported.26 While the IOC leadership basked in the glow of what 
they called the “purest” Games in the history of the movement, one of their number was 
not quite ready to be persuaded.27 Manfred Donike, a West German physician on the 
 
23 Medical Commission Report, Minutes of the 82nd General Session of the International Olympic 
Committee, February 10-13, 1980, Lake Placid, p. 24, IOCL. 
 
24 See Robert O. Voy and Kirk D. Deeter, Drugs, Sport, and Politics: The Inside Story about Drug Use in 
Sport and its Political Cover-up, with a Prescription for Reform (Champaign, Ill.: Leisure Press, 1991), 
112. 
 
25 IOC Medical Commission member Dr. Arnold Beckett, observing the events in Moscow, said, “You see 
some of the shapes . . . and suspicions are probably justified.” Beckett quoted in “I.O.C. Issues Doping 
Report,” New York Times, August 4, 1980. A Russian sports journalist later laughingly told British 
journalist Andrew Jennings about the media’s knowledge of the drug tests in Moscow: “‘Doping control in 
Moscow? . . . There was no doping control!’” See Andrew Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996), 236. 
 
26 The number of drug tests in Moscow are provided in the Organising Committee for the 1980 Olympic 
Games in Moscow, “Doping Control at the Games of the XXIInd Olympiad,” February 1981, p. 28, 
International Olympic Committee Medical Commission Records, Folder: Affairs Medicale aux Jeux 
Olmpiques de Moscou 1980: controles du dopage et de feminale 1980, 1980-1987, IOCL. 
 
27 De Merode quote from Ibid. 
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Medical Commission, privately ran a series of additional tests. Having developed a new 
technique for identifying abnormal levels of testosterone, involving measuring its ratio to 
epitestosterone in urine (positive tests were set at a 6:1 ratio of the former to the latter), 
he determined that the rumors of extensive doping were likely founded in fact. A full 
twenty percent of the specimens that underwent his testing protocol, including those from 
an alarming sixteen gold medalists, had testosterone-epitestosterone ratios that would 
have resulted in disciplinary proceedings if the screens had been official.28  
Consequently, these were not the “purest” Games in history; they were one of the 
dirtiest. Athletes had not cleaned up—they had simply switched to testosterone and other 
drugs for which the IOC did not yet have tests. The hypocrisy of the competitions was 
perhaps best described in a 1989 study by the Australian government: “there is hardly a 
medal winner at the Moscow Games, certainly not a gold medal winner,” it reported, 
“who is not on one sort of drug or another: usually several kinds. The Moscow Games 
might as well have been called the Chemists’ Games.”29 An IOC gadfly, Andrew 
Jennings, even cited an anonymous KGB colonel as stating that Soviet security officers, 
posing as IOC anti-doping authorities, had sabotaged the drug tests. Soviets athletes, the 
colonel professed, “were rescued with [these] tremendous efforts.”30 Whether these 
 
28 Donike interview by Terry Todd, February 6, 1982, referenced in Todd and Todd, “Significant Events in 
the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement,” 77. See also Terry Todd, “A History of the Use 
of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” in Sport and Exercise Science: Essays in the History of Sports Medicine, ed. 
Jack W. Berryman and Roberta J. Park (Urbana; Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 333. 
 
29 Government of Australia, “Drugs in Sport,” Interim Report of the Senate Standing Committee on the 
Environment, Recreation and the Arts (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989), p. 10, 
quoted in Houlihan, Dying to Win, 47.  
 
30 In addition to those of Soviet athletes, the colonel also claimed that positives tests were suppressed for 
several Swedish and East German Olympians. See Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings, 235-236. 
According to a fellow English journalist, three Soviet security agents were appointed to the Soviet Olympic 
Committee prior to the 1980 Games by KGB director Yuri Andropov. The KGB agents were Anatoly 
Gresko (who in 1971 had been thrown out of England for espionage), Semyon Nitkin (the controller for the 
notorious British double-agent Kim Philby), and V.I. Popov. See “Sporting Scene,” 1280. 
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claims were true or false, the question, then, was not how the doping policies had 
succeeded, but why they had failed so miserably. Were the tests deliberately tampered 
with? Were results suppressed? Could there be a conspiracy? While answers were not 




In the immediate aftermath of the Moscow Games, the IOC Medical Commission 
continued to push for more robust doping regulations. Chairman de Merode was 
particularly concerned that the commission’s jurisdictional limitation to the Olympic 
competitions was restraining its success in the field. He therefore pointed out to other 
IOC members that “it had been hoped to set up some kind of control between the 
Olympic Games. . . . It was essential to continue the work of approving neutral 
laboratories for doping testing in order that these could be used to test between Games.”31 
Dr. Eduardo Hay replied that the politics of the international sport system might make 
such policy reform difficult. Preaching caution, he stated that “the Medical Commission 
of the IOC only had [sic] jurisdiction within the Olympic Games at present. It would be 
necessary to modify its role and work with the IFs and NOCs if this authority were to 
spread to regional Games or international competitions in general.” Explaining the 
nuances of an additional proposal that more athletes should be tested, he continued that 
“rule changes would create major technical problems,” so it was “better to retain the 
present procedure.”32 For a time, the IOC leadership supported Hay’s position. 
 
31 Minutes of the 84th IOC General Session, Baden-Baden, Germany, September 29-October 2, 1981, p. 
28-29, IOCL. 
 
32 Minutes of the 84th IOC General Session, Baden-Baden, Germany, September 29-October 2, 1981, p. 
29, IOCL. 
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De Merode made some progress by May 1982, however, in advocating inter-
Games testing. Through negotiations with the international federations, for example, he 
strengthened an agreement with the International Amateur Athletics Federation for 
procedures through which laboratories could be recognized, and also established a 
universal set of sanctions for those IAAF track-and-field athletes caught doping between 
Olympic competitions.33 In addition, the results of Donike’s unofficial testosterone 
screens in Moscow convinced de Merode that the hormone must be added to the IOC’s 
list of banned substances. In a 1982 interview, he explained that “the increase in 
testosterone [use] is a direct consequence of the doping control for anabolic steroids. In 
former times, athletes . . . have to stop the use of anabolic steroids at least three weeks 
before the event. So they have to substitute. And the agent of choice is testosterone—
testosterone injections.”34 Due to his efforts, the IOC quickly announced that it was 
banning the hormone along with caffeine.35
Such medical advances also led to rumors of a major doping cover-up at the 1983 
World Track-and-Field Championships in Helsinki, Finland. Given that a number of 
world records were broken at the event, insiders were convinced of a connection with 
doping practices. Because the IAAF was in charge of the drug screens rather than the 
IOC, the “insiders” believed that the diffuse regulatory system of international sport 
played a major role in the controversy. USOC physician Robert Voy specifically blamed 
Primo Nebiolo, then president of the IAAF, for suppressing the positive tests. “There is 
no doubt in my mind,” he later wrote, “that, at least in 1983, Nebiolo would not have 
 
 
33 Prince Alexandre de Merode, “Report from the IOC Medical Commission,” Annex 13 of Minutes of the 
85th IOC General Session, Rome, May 27-29, 1982, p. 56-57, IOCL. 
 
34 Todd, “A History of the Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” 332. 
 
35 See Hage, “Caffeine, Testosterone Banned for Olympians,” 15, 17. 
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pressed for honest, accurate testing in Helsinki.”36 Within the IOC leadership, Canadian 
delegate Dick Pound likewise stated that “something was very, very wrong with the 
testing procedures [in Helsinki].” He continued that “my feeling was that . . . there either 
were positives that were not acted upon by the IAAF or that there were directions not to 
test for certain compounds or substances.” Indeed, according to Pound, “all over the 
world, people shook their heads and said (the testing) is not credible. . . . [The IAAF] was 
in serious jeopardy of becoming a laughingstock because of the results.”37
Although test failures were not announced in Helsinki, testimony at a later 
Canadian investigation revealed that some athletes did, in fact, test positive for 
performance-enhancing drugs at the competition. As an indirect consequence of the 
episode, elite athletes began to understand the accuracy of the new gas chromatography 
and mass spectrometry testosterone tests.38 A larger controversy ensued at the 1983 Pan-
American Games held in Caracas, Venezuela, when twelve members of the U.S. track-
and-field squad left before their events to avoid the screens. Several of those who 
remained were caught and punished.39 Still more damning was the USOC’s involvement 
in warning its athletes of the more rigorous doping protocols. After learning of the new 
testing procedures upon her arrival in Caracas, the American team’s chief of mission, 
Evie Dennis, asked U.S. coaches and managers to alert their athletes of the screens.40 
 
36 Voy and Deeter, Drugs, Sport, and Politics, 104. 
 
37 Pound quoted in Randy Harvey, “IOC Official Questions Drug Testing in Track,” Los Angeles Times, 
May 9, 1989. See also Voy and Deeter, Drugs, Sport, and Politics, 104. 
 
38 See Voy and Deeter, Drugs, Sport, and Politics, 102-105. 
 
39 These included one cyclist, one sprinter, one fencer, one shot-putter, and eleven weightlifters. Their most 
prominent member was U.S. weightlifter Jeff Michaels.  See Todd and Todd, “Significant Events in the 
History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement,” 79. 
 
40 See Frank Litsky, “Some U.S. Athletes Leave Games at Caracas Amid Stiff Drug Tests,” New York 
Times, August 24, 1983. 
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Before the events, a few USOC officials also advocated pre-competition tests to prevent 
unexpected results. Speaking at a July 1983 meeting, USOC member Jack Kelly stated 
that “one of the things that concerns me a great deal . . . is what would be tremendously 
embarrassing to the [USOC], and hurt us greatly in future fund-raising, and things of that 
nature, if several of our athletes were tested for steroids . . . and barred from the Olympic 
Games.” He continued, “I would hope that the Medical Committee would be doing some 
preliminary testing with the likely athletes . . . to make sure that, when they go to the 
Games, that [sic] they are going to pass whatever tests may be used.”41 USOC President 
William Simon later admitted that a number of American athletes prior to the 1984 
Games failed pre-competition steroid screens sponsored by his organization, but were 
allowed to compete because participation in the testing program was not required.42 In 
addition, as only medalists were tested at the Pan-American Games in Venezuela, U.S. 
weightlifters who failed these preliminary screens, according to Dr. Voy, circumvented 
the official tests by deliberately performing poorly.43  
 
1984 LOS ANGELES GAMES 
 
The USOC continued its policy of testing American athletes in the period before 
the opening of the Los Angeles Olympic Games in the summer of 1984.44 Although drug 
 
41 Kelly comments in Proceedings of the Meetings of the Administrative Committee and Executive Board 
of the United States Olympic Committee, July 15-16, 1983, New York, p. 190, USOCLA. 
 
42 See “Some on U.S. Squad at Caracas Failed Drug Tests Before Games,” New York Times, August 27, 
1983. 
 
43 Voy and Deeter, Drugs, Sport, and Politics, 102-103. 
 
44 See “The Daily Dope Dialogue,” Track and Field News (February, 1985), 52; Todd and Todd, 
“Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement,” 83-84. 
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screens were considered “formal” at the 1984 American Olympic Trials in the sense that 
sanctions were required for positive results, Dr. Voy later learned that many athletes were 
allowed to compete despite affirmative indications of doping.45 In a self-incriminating 
report that was withheld until after the conclusion of the 1984 Games, USOC President F. 
Don Miller admitted that eighty-six athletes, including ten at the Olympic trials, tested 
positive for banned substances before the competitions in Los Angeles. The timing of this 
disclosure was, of course, likely motivated by the wish to avert pre-Games criticism of 
the American team.46
The other components of the Olympic governance system, including the IOC and 
the Los Angeles Organizing Committee, were motivated less by sincere moralistic 
concerns over doping than by economic issues.47 Never overly-profitable to begin with, 
the financially troubled 1976 Montreal Games served as a warning for officials in 
California that what mattered most was the bottom line.48 The U.S.-led boycott of the 
1980 Games in Moscow only made the situation worse. Within the IOC, a more 
commercially astute leader than Lord Killanin was elected to the IOC presidency in 1980 
 
45 Voy and Deeter, Drugs, Sport, and Politics, 89-90. 
 
46 See “86 Athletes Tested Positive,” New York Times, January 11, 1985. See also Todd, “A History of the 
Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” 334; “U.S. Olympic Group to Weight Drug Test Plan; 86 American 
Athletes Failed 1984 Screening,” Chronicle of Higher Education  (January 23, 1985). Prior to the 1984 
Games, the public was told that all members of the U.S. track-and-field team had passed their drug tests at 
the Olympic trials. See “U.S. Track Olympians Pass Drug Tests,” New York Times, July 18, 1984. 
 
47 An award-winning study of the IOC’s ascent as an economic power is provided in Robert Knight 
Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott G. Martyn, Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic 
Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism, Revised ed. (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
2004). 
 
48 For the economic failures in Montreal, see Nick Auf der Maur, The Billion-Dollar Game: Jean Drapeau 
and the 1976 Olympics (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1976); Jack Barry Ludwig, Five Ring Circus: The Montreal 
Olympics (Toronto: Doubleday, 1976). 
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in the person of Spaniard Juan Antonio Samaranch.49 Despite his intimate knowledge of 
financial considerations, the choice was not ideal for those wishing for robust drug 
regulations. According to Pound, the new president “always thought the IOC Medical 
Commission was dangerous” in that its activities might threaten the public image of the 
movement. Indeed, Samaranch used to tell him that “all they [members of the 
commission] live for is to find a positive sample.”50
In Peter Ueberroth, the Los Angeles Organizing Committee was led by an 
individual with a similar commitment to economic success. As the former owner of North 
America’s second largest travel business, the First Travel Corporation, he spearheaded an 
effort that would eventually yield an unprecedented $250 million in profits, which was 
the largest surplus in Olympic history.51 Achieving this, however, required Ueberroth to 
neglect such non-moneymaking ventures as drug testing; indeed, the USOC’s refusal to 
disclose positive drug tests by American athletes prior to the Games was likely linked to 
Ueberroth’s fundraising campaign. Due to its concern over expenses, the Los Angeles 
Organizing Committee additionally announced in April 1983 that it would not test for 
caffeine or testosterone unless the IOC provided convincing proof that the screens were 
scientifically justifiable.52 In June, Dr. Anthony Daly, Medical Director of Olympic 
 
49 The best biography of Samaranch is David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Biography of Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, Revised ed. (London: Pavilion, 1996). See also Juan Antonio Samaranch and Robert Parienté, 
The Samaranch Years: 1980-1994, Towards Olympic Unity, Entrevues (Lausanne: International Olympic 
Committee, 1995). 
 
50 Pound and Samaranch quoted from Pound, Inside the Olympics, 67. 
 
51 For Ueberroth’s leadership in Los Angeles, see Kenneth Reich, Making It Happen: Peter Ueberroth and 
the 1984 Olympics (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Capra Press, 1986). 
 
52 See “Drug Testing at Issue,” New York Times, April 29, 1983. An anonymous member of the Los 
Angeles Organizing Committee admitted that the cost of the tests had a relationship to his organization’s 
reluctance to use them in Elliott Almond, Julie Cart, and Randy Harvey, “[Analysis] The Olympic Dope 
Sheet is Redefined,” Los Angeles Times, November 13, 1983. A clipping of this article was found in 
International Olympic Committee Medical Commission Records, Folder: IOC, Commission médicale: 
Dopage – correspondence et articles de presse, 1965-1977, IOCL. 
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Health Services in Los Angeles, outlined the reasons for this position in a letter to de 
Merode. “We are certain,” he wrote, “that the goals of the IOC Medical Commission are 
precisely the same as those of the LAOOC – namely, not to permit dope testing which 
has not been scientifically validated to be performed on athletes during the 1984 Olympic 
Games.”53  
By November of 1983, Ueberroth had come to believe that the expensive doping 
regulations constituted a direct threat to the economic integrity of the competitions. He 
thus wrote to Samaranch that the “drugs and doctors are not only controlling the Games 
of the XXIIIrd Olympiad, they are beginning to gain control of the whole Olympic 
movement.” In addition, Ueberroth worried regarding the harmful effects that might 
derive from public disclosures of positive test results. While admitting that “the use of 
drugs must be curtailed in every way,” he also asserted that such an orientation had a 
limit. Implying that economic necessities might trump rigorous adherence to doping 
regulations in some instances, Ueberroth stipulated that “equally important the dignity of 
the Olympic movement must be preserved.”54 To undercut anticipated media stories that 
“all athletes were doped,” Ueberroth moreover asked the IOC leadership to emphasize 
the fact that not all competitors were “drug addicts.”55 Integrity, then, was more a product 
of financial success than effective doping policy. 
Balancing these competing interests, the Los Angeles Organizing Committee 
acquiesced to testosterone and caffeine screens in late-November 1983 after IOC medical 
 
 
53 Daly to de Merode, June 8, 1983, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission Records, 
Folder: IOC, Méd. Comm.., Los Angeles ‘84 medical matters, 1985-1986-1994, IOCL. 
 
54 Ueberroth to Samaranch, November 14, 1983, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission 
Records, Folder: Médicale: Dopage – correspondence et articles de presse, 1965-1977, IOCL. 
 
55 Ueberroth quoted in Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings, 238. 
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authorities asserted that “these controls were scientifically perfect and not assailable as 
incorrect.”56 Despite the accuracy of the tests, a more ominous situation arose when it 
become known that some athletes were using a lesser-known substance called Human 
Growth Hormone (hGH) at the 1983 World Track-and-Field Championships.57 Both 
scientific and economic hurdles prevented its inclusion on the IOC’s list of prohibited 
substances for the Los Angles Games. The November 1983 Medical Commission report 
stated that “a method of detection [for hGH] has been almost perfected . . . but there are 
very serious doubts as to the real effectiveness of this very costly treatment.” The 
document therefore declared that “it would be premature to draw definitive conclusions 
and in any case it is out of the question that it be controlled in Los Angeles.”58
Several Olympic leaders also worried that American officials in Los Angeles 
would treat athletes from the communist-bloc unfairly. Manfred Ewald, a member of the 
East German sport establishment, thus informed de Merode of the positive attributes of a 
suggestion by Marat Gramov, the chairman of the Soviet national Olympic committee, 
“to carry out doping controls according to politically and geographically balanced view-
points.”59 Conducting “doping controls in 2 laboratories each in socialist and non-
 
56 Drs. Hans Howald and Donike provided this scientific testimony according to “Report on the seminar of 
the Medical Commission of the IOC,” September 25-October 2, 1983, International Olympic Committee 
Medical Commission Records, Folder: IOC, SD1: Comm. Méd.: Rapp. Sessions, CE 1968-1984, IOCL. 
The final decision to test for caffeine and testosterone in Los Angeles is provided in “Report of the IOC 
Medical Commission,” November 24-25, 1983, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission 
Records, Folder: IOC, SD1: Comm. Méd.: Rapp. Sessions, CE 1968-1984, IOCL. See also Annex 22, 
“Report of the Medical Commission Presented by Prince Alexandre De Merode, Chairman,” in Minutes of 
the 87th IOC General Session, Sarajevo, February 5-6, 1984, p. 90-91, IOCL. 
 
57 See Almond, Cart, and Harvey, “[Analysis] The Olympic Dope Sheet is Redefined.” For an early 
analysis of the future effect of HGH on sport, see Terry Todd, “Sports RX: The Use of Human Growth 
Hormone Poses a Grave Dilemma for Sport,” Sports Illustrated (October 15, 1984), 8. 
 
58 “Report of the IOC Medical Commission,” November 24-25, 1983, International Olympic Committee 
Medical Commission Records, Folder: IOC, SD1: Comm. Méd.: Rapp. Sessions, CE 1968-1984, IOCL. 
 
59 At a broader level, Soviet officials listed the likelihood of unfair treatment in Los Angeles as one of the 
reasons for the Soviet boycott of the 1984 summer Olympics. See “Statement of the Soviet National 
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socialist countries,” as Gramov proposed, would help “bring about a rather correct and 
objective doping control.”60 A number of IOC members were, in addition, anxious that 
U.S. judges might interfere if and when American athletes were detected using 
performance-enhancing substances. At a July 1984 meeting, Italian delegate Franco 
Carraro accordingly asked Chairman de Merode to provide “assurance that the doping 
tests in Los Angeles would be held under strict conditions.” Although de Merode 
recognized that “if an American athlete had a test that was positive, the IOC might be 
taken to Court,” he told Carraro that “. . . this consideration should not prevent the IOC 
from doing its work.”61 In his pre-Games official report, the chairman downplayed the 
issue by emphasizing the positive steps that had been taken in Los Angeles. “The 
laboratory is perfectly equipped,” de Merode declared. With respected physician Don 
Catlin as its director, he continued, “it [the medical facility] has acquired remarkable 
experience and is perfectly satisfactory.” As for the earlier tension between the IOC and 
the Los Angeles Organizing Committee regarding the testosterone and caffeine screens, 
de Merode stated happily that all difficulties had been resolved.62 The drugs tests, 
including testosterone and caffeine screens, would therefore be “objective, firm and 
 
Olympic Committee,” May 8, 1984, reprinted in Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon, eds., The Cold 
War: A History through Documents (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), 220-221. 
 
60 Ewald to de Merode, November 9, 1983, International Olympic Committee Medical Commission 
Records, Folder: Los Angeles ‘84 medical matters, 1978-1983, IOCL. 
 
61 Carraro and de Merode statements from Minutes of the 88th IOC General Session, Los Angeles, July 25-
26, 1984, p. 23, IOCL. 
 
62 “Report of the Medical Commission Presented by Alexandre De Merode, Chairman,” Annex 19 of 
Minutes of the 88th IOC General Session, Los Angeles, July 25-26, 1984, p. 74, IOCL. 
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comprehensive, and any positive cases would be dealt with in accordance with IOC Rules 
[sic].”63
De Merode’s initial hopes for a set of rigorously enforced doping protocols in Los 
Angeles were largely unfulfilled, however. Although U.S. athletes won a spectacular 
eighty-three gold, sixty-one silver, and thirty bronze medals, not a single American was 
included on the list of those found to have been doping.64 Indeed, the fact that only 
twelve Olympians tested positive for performance-enhancing drugs showed that the 
IOC’s doping control efforts had made little progress since the 1960s. Unfortunately, the 
absence of positive drug screens was perhaps due less to Olympic doping policies than 
with the destruction of test results before they could be disclosed to the public. Before the 
opening of the Games, the Los Angeles Organizing Committee had refused to provide 
IOC doping authorities with a safe. This resulted in the theft of a number of medical 
records at the competitions. With few exceptions, the consequent lack of evidence made 
sanctions impossible.65
While some suspected that de Merode played a role in the scheme, others who 
remembered Ueberroth’s hostility towards rigorous tests placed the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of local authorities.66 In a 1994 letter, de Merode claimed that the organizing 
committee’s Dr. Tony Daly at first explained that the documents had been shipped to 
 
63 De Merode comment from Minutes of the 88th IOC General Session, Los Angeles, July 25-26, 1984, p. 
23, IOCL. 
 
64 The medal totals for the Los Angeles Games is provided on the International Olympic Committee 
internet website: www.olympic.org (accessed January 28, 2007). 
 
65 See Pound, Inside the Olympics, 67-68. 
 
66 John Hoberman depicts IOC President Samaranch and de Merode, whom he describes as a “sometimes 
cynical and occasionally clumsy pragmatist,” as the central figures of the cover-up. John Hoberman, “How 
Drug Testing Fails: The Politics of Doping Control,” in Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing 
and the Olympic Movement: 1960-1999, ed. Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (Champaign, IL: Human 
Kinetics, 2001), 244. 
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IOC headquarters in Switzerland, but then, after further questioning, admitted that the 
papers had in fact been destroyed.67 Describing his frustration over the episode, IOC 
member Dick Pound later wrote that the elimination of documents “led to the perception 
that the IOC was soft on drugs and that it did not want to find positive cases at the 
Games, but it was the L.A. organizing committee that had removed the evidence before it 
could be acted on by the IOC.”68  
Local officials, of course, denied any complicity. Dr. Craig Kammerer, the 
associate director of the laboratory that handled the tests, claimed that “we were totally 
puzzled initially and figured that something must be going on, politically or a cover 
up.”69 As a self-described “cynical idealist,” Pound also did not absolve the IOC 
leadership from all responsibility.70 According to Pound, IOC President Samaranch 
conspired with his IAAF counterpart, Primo Nebiolo, to delay the announcement of a 
positive test result to make sure that the competitions in Los Angeles ended without 
significant controversy.71 Elaborating on their motivations, Medical Commission 
member Dr. Arnold Beckett likewise asserted that “it would have done quite a lot of 
damage if five or six . . . of the positives . . . had led to the medal winners. . . . Some of 
the federations and IOC are happy to show that they’re doing something in getting some 
positives, but they don’t want too many because that would damage the image of the 
 
67 The best account of the destruction of the doping documents in Los Angeles is provided in Jim Ferstle, 
“Evolution and Politics of Drug Testing,” in Anabolic Steroids in Sport and Exercise, ed. Charles E. 
Yesalis, 2nd edition (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2000), 386-387. 
 
68 Pound, Inside the Olympics, 68. 
 
69 Kammerer quoted in Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails,” 244. 
 
70 Pound’s description of himself quoted from Frank Deford, Kostya Kennedy, and Richard Deitsch, “Just 
Say No,” Sports Illustrated (December 16, 2002), 48. 
 
71 Pound, Inside the Olympics, 67. 
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Games.” As a result, Beckett elaborated, “We [the IOC Medical Commission] took the 
responsibility of not revealing [the destruction of the documents] publicly.”72 Image and 
commercial viability were de facto primary in importance to the Samaranch presidency, 
even if at the expense of regulatory responsibility and integrity.73
 
LEGACY OF THE LOS ANGELES GAMES 
 
Several new forms of doping in Los Angeles highlighted the dynamic nature of 
the drug problem. Anticipatory athletes switched to alternative performance-enhancing 
techniques by the time a new drug screen was developed. At the 1984 Games, five U.S. 
cyclists who had medaled at the competitions received blood transfusions prior to their 
races from prominent cardiologist Herman Falsetti.74 The idea of autologous blood 
transfusion was to preserve an athlete’s red blood cells and then introduce them into his 
or her body immediately prior to a competition. Because red blood cells carry oxygen, the 
reintroduction of a half-liter of blood provides the human organism with a roughly 
equivalent amount of oxygen per minute.75 Although the practice is now known as 
“blood doping,” the procedure did not violate IOC regulations in place at the time. As 
 
72 Beckett quoted in Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails,” 244. 
 
73 This stance extended, of course, to future scholarship on the issue. Dr. Catlin wished to co-publish his 
recollections of the episode (with Craig Kammerer, the assistant director of the laboratory at the Games) in 
a medical journal. He was prohibited from doing this by de Merode. Catlin asserted, “I would not still be a 
member of the IOC medical commission if I had published a report without the co-operation of the prince.” 
Catlin quoted in Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings, 242. This work includes a useful discussion of the 
cover-up (p. 237-243). 
 
74 See Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., “U.S.O.C. Checking Use of Transfusions,” New York Times, January 10, 
1985. 
 
75 This description of “blood doping” can be found in Houlihan, Dying to Win, 87-88. 
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Thomas Dickson, the team physician who witnessed the transfusions, put it, “They were 
certainly unethical, [but] whether they were illegal is something I still don’t know.”76  
Whatever the moral dimensions of the episode, the United States Cycling 
Federation (USCF), as the national governing body for the sport, split the difference 
between apathy and responsiveness. While an apology to the American public was issued 
and the officials involved in administering the transfusions were punished, federation 
president David Prouty announced that “no athletes will be held or considered 
responsible.” Describing the cyclists as unsuspecting victims, he went on to assert that 
“nothing should be considered to have tainted any medal” won by them.77 Seeking a 
more active position, USOC Executive Director Don Miller wished to supplement the 
IOC’s antiquated rules with policies promulgated by his own organization. Speaking at a 
February 1985 USOC meeting, he argued that “it has not been declared illegal in the past 
by the IOC medical commission, simply because . . . there was no medical tests [sic] for 
blood doping, and that almost invalidates our whole system of laws.” Miller 
recommended, therefore, “to make the proposal to the [USOC] Executive Board that 
blood doping is, in fact, a form of doping, and is illegal.” After all, he concluded, “there 
are other methods of proving that people have broken the law.”78 Members of the 
American government also took notice. Citing public health concerns derived from the 
 
76 Thomas, “U.S.O.C. Checking Use of Transfusions.” For a contemporaneous legal analysis concerning 
the possible prohibition of blood doping, see G. Legwold, “Blood Doping and the Letter of the Law,” 
Physician and Sportsmedicine 13 (March, 1985): 37-38. 
 
77 “Cycle Group Bans Use of Blood Doping,” New York Times, January 19, 1985. This article also 
describes the sanctions handed out to the officials involved in the scandal: Eddy Borysewicz, a team coach, 
and Ed Burke, director of the federation’s Elite Athlete Program, were both suspended without pay for 30 
days and received letters of reprimand. Former USCF President Mike Fraysse was also demoted from 1st 
Vice-President to 3rd Vice-President of the organization. 
 
78 Miller comments in Proceedings of the Meetings of the United States Olympic Committee, Minutes of 
the Administrative Committee Meeting, May 4, 1985, Chicago, p. 140, USOCLA. 
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fact that several of the cyclists who received transfusions in Los Angeles became ill, 
National Institutes of Health official Dr. Harvey Klein urged Olympic administrators to 
prohibit blood doping at their competitions.79  
By this time, the IOC also realized that the doping crisis was quickly spinning out 
of control. Swedish delegate Matts Carlgren told his counterparts at a December 1984 
IOC session that he “believed that the main problem concerning the future of the 
Olympic Games was not participation but doping.” Proposing more funds for medical 
research, he argued that “the IOC ought to lead in this domain and analyse the threats 
drugs impose of sport.”80 Several months after Miller’s criticism of the IOC’s position 
towards performance-enhancing blood transfusions, de Merode announced that his 
commission had decided to ban the practice. “Although no feasible detection test is 
av[a]ilable at the present time,” he argued, “the Commission feels that it is a question of 
ethics.”81 Describing the difficult negotiation process through which the policy was 
promulgated, he stated that “with this aim in mind, the Commission had met with 
representatives from the IAAF, the AIBA, the FINA and the IWF.” Enforcement of the 
rule, according to de Merode, would be no less complicated: “Steps should be taken, in 
 
79 H[arvey] G. Klein, “Blood Transfusions and Athletics: Games People Play,” New England Journal of 
Medicine 312, no. 13 (March, 1985): 854-856. See also Richard D. Lyons, “Expert Urges Ban on Blood 
Doping,” New York Times, March 28, 1985. In January 1985, the Food and Drug Administration also 
requested that the Justice Department begin an investigation of the illegal “black market” distribution of 
anabolic steroids. See Todd, “A History of the Use of Anabolic Steroids in Sport,” 338. 
 
80 Carlgren’s argument over the importance of doping to the direction of the Olympic movement is 
provided in Minutes of the 89th IOC General Session, December 1-2, 1984, Lausanne, Switzerland, p. 13, 
IOCL. 
 
81 “Report of the IOC Medical Commission to the 90th Session of the IOC,” appended as Annex 11 to 
Minutes of the 90th IOC General Session, June 4-6, 1985, Berlin, p. 85, IOCL. In addition , on page 22 of 
the minutes of this meeting, Dr. Eduardo Hay supported de Merode’s position despite the fact “it was not 
possible for the time being to provide that blood doping had been practiced” in Los Angeles. 
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collaboration with the IFs,” he concluded, “for the standardisation of methods and 
procedures of the laboratories.”82
Unofficial tests in Los Angeles also indicated that a majority of the athletes 
competing in the pentathlon used beta-blockers during the event.83 Indeed, before the 
Games, the IOC Medical Commission had expressly permitted their dispensation for 
“therapeutic” purposes upon presentation of certificates issued by athletes’ personal 
physicians.84 By reducing blood pressure, heart rate, and blood vessel constriction, these 
drugs, normally used to treat hypertension and heart disease, steadied the hands of 
pentathletes during the shooting components of their competitions.85 While nothing could 
be done about the situation in California, de Merode declared the following year that the 
administration of beta-blockers for the purpose of enhancing performance would be 
considered, like blood doping, an illegitimate practice.86  
As demonstrated by its aggressive reactions to the blood doping scandal in Los 
Angeles, the 1984 Games served as a focusing event for the USOC. In March 1985, the 
organization announced a comprehensive plan calling for rigorous drug screens at all 
major events in the period before the 1988 Olympics opened in Seoul. In terms of 
punitive measures, the proposal included an escalating set of punishments; first offences 
would result in one year suspensions while a four-year suspension, which would preclude 
 
82 De Merode statements, Minutes of the 90th IOC General Session, June 4-6, 1985, Berlin, p. 21, IOCL. 
 
83 See “Drugs Used,” New York Times, August 6, 1984. 
 
84 See de Merode circular to International Sports Federations, National Olympic Committees, and IOC 
Accredited Dope Control Laboratories, May 31, 1985, attached to Annex 11, Minutes of the 90th IOC 
General Session, June 4-6, 1985, Berlin, p. 21, IOCL. 
 
85 A description of beta-blockers is provided in Houlihan, Dying to Win, 91-92. 
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participation in Seoul, would follow a second finding of guilt. “Wherever the athletes 
compete,” said USOC Director of Sports Medicine Kenneth Clark, “they’ll be tapped on 
the shoulder and told it’s time for the urine sample.” While the USOC leadership was 
eager to accept the plan, the support of the national federations that governed individual 
sports was less certain. To his credit, USCF President David Prouty announced that the 
suggestion was “terrific” and that “philosophically, it meshes perfectly with what we 
want to accomplish.”87 By June 1985, however, the plan, which would go into effect at 
that month’s National Sports Festival in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had been changed to 
meet the approval of the national federations.88 Although the USOC committed $800,000 
to a comprehensive testing regime, the enforcement mechanisms were significantly 
weakened. Rather than an escalating set of punishments controlled by the USOC, athletes 
would be sanctioned only at the behest of the national governing bodies of their 
respective sports.89
These modest steps, though, did little to improve the situation in the four years 
before the next Olympic Games. Nationalist forces again played a part in weakening 
doping regulations in international sport at the 1986 Goodwill Games in Moscow. The 
U.S. team traveling to Russia was told that all competitors would be subjected to rigorous 
drug inspections after their events. As a result, the Americans reportedly ceased their 
anabolic steroid cycles well before the competitions. “What they found in Moscow, 
however,” according to Dr. Voy, “was something quite unexpected. There wasn’t any 
drug testing.” Apparently, the U.S. squad was deliberately “burned” in order to foster the 
 
87 Clark and Prouty quoted in Michael Goodwin, “U.S.O.C. to Seek More Tests for Drugs,” New York 
Times, March 24, 1985. 
 
88 Even then, only twenty of the thirty-eight national governing bodies supported the plan. See “U.S.O.C. 
to Begin Tests,” New York Times, June 25, 1985. 
 
89 See Ibid. 
 
 116
                                                
notion that the communist-bloc, despite its absence in Los Angeles, still reined supreme 
in elite international athletics.90 While such machinations may have had perceived short-
term political benefits, many Soviet athletes, like those in East Germany, were afflicted 
with subsequent medical problems. Prior to the 1984 Games, an unofficial study cited the 
wide-spread administration of performance-enhancing drugs to Soviet athletes as the 
primary reason for their enormously high mortality rate, which had accelerated since the 
mid-1970s.91 The actions by Soviet administrators at the 1986 Goodwill Games 
demonstrated that the report had little effect in moderating their policies. 
Many of the national governing bodies and international federations that governed 
individual sports were equally reluctant to toughen their enforcement of doping 
regulations. In 1987, both the IAAF and its American counterpart at the national level, 
The Athletics Congress (TAC), managed to circumvent positive test results. At that 
year’s National Outdoor Championships in San Jose, California, TAC officials avoided a 
finding of guilt for American discus champion John Powell by citing minor procedural 
errors in labeling his “A” and “B” specimens by Dr. Harmon Brown, head of the 
organization’s medical committee.92 Later that year, the IAAF weakened their testing 
system at the World Track-and-Field Championships in Rome by replacing IOC doping 
authorities Dr. Manfred Donike and Dr. Arnold Beckett with several less qualified 
individuals.93 Demonstrating how far unscrupulous members of the elite sports 
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establishment would go to avoid detection, Charlie Francis, then coach of Canadian 
sprinter Ben Johnson, told a colleague at the event that his protégé had gonorrhea to 
rationalize the presence of the steroid masking agent probenecid (which could be 
justifiably used as an adjunct in treating the disease) in his system.94  
Still, Samaranch was confident enough to claim in January 1987, “You may rest 
assured that we shall be very firm where doping is concerned. . . . It is a form of cheating 
which we cannot tolerate.”95 At the 1988 winter Olympics in Calgary, he continued this 
theme. “Above all,” he exclaimed, “such behavior makes a mockery of the very essence 
of sport, the soul of what we, like our predecessors, consider sacrosanct ideals.” 
Samaranch thus resolved, “Doping is alien to our philosophy, to our rules of conduct. We 
shall never tolerate it”96 Of course, the IOC’s actions in the run-up to the 1988 Games 
often did not live up to Samaranch’s lofty words. In an episode eerily similar to the theft 
of medical records at the Los Angeles Games, de Merode later admitted that he destroyed 
a list of names of fifty-five athletes who had been detected doping in the six months prior 
to the opening of the 1988 Games in Seoul.97
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Despite President Samaranch’s assuredness, Francis’s explanation in Rome 
following Johnson’s positive test for probenecid foreshadowed deeper troubles for the 
Canadian sprinter and, as a consequence, the Olympic movement. On September 24, 
1988, Johnson defeated American track star Carl Lewis in the one-hundred meter sprint, 
lowering his previous world record to 9.79 seconds. Two days later, Francis, “about 42 
hours after my life’s greatest moment,” was awakened by a knock on his door from Dave 
Lyon, manager of Canada’s track-and-field squad. “We’ve got to get over to the Medical 
Commission,” Lyon said. “Ben’s tested positive.” If the race had been the climactic event 
of Francis’s career, it was equally important for the future of Olympic doping policy. 
This was something that Francis himself realized: “The track federations had staged drug 
tests for 20 years,” he later wrote, “and in all that time no major star had failed one—not 
officially, at any rate.”98 Upon being told that there was “terrible” news, Dick Pound 
asked IOC President Samaranch, “Has someone died?” Samaranch replied, “Is worse 
[sic]. . . . Ben Johnson. . . . He has tested positive.”99 Although the sprinter initially 
claimed that someone might have spiked his urine after the race, the IOC quickly found 
Johnson guilty and stripped him of his medal.  
Observers of the event immediately realized the effect of Johnson’s positive 
screen for the future of elite international sport. In the aftermath of the race, American 
sprinter Edwin Moses predicted that “this will change the history of the Olympics. . . . 
This will change a lot of people’s lives.”100 Johnson’s financial losses were personally 
 
98 Francis and Lynon quoted in Charlie Francis and Jeff [with] Coplon, Speed Trap: Inside the Biggest 
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catastrophic. In the immediate aftermath of his record-setting performance, the sprinter’s 
manager, Larry Heidebrecht, said, “The total endorsement power that he has following 
the world record and gold medal would certainly put him into seven figures. . . . How 
many millions, I wouldn’t want to speculate.”101 The economic windfall came to a 
sudden end, however, after the test results were made public. The Italian sportswear 
company Diadora, mirroring the actions of several other enterprises, immediately 
canceled its five-year, $2.4 million contract with the runner and the Japan-based Kyodo 
Oil Company terminated a marketing campaign featuring Johnson.102 Estimating the 
financial loss for the sprinter, Heidebrecht later stated that the scandal cost Johnson a 
staggering $25 million in endorsement deals.103 Johnson, as put by Canadian IOC 
member James Worrall, had thus “just been killed as an athlete, and probably his 
complete life has been ruined.”104
Though Johnson’s was the most explosive, there were, of course, several other 
drug scandals in Seoul. A 1989 issue of the Soviet’s official publication Zmena stated 
that a $2.5 million laboratory aboard a vessel sailing off the Korean coast provided pre-
competition screens to Soviet Olympians to make sure they were not caught through 
official tests. Due to fears that instances of doping would be revealed, several athletes, 
according to the report, were not allowed to compete.105 Without similar facilities, 
Bulgaria and Hungary both pulled their weightlifting teams from the Games after several 
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of their athletes tested positive for performance-enhancing substances.106 Not willing to 
allow a communist-bloc advantage at the Olympics, American sport officials were 
equally concerned with preventing drug scandals. At that time, U.S. rules had a loophole 
through which athletes were provided a one-time “inadvertent use” defense in the case of 
a positive test at a national competition; at the 1988 U.S. Olympic trials, eight track-and-
field athletes found to be using the prohibited substance ephedrine escaped punishment 
through the clause. After a member of a prominent American team competing in Seoul 
was found with an abnormally high testosterone level, which should have resulted in the 
disqualification of the entire squad, U.S. officials convinced the IOC that the athlete’s 
normal production of the hormone was elevated.107
Despite the previous failures to eliminate drugs at their competitions, IOC 
officials optimistically portrayed these incidents as successes for their doping policies.108 
Taking a positive view that Johnson’s test would catalyze future efforts with regard to the 
issue, Dick Pound proclaimed that “this is a disaster for Ben, a disaster for the Games, 
and a disaster for track and field. But let’s turn this around to make the slate clean and 
show the world that we do mean business. We are prepared to act.” More sensitive to the 
public perception of the Olympic movement, President Samaranch was downright 
cheerful in an interview: “We are showing that the system works,” he proclaimed. “We 
are showing that my words are not only words, they are facts. We are winning the battle 
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against doping.”109 Experts in the field, however, demonstrated that the president was 
mistaken. After the Games, USOC chief medical officer Dr. Robert Voy estimated, for 
instance, that over fifty percent of those competing in Seoul used some form of 
performance-enhancing substance.110
 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF DOPING AT DECADE’S END 
 
In addition to embarrassing Olympic administrators, the events in Seoul infuriated 
government officials in the home countries of banned athletes. The Canadian national 
government appointed Charles W. Dubin, Associate Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Ontario, as chair of a special commission charged with investigating drugs in 
athletics.111 After nearly ten months of public hearings, which resulted in 14,817 pages of 
testimony from one-hundred and nineteen witnesses, Dubin issued his report. Arguing 
that Olympic doping policies were overly-narrow, he wrote that while “the athletes who 
cheat must, of course, bear their full share of responsibility. . . . the responsibility cannot 
be solely theirs.”112 “Until now,” Dubin continued, “the focus has been only on the 
athletes. It is obvious that a broader net of responsibility will need to be cast. Coaches, 
physicians, therapists, and others involved in the care and training of athletes cannot 
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escape responsibility for the sorry state of sport today.”113 In the wake of Johnson’s test, 
several IOC officials expressed similar beliefs. Canadian IOC member James Worrall 
declared, for instance, that “obviously, people behind . . . [Johnson] are responsible. . . . 
Ben is a lad who will follow instructions. If he is told that something is good, he will 
believe it.”114
Exacerbating the problems caused by such unscrupulous individuals were the 
organizational conflicts within the Olympic governance structure that prevented the 
promulgation and enforcement of a universal set of doping regulations. Describing the 
diffuse nature of this system, Dubin explained that the collective “failure of many sport-
governing bodies to treat the drug problem more seriously and to take more effective 
means to detect and deter the use of such drugs has . . . contributed in large measure to 
the extensive use of drugs by athletes.”115 Using similar logic, Pound believed that 
Johnson was simply “a pawn in this, the host organization for the substance.” The 
sprinter’s use of steroids, Worrall concluded, “points up the tragedy of the whole system 
endemic in international sport.”116  The problems with the Olympic movement that 
Johnson’s test exemplified therefore required a wider range of enforcement mechanisms 
than had been previously provided. 
While setting the agenda in terms of this policy development was relatively 
simple, actually accomplishing a coordinated approach to doping was far more 
complicated. The first step in this process occurred before the Seoul Games when de 
Merode chaired the first World Conference on Doping in Sport in late-June 1988. 
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Attended by delegates from twenty-six countries, the meeting put forth the idea of an 
anti-doping charter to be signed by both private sports authorities and national 
governments.117 Describing the conference during the Seoul Games, de Merode 
continued to push for this approach. According to a report of that meeting, he explained 
that a new working group composed of an international list of sports authorities would be 
“responsible for working out this strategy so that it is adhered to by all sporting nationals 
at a governmental level, and by all international authorities.”118 This was a point 
hammered home by Samaranch in a November 1988 speech in Moscow. “In order to 
overcome the scourge of doping,” the IOC President asserted, “all our forces must be 
united and a concerted effort made by sports and civil authorities working together in 
perfect harmony.”119
Realizing that their scientists could not keep pace with the western 
pharmaceutical industry in terms of the development of new performance-enhancing 
substances, Soviet sports authorities took a surprising position of leadership in pushing 
for the implementation of de Merode’s universal system of doping control. At a 
UNESCO meeting held in Moscow in November 1988, sports leaders from one-hundred 
countries signed a statement of support for the IOC’s proposed Anti-Doping Charter. 
Although there was no enforcement device under the statement, IOC official Alain 
Coupat claimed that “this is a big day for the I.O.C. . . . It means UNESCO recognizes 
that the fight against doping must be constructed on a global basis, not by state, and that 
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the I.O.C. is the best organization to direct the fight.”120 Because the United States did 
not belong to UNESCO, Soviet officials came to a separate, preliminary agreement with 
American leaders that would allow their respective doping experts to test each other’s 
athletes.121 This cooperative arrangement was later expanded to include Great Britain, 
Australia, West Germany, Sweden, South Korea, Italy, Norway, Bulgaria, and 
Czechoslovakia.122
At the summer 1989 General Session of the International Olympic Committee, de 
Merode additionally began to advocate the creation of a new doping commission within 
the IOC that would take control over the issue. Composed of IOC Medical Commission 
members as well as representatives from national Olympic committees and international 
federations, the body, he elaborated, would meet every year to consider how positive tests 
should be addressed. The commission would be supplemented with an IOC-run “mobile 
laboratory” that would enable a program of out-of-competition testing to begin.123 
Although de Merode preferred that the IOC remain in command of the body, his concept 
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Observers of international sport during the 1980s witnessed a series of crises that 
collectively led to a paradigm shift in Olympic doping policy. In the early years of the 
decade, most policymakers believed that the issue was of secondary importance to the 
1980 and 1984 boycotts. This conception led to a belief that the problem could be best 
addressed by either obscuring its true extent or by actively suppressing instances of 
doping. As in the 1960s and 1970s, the effect of these strategies was exacerbated by the 
loose system of Olympic governance through which a variety of organizations could set 
their own degrees of compliance with doping regulations.124 The respective cover-ups at 
the 1983 World Track-and-Field Championships and Pan-American Games by the IAAF 
and the USOC were direct results of this regulatory framework. Although it was more 
progressive than national committees and international federations in terms of doping, the 
IOC also engaged in questionable behavior; uncertainties remain, for instance, as to the 
degree of Samaranch and de Merode’s complicity in destroying test results at the 1984 
Los Angeles Games. 
In the end, these activities set the stage for the single most important event in the 
history of Olympic doping policy: the disqualification of Ben Johnson at the 1988 Games 
in Seoul. The concentrating effect of the episode was best put by Dick Pound, who wrote 
in 1989 that “there have been positive tests and disqualifications on other occasions, but 
never one which has attracted such scrutiny and created such concern.”125 At last 
convinced as to the necessity of state intervention, the deeply embarrassed Canadian 
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government called attention to the inadequacies of the existing system. Having also 
determined that it could not keep pace with western pharmacological advances, the 
weakening Soviet government also insisted on comprehensive reform. Although a 
universal doping authority would not come into existence for almost another decade, the 
consequent pressure on Olympic officials created a political climate conducive to its 
creation.
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Ch. 4: Towards a Unified Approach, 1990-1999 
As with new opportunities for cooperation in the larger international political 
environment, the conclusion of the Cold War inspired fresh hopes for a unified regulatory 
approach to doping in the Olympics. In Central Europe, the dismantling of the Berlin 
Wall that began in November 1989 signaled the end of the GDR sport machine and 
unlocked the secrets of its extensive doping system. The subsequent collapse of the 
Soviet empire likewise resulted in broadened prospects for a less quarrelsome political 
process regarding the doping issue. In Asia, a rise in indications of doping among athletes 
from the People’s Republic of China gave way to official, if questionably-enforced 
prohibitions of performance-enhancing substances in that country. Although 
organizational conflicts remained, selected leaders in both governmental and non-
governmental bodies engaged in efforts to merge the powers of the existing set of doping 
authorities.1 Over the course of the decade, this process included a series of international 
conferences that collectively led to the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) in November 1999. Through the involvement of the United Nations, multiple 
national governments, and leading private sports organizations, the agency was given a 
more aggressive mandate to both promulgate and enforce doping regulations within the 
Olympic movement. 
Because the IOC “embargoes” its internal publications and memoranda for a 
period of twenty years, it is difficult to discern the actual deliberations of IOC leaders 
during the 1990s. However, the available evidence suggests that the IOC’s avoidance of 
moral leadership remained relatively unchanged during the decade. Thus, while there was 
 
1 In a 1992 book, Olympic specialist John A. Lucas predicted several alternatives for how Olympic doping 
policy might evolve in the 1990s. See John A. Lucas, Future of the Olympic Games (Champaign, IL: 
Human Kinetics Books, 1992), 110-111. 
 128
                                                
progress during the 1990s towards the development of a universal regulatory system, 
principally due to the threat of governmental involvement, the decade was also 
characterized by the same unscrupulous practices and questionable regulatory judgments 
that weakened previous initiatives. As the turn of the decade approached, IOC Vice 
President Dick Pound acknowledged in July 1989 that the movement’s understanding of 
the doping problem had developed little since the 1960s, asserting, “We still have no 
clearly stated definition of what doping is.”2 This lack of guidance regarding the issue 
served as a significant obstacle to be overcome only through the impetus of public and 
governmental sentiments emanating from the Ben Johnson affair.  
More concerning, President Juan Antonio Samaranch failed to provide a requisite 
degree of clarity over the saliency of the subject for his IOC leadership throughout most 
of the decade. Samaranch was primarily concerned with the economic vitality of the 
Olympic movement. As de Merode described, “Samaranch knew he needed money to 
develop the IOC, that without it we were beaten, but the problem with money is that you 
are under the influence of it.”3 Worried that his movement was beginning to suffer 
financially from adverse publicity regarding its increasing number of drug scandals, 
Samaranch attempted to undermine the established belief that doping constituted an 
ethical crisis. In July 1998, for example, he asserted that policies based on philosophical 
notions of “fair play” were excessive in that “for me, everything that does not injure the 
health of the athlete is not doping.”4  
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At the same time, newly-established bodies such as the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, created in the 1980s to prevent public judicial interference, often undermined 
doping decisions by the IOC leadership. Although fostering significant short-term 
obstacles to a coordinated approach, the consequences of these influences were, on the 
other hand, not altogether negative; indeed, by calling attention to the need for reform, 
they played important roles in constructing the broad political support for WADA that 




In the January 1990 issue of the IOC’s Olympic Review, President Samaranch 
outlined several anticipated developments in a post-Cold War international sports 
environment. Averring that the end of the superpower conflict was in part due to the 
internationalist ideology of the Olympics, he declared that “the unity of our Movement is 
triumphant. This unity has opened up perspectives, freed an undreamt-of development 
potential that would have been unthinkable only ten years ago. Our task is now to turn 
these promises into action.” The events of the previous few years, Samaranch continued, 
also held important implications for the battle against performance-enhancing drugs. 
Envisioning a peace dividend of transnational cooperation, he sought to reverse 
skepticism regarding the IOC’s previous inaction by stating, “The fight is now being 
waged daily, and all, whether athletes or those around them who look after them, must be 
aware of their own involvement, and seek to combat all cheating and misconduct.”5 In 
this regard, Samaranch’s administration presented several new ideas as means to go 
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beyond the limited on-site drug screens that were at the traditional center of Olympic 
doping policy.  
For future out-of-competition examinations, which most knowledgeable observers 
felt was a prerequisite to effective regulation, Olympic officials proposed a mobile, flying 
laboratory to extend the temporal and geographic reach of their tests.6 Believing that the 
facility would be completed by late-1990, de Merode explained after an IOC Executive 
Board meeting that “these anti-doping measures, and those taken by other sports 
organizations and government bodies, could have an impact on the results of the [1992 
Olympic] competitions in Barcelona.”7 Such a step was in fact long overdue. Speaking at 
a 1991 international conference on sport law, Robert Armstrong, an attorney who had 
worked on the Canadian investigation of the Ben Johnson scandal, sharply asserted that 
“the IOC and its Medical Commission have known for years that testing for anabolic 
steroids at the competition was a virtual waste of time in terms of providing effective 
deterrent for their use during training periods.”8 Although himself encouraged by the 
potential of the mobile laboratory to dampen public scrutiny, Samaranch nevertheless 
realized that to usurp future criticism, “much still remains to be done towards 
standardizing the application of sanctions in the event of a positive test.” Again 
commenting on the possibilities afforded by larger global developments, he emphasized 
“how vitally important it is for us to define and implement, without haste yet also without 
 
6 De Merode suggested the possibility of “a flying medical analysis laboratory” at a 1989 IOC General 
Session. The Medical Commission chairman elaborated that “the mobile laboratory would be a 
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false modesty, a sports policy which is adapted to the new political, social and economic 
circumstances of our planet.”9  
Despite such statements, the Olympic doping-control system remained 
organizationally and politically fragmented; it was, as a consequence, largely ineffectual 
at the beginning of the decade. The creation of a new body charged with resolving 
disputes in international athletics, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), provided an 
additional factor in the already diffuse regulatory framework.10 While the body allowed 
IOC leaders to more easily keep doping controversies from the public eye, its decisions 
sometimes diluted the enforcement of the IOC’s own regulations. In a 1986 advisory 
opinion concerning the possibility of a lifetime ban for individuals caught using 
performance-enhancing substances, the CAS pronounced, for instance, that every action 
by an international sport body—including the IOC—must conform to basic principles of 
fairness; only deliberate offenses against legitimately promulgated and enforced rules 
and procedures would therefore warrant such a far-reaching punishment.11 While 
useful—and perhaps even necessary—for the protection of athletes’ rights, such decrees 
provided significant obstacles to the type of tough countermeasures that many believed 
were needed by the IOC. In the longer-run, though, these activities obliged Olympic 
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policymakers to promulgate more rigorous standards for their own conduct; only a threat 
to its power could induce the IOC to take such substantive action.12
Because a more rigorous approach had not yet been developed, though, national 
sport bodies continued to dampen transnational anti-doping activities. In contesting 
charges of anabolic-steroid use at an August 1990 track-and-field meet in Sweden, 1988 
U.S. silver-medalist Randy Barnes—the reigning world-record holder in the shot-put—
filed an appeal alleging “erroneous doping procedures.” Because the positive test 
occurred at an overseas competition, the International Association of Athletics 
Federations, which served as the international federation for track-and-field, 
recommended a two-year suspension. Rather than confronting the IAAF, however, 
Barnes used his status as an American competitor to petition The Athletics Congress 
(TAC), the sport’s governing body in the United States, to overturn his punishment.13 A 
similar TAC appeal by U.S. sprinter Butch Reynolds, who had also received a silver-
medal at the Seoul Games, likewise highlighted the problem of overlapping jurisdictions 
on doping questions.14 Notably, the episodes also demonstrated the fact that American 
sport bodies were falling behind their international counterparts in terms of their 
reputations for fairness on drug issues. 
While a three-member TAC panel eventually—and quite surprisingly—supported 
Barnes’s punishment, another ruled that Reynolds was innocent of the IAAF’s charges. 
Dr. David Black, testifying as an expert witness, first called into question the validity of 
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the data derived from the drug screen that was employed. In a complementary step, 
Reynolds’s legal team demonstrated that the seal on the container in which the sprinter’s 
urine was stored could be “picked,” thus successfully challenging the “chain of custody” 
of the sample.15 The sprinter’s two-year suspension by the federation was accordingly 
lifted within the context of domestic competitions, although the IAAF’s punishment 
could not be challenged at the international level. Elaborating on the contradictory effects 
of this outcome, Greg LaShutka, who served as Reynolds’s attorney, commented that 
“now we’re on a collision course between TAC’s executive Director [Ollan Cassell] and 
the IAAF.”16 The lack of clarity regarding organizational authority again undermined 
effective regulation. 
This situation allowed Reynolds to remain optimistic that he would be allowed to 
compete in the forthcoming Barcelona Games scheduled for the summer of 1992. In 
October 1991, Reynolds stated that “right now, I’m in the Olympic trials, and I hope that 
once I earn the right to represent the United States at the Olympics, I will be able to go to 
the Olympics.”17 The TAC’s reputation for duplicity concerning the issue did little, 
however, to persuade Reynolds’s fellow competitors of its integrity.18 After its decision 
to restore the sprinter’s domestic eligibility was announced, British track star Linford 
Christie lamented that “the state of the sport at the moment is disgraceful.” “Sometimes,” 
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he continued, “I’m just embarrassed to be among these people and I’m glad I’m near the 
end of my career and not starting it. He [Reynolds] is going to retire a very rich man 
while the rest of us are still running our legs off.”19 The episode also demonstrated that 
political conflicts would continue to allow utilization of performance-enhancing drugs to 
often go unpunished. 
Because his suspension remained in force at international competitions, Reynolds, 
who stood to lose millions of dollars if the ban continued, eventually sought and won an 
injunction against the IAAF.20 Although made in a slightly different context, Christie’s 
prediction of a financial windfall for the American sprinter proved quite prescient, as a 
U.S. district judge awarded Reynolds $27.3 million in damages.21 Upset by the prospect 
of significant economic losses in the future, IOC leaders vowed to re-work their 
strategies. In what had become a predictable pattern, a circumstance that threatened the 
profitability of the movement once again catalyzed action by Olympic leaders who would 
otherwise have preferred more restraint. De Merode, as head of the IOC Medical 
Commission, stated in this regard that “we are making a review of all our procedures and 
 
19 Christie quoted in “Christie Slams US Decision on Reynolds: Briefly,” Melbourne [Australia] Herald 
Sun, June 18, 1991. Ironically, Christie was later convicted of doping. See John M. Hoberman, 
Testosterone Dreams: Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 
226. 
 
20 Reynolds first won an injunction requiring the IAAF to rescind his suspension in Reynolds v. 
International Amateur Athletic Federation, 841 F. Supp. 1444 (S.D. Ohio 1992). A stay on the injunction 
was subsequently ordered by the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Reynolds v. International Amateur 
Athletic Federation, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14058 (U.S. 6th Cir. 1992).. The Sixth Circuit was itself 
reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation, 
505 U.S. 1301 (U.S. Supreme Court 1992). See also Glenn M. Wong, Essentials of Sports Law, 3rd ed. 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 305. 
 
21 For the award, see Wong, Essentials of Sports Law, 305.  
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regulations. . . . We are sure we will be in a position where it will be impossible to find 
any failure in these rules.”22  
For its part, the IAAF deemed the award “worthless” due to a belief that the U.S. 
court lacked jurisdiction over its measures.23 Although the award was eventually 
reversed, the case did much to convince Olympic leaders of the need for a central 
mechanism through which a more coordinated regulatory strategy could be promulgated; 
after all, judicial proceedings involving the Olympics entailed costly attorney’s fees, 
judicial awards, and damage to the movement’s already tarnished image.24 Obscuring the 
underlying motivations for this position, de Merode shrewdly claimed that public 
courts—as opposed to IOC officials like himself—“are not interested in knowing if 
somebody has taken some banned drug but only in finding any kind of mistake in the 
procedure.”25
 
THE IOC DEALS WITH EAST GERMAN DOPING 
 
Information concerning East Germany’s doping regime began to surface after the 
disintegration of the country in November 1989. Late the following year, Germany’s 
Stern magazine published a report on the activities of a former GDR doping center near 
the Bavarian town of Kreischa. The facility, according to the article, provided pre-
 
22 De Merode quoted in “IOC to Review Procedures to Stem Drug Test Suits,” Washington Post, 
December 8, 1992. 
 
23 See Ibid. 
 
24 The award was reversed in Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th 
Cir. 1994). 
 
25 De Merode quoted in “IOC to Review Procedures to Stem Drug Test Suits.” 
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competition tests to ensure that no East German athlete would be caught using 
performance-enhancing substances outside the country’s borders. Moreover, six 
individuals, including three gold medalists, were specifically named as participants in the 
program.26 A pair of German researchers, Dr. Werner Franke and Brigitte Berendonk, 
later added substance to these allegations by appropriating a documentary collection of 
East German Stasi reports and doctoral theses written by scientists participating in the 
program.27 In 1991, the preliminary findings of this husband-and-wife team were 
published in the ground-breaking book Doping Dokumente.28 Though reluctant to deal 
with such a controversial topic, IOC leaders were consequently compelled to address the 
matter. 
Rather than viewing the East German scandal as a legitimate ethical concern, 
however, Olympic officials once again approached the issue as one requiring image 
management; actual punishments for those involved in the GDR doping system were 
therefore not initially considered. In elaborating the official IOC position, de Merode 
declared that “what we are dealing with here is a certain kind of public relations issue. 
The public must be persuaded that something is being done.” For him, this required little 
 
26 The athletes included six-time Olympic gold medalist swimmer Kristin Otto, 1988 silver and gold 
medalist swimmer Heike Friedrich, 1988 Olympic shot-put champion Ulf Timmermann, 1988 Olympic 
discus champion Juergen Schult, 1988 gold medal decathlete Christian Schenck, Torsten Voss, who 
finished second to Schenck in Seoul, 1988 silver and bronze medalist jumper Heike Dreschler, and Dagmar 
Hase, who would go on to win seven Olympic medals in the 1990s. Michael Janofsky, “Drug Use by 
Prominent Athletes Reported,” New York Times, November 29, 1990. See also Jan Todd and Terry Todd, 
“Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement: 1960-1999,” in Doping in 
Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, ed. Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse 
(Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001), 97. 
 
27 Werner W. Franke and Brigitte Berendonk, “Hormonal Doping and Androgenization of Athletes: A 
Secret Program of the German Democratic Republic Government,” Clinical Chemistry 43, no. 7 (July, 
1997): 1263. 
 




                                                
substantive response in that the IOC need only provide “moral credit” to the work of 
others.29  
Also realizing that a stable German presence was essential to the financial future 
of the Olympic movement, Samaranch focused instead on the steps required for a unified 
German team and expressed enthusiasm for a possible bid by the city of Berlin to host the 
2000 or 2004 Olympic Games.30 Upon visiting former East German sports leaders shortly 
before the publication of Doping Dokumente, he downplayed their culpability, even 
stating that “damage to the high performance sports of the G.D.R. would be not only a 
damage for Germany but also for [the] whole Olympic movement.”31 As for the 
possibility of punitive steps, the IOC President opposed the administration of ex post 
facto penalties because of a belief expressed in January 1998 that “there are time limits, 
one cannot go back that far.”32 The basis for Samaranch’s position was economic in 
nature: “We now have a more critical situation than ever,” he said, “with revelations of 
systematic drug-taking by competitors in Germany over the years. . . . This could be 
seriously damaging financially, with the loss of sponsorship.”33  
  
 
29 De Merode quoted in Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails,” 244. 
 
30 See “Germanys Closer to Olympic Merger,” Washington Post, August 13, 1990; “Sports People: 
Olympics; Backing for Germans,” New York Times, August 17, 1990; Marc Fischer, “IOC Supports Idea of 
Berlin Games,” Washington Post, January 23, 1990. 
 
31 Samaranch quoted in Peter Herrmann, “[View of Sport] Germany’s ‘Miracle Machine’ is Left in the 
Blocks,” New York Times, November 4, 1990. 
 
32 Samaranch quoted in Hoberman, Testosterone Dreams, 247. See also John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: 
The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport (New York: Free Press, 1992), 267. 
 
33 Samaranch quoted in Miller, Olympic Revolution, 150. 
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TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY 
 
Despite the IOC’s indifference, the growing number of drug allegations persuaded 
Olympic officials that the public must be convinced that effective policies were being 
developed to prevent future problems. In a July 1991 speech at the opening of the Ninety-
Seventh IOC General Session, Samaranch pronounced that “doping is cheating, and is in 
absolute contradiction to the Olympic ideals of fair play and loyalty.” Expressing a 
profound—if historically dubious—dedication to the eradication of prohibited 
performance-enhancing activities, the IOC President assured his audience that “the IOC 
has fought against this scourge not only with words but also, and especially, with 
effective measures.” Nevertheless, more should be done, according to the President. “For 
this,” Samaranch explained, “we would like all International Sports Federations to adopt 
the same measures against drug abuse.”34 Efforts for the harmonization of Olympic 
doping policies were thus given a new rhetorical emphasis. 
The Third Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in Sport, held in the fall 
of 1991, provided the next venue through which the process of unifying drug policies was 
discussed; topics addressed included long-term plans for “international-cooperation and 
co-ordination” of doping regulations.35 Athletes concerned with the direction of elite 
sport expressed a surprising level of commitment to rigorous sanctions for those caught 
using prohibited ergogenic aids. In a presentation to the conference, Peter Radford of the 
British Sports Council outlined survey findings that twenty-four percent of the athletes in 
his country supported five year suspensions for those who failed drug tests; even more 
 
34 Juan Antonio Samaranch, “The IOC President’s Speech at the Opening of the 97th Session,” [IOC] 
Olympic Review (July, 1991), 309-310. 
 
35 “Important Medical Meetings this Autumn,” [IOC] Olympic Review (September, 1991), 433. 
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astonishing, fifty-one percent agreed with the imposition of lifetime bans in certain 
instances. Radford, perhaps conscious of the IOC leaders in attendance, therefore 
remarked, “Elite athletes . . . would not be as squeamish as officials in dealing out harsh 
punishment to their drug-taking colleagues.”36 In addition to ideas for tougher penalties, 
several delegates suggested that a broad-based educational campaign would provide a 
nice complement to this more punitive anti-doping system. “The emphasis will have to be 
placed on educating the athletes about the health hazards of anabolic steroids,” said Paul 
Dupre, president of Athletics Canada, “and I believe it’s only then we will be able to 
overcome this problem.”37 First, though, Samaranch had to be convinced that his more 
progressive rhetoric needed to be matched with substantive reform. 
In terms of scientific difficulties, inadequacies in the urine tests then in use by 
Olympic authorities led the IOC Medical Commission to consider more sensitive blood 
screens for identifying prohibited substances.38 The growing use of “blood doping” with 
the hormone erythropoietin (EPO) was a particularly important catalyst for such tests in 
that EPO could not ordinarily be detected in an athlete’s urine. De Merode’s refusal to 
consult the other bodies in the Olympic governance structure before bringing the proposal 
before the IOC Executive Board provoked significant inter-organizational conflict, 
however. As a result, the suggestion failed to receive the political support necessary for 
its immediate implementation.39 Individual miscalculation in this instance combined with 
 
36 Radford quoted in “Athletes Want Drug Bans,” Brisbane [Australia] Courier-Mail, September 26, 1991. 
 
37 Dupre quoted in  Norman Da Costa, “Illegal Drug Use by Athletes Reported on Rise in Canada,” 
Toronto Star, September 25, 1991. In a similar argument, Sergio Fantini, then president of Chile’s national 
Olympic committee, wrote in February 1990, “Doping can destroy athletes and therefore the movement. 
Massive education first, and along with it strict enforcement [are] the only way out of this 
nightmare.”Quoted in Lucas, Future of the Olympic Games, 105.  
 
38 “The Executive Board and the Summer IFs in Barcelona,” [IOC] Olympic Review (May, 1991), 187. 
 
39 See Allan R. Gold, “Albertville ’92; I.O.C. Looks at Use of Blood Tests,” New York Times, February 7, 
1992. An alternative to erythropoietin introduces an athlete’s own recycled blood cells (or those of another) 
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political fragmentation to undermine a potentially useful new policy. De Merode 
nevertheless suggested that his organization’s anti-doping efforts were beginning to 
succeed. He emphasized that sixty-one thousand drug screens were conducted in 1991, 
representing a thirty-six percent increase from the previous year; more importantly, out-
of-competition tests increased by ninety-two percent. These activities, according to the 
Medical Commission chairman, collectively resulted in a net one percent drop in positive 
drug tests for the year in Olympic sports.40 De Merode failed to show any link, though, 
between the higher number of drug screens and the lower percentage of positive tests; 
athletes may have simply discovered other loopholes in the IOC’s drug protocols. In any 
event, due to these perceived successes, screens performed outside actual competitions 
formed the basis of de Merode’s future testing prescriptions. In September 1991, a 
temporary IOC commission for such testing was created with de Merode stating the 
obvious provision that “this is an area where there really is work to be done.”41
Despite de Merode’s public display of optimism, other doping experts remained 
unconvinced that a significant turn had been reached in the struggle against performance-
enhancing drugs. Dr. Donald Catlin, a member of the IOC Medical Commission and head 
of doping control at the 1984 Los Angeles Games, believed that while the use of illicit 
ergogenic substances may have been decreasing in the advanced western nations, it was 
proliferating in several areas of Eastern Europe that were still coping with the end of the 
Cold War. “Worldwide,” he declared in July 1992, “I feel we’re making real progress. . . 
 
into the body in order to boost the amount of oxygen in the competitor’s body. Both techniques are 
discussed in Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, 
2nd ed. (Strasbourg, Germany: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), 87-88. 
 
40 “Commission Reports,” [IOC] Olympic Review (July, 1991), 322. 
 




                                                
. But we can’t pretend the problem is over.” “Clearly, in some countries,” Catlin 
concluded, “there is still a lot of work to do. In some areas, we have no doping controls at 
all.”42  
The newly unified Germany was by then experiencing intra-state tensions due to 
the fallout from the public exposure of the GDR doping system. In the winter of 1992, a 
media frenzy ensued after three former East German athletes, including one-hundred 
meter world champion Katrin Krabbe, were found substituting another person’s 
“untainted” urine for their own while training in South Africa.43 The trio’s controversial 
coach, Thomas Springstein, complained about the polarizing effects of such allegations, 
stating, “I have no good relations with any western coaches. . . . They do their work, I’ll 
do mine. There’s lots of talk about east-west togetherness on the team, but there’s been 
very little success.” As for disparities within the squad as a result of the matter, he 
continued that “our athletes are sent to doping tests at every turn, while the western 
athletes hardly ever get checked.” Springstein was not alone in his criticisms. “What 
impertinence!” German Olympian Sigrun Grau lamented. “Our western colleagues 
accuse east athletes of doping with no proof. I can only hope we will be a real team in 
Barcelona.”44
In addition to elucidating the challenges caused by the formation of a new global 
environment, the episode demonstrated the problems still inherent in international sport’s 
 
42 Catlin quoted in Michael Janofsky, “Olympics; Sophisticated Doping Begets More Testing,” New York 
Times, July 19, 1992. 
 
43 The other two athletes were Grit Breuer, a 1991 World Track-and-Field Championships silver-medalist, 
and former 100-meter and 200-meter world champion Silke Moller. See Todd and Todd, “Significant 
Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement,” 98-99; William Oscar Johnson and 
Anita Verschoth, “Testy Times in Germany. (Banning of Track Stars for Drug Use),” Sports Illustrated 
(March 9, 1992), 51-52.  
 
44 Springstein and Grau quoted in Marc Fischer, “Germany Has Everything - Except for Harmony,” 
Washington Post, July 22, 1992. 
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doping regulatory system. Although Springstein’s employment was terminated and the 
three runners received four-year suspensions by the German national track-and-field 
federation, they cited flaws in the testing procedures in their appeals of the decision.45 
Because the German federation had requested its South African counterpart to conduct 
the actual urine collections, questions arose as to the propriety of the arrangement. Dutch 
attorney Emil Vrijman, acting on behalf of the athletes, asserted that the “[IOC] charter 
for doping in sports says very clearly that in order to have your athletes tested abroad, 
you should have an agreement [on testing procedures] between federations.” In this case, 
he continued, “the Germans didn’t know how the South Africans tested. . . . No 
procedural guidelines were drawn up.”46 Such concerns were later given credence when 
Sam Ramsay, South Africa’s leading Olympic official, specifically criticized the anti-
doping programs on his continent as “a relatively lackadaisical one.”47
While Ramsay’s statement was made several months after its decision, such 
discrepancies eventually convinced the German federation to reduce Krabbe’s ban from 
four years to one; this, in turn, angered IAAF officials. Calling the decision “absolutely 
ridiculous,” IAAF staff member Enrico Jacomini argued that “there is no such thing as a 
one-year ban. If she’s innocent, there’s no ban. If she’s guilty, she serves four years.”48 
Taking control of the case, the IAAF circumvented the problems caused by the 
procedural inconsistencies in South Africa by invoking a regulation allowing two-year 
 
45 Johnson and Verschoth, “Testy Times in Germany,” 51-52. 
 
46 Vrijman quoted in Ibid. 
 
47 Ramsay quoted in “Sports People: Track and Field; African Official Seeks Help on Drug Detection,” 
New York Times, September 7, 1993. 
 
48 Jacomini quoted in Dick Patrick and Gary Mihoces, “Krabbe Cleared to Run by German Federation,” 
USA Today, March 31, 1993. 
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suspensions for those who bring “disrepute” to the sport of track-and-field.49 Although 
her running career was effectively terminated, Krabbe sought recourse in the German 
judicial system. In 1995, a Munich-based regional court ordered the German track-and-
field federation and the IAAF to pay the runner $2.7 million in lost wages due to the fact 
that they were “not competent” to impose such a sanction.50 As in the past, the divided 
policy environment through which such issues were addressed undermined the effective 
enforcement of anti-doping regulations. 
At the 1992 Summer Games in Barcelona, cracks in the Olympic regulatory 
structure remained apparent. Although medalists were automatically tested in most 
events, only two of the top four finishers in swimming were screened for drugs. As a 
result, Chinese swimmer Zhuang Yong did not undergo examination after winning the 
women’s one-hundred meter freestyle competition. “I think that all gold medalists should 
be drug-tested,” complained U.S. swimmer Jenny Thompson, who was tested after 
finishing behind Yong. “They do it random here,” she explained, “and I wouldn’t mind, if 
I got a gold medal, getting drug-tested.”51 British sports officials were also frustrated by 
the existing framework when several of their athletes, whom they initially cleared after 
hearing testimony by Olympic doping expert Arnold Beckett, were asked to leave 
Barcelona after drug screens revealed the pharmacological agent clenbuterol in their 
systems. The need for greater clarity turned on the fact that while Beckett was of the 
opinion that the substance was permitted, other IOC members believed that although the 
 
49 See Mark Hayes and Michael Hiestand, “Krabbe Case,” USA Today [International Edition], August 24, 
1993. 
 
50 See “Furthermore,” Washington Post, May 18, 1995. After initially appealing the decision by the 
regional court, the IAAF later dropped its appeal. See “Sports People: Track and Field; I.A.A.F. Drops 
Appeal on Krabbe,” New York Times, January 29, 1997. 
 
51 Thompson quoted in “Notebook; Swimmers’ Drug Tests in Spotlight,” Washington Post, July 28, 1992. 
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substance was not specifically listed, it fell within the IOC’s prohibited class of 
substances related to anabolic steroids.52
By convincing sports leaders that public courts should be avoided at all costs, 
these and other events collectively led to an agreement in the summer of 1993 for a 
universal set of doping principles to be enforced by a new, private arbitration system with 
a more robust CAS as its nucleus. In addition to suggesting that they adopt the IOC’s list 
of banned substances, international and national federations were asked under the 
agreement to join a multi-lateral enforcement system under which sanctions by one 
would be enforced by all others. To avoid troublesome public judicial proceedings, 
athletes, under the agreement, would be required to submit their disputes to a “Supreme 
Council of International Sport Arbitration” before being allowed to compete. “The 
decisions of the arbitration tribunal will be equivalent to the final decision of an ordinary 
civil appeals court,” described IOC Director General Francois Carrard in reference to its 
membership of twenty international jurists and a set of expert arbitrators. As for the 
combined effects of this arrangement, de Merode optimistically declared that “I would 
say this is a historic step. . . . We have followed up words with real action.”53  
 
A NEW “RED” THREAT 
 
 
52 Andrew Davies and Andrew Saxton were the two British weightlifters who tested positive for 
Clenbuterol. See Beth Tuschak, “British want IOC Heads to Clarify Doping Rules,” USA Today, November 
6, 1992. A third British sportsman, Jason Livingston, the sixty-meter European indoor champion, was also 
suspended after failing a pre-competition test for anabolic steroids. See “3 U.K. Athletes Sent Home in 
Doping Scandal,” Toronto Star, July 30, 1992. 
 
53 Carrard and de Merode quoted in “Olympic Sports Set to Unify Doping Rules, Penalties,” Washington 
Post, June 22, 1993. 
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Like Thompson, many of the athletes competing in Barcelona also came to 
believe that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was operating a state-sponsored 
doping regime similar to the one conducted by East Germany prior to the end of the Cold 
War. Some even claimed that there were suspicious links between Chinese sports 
officials and former GDR coaches. Seeking to dispel these rumors after Chinese 
swimmer Lin Li set a new world record in the 200-meter individual medley, coach Zhang 
Xiong asserted that while “an East German coach came to China in 1986. . . . [s]he [Lin 
Li] has never trained with East German coaches.”54 After three runners from the PRC 
swept the women’s 3,000 meter race at the 1983 World Track-and-Field Championships 
in Stuttgart, Germany, a frustrated Canadian competitor, Angela Chalmers, remarked that 
Chinese doping “[is] pretty obvious, in my opinion.” Believing that PRC scientists were 
taking advantage of loopholes in IAAF drug regulations, she despondently asked, “What 
can we do? They don’t fail the tests.” For Chalmers’s coach, Doug Clement, the 
discrepancy between Chinese male and female performances was telling; “When you see 
that pattern,” he asserted, “where the women suddenly go ahead and the men don’t make 
such a huge impact, there is a concern that the response to anabolic agents would be 
much bigger in women than men.”55  
At the conclusion of the competitions in Stuttgart, a grassroots campaign for a 
crackdown on Chinese doping developed among western journalists, athletes and sports 
officials.56 “Something has to be done. . . .” argued Chalmers, because “we’ve witnessed 
 
54 Xiong quoted in Filip Bondy, “Barcelona: Swimming; Too Good? Too Fast? Drug Rumors Stalk 
Chinese,” New York Times, July 31, 1992. 
 
55 Chalmers and Clement quoted in Randy Starkman, “Chinese Track Success Sparks Doping Questions,” 
Toronto Star, August 17, 1993. 
 
56 For the reaction to the events in Stuttgart, consult Darcy C. Plymire, “Too Much, Too Fast, Too Soon: 
Chinese Women Runners, Accusations of Steroid Use, and the Politics of American Track and Field,” 
Sociology of Sport Journal 16, no. 2 (June, 1999): 155-173. 
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some things that are pretty scary.” Fellow Canadian runner Leah Pells likewise alleged 
that “it’s very strange that a couple of years ago they were nowhere to be seen in any 
middle distance events for women—heats, finals, anywhere. . . . And now they’re 
winning literally everything.” Perhaps remembering the complicity of East German 
public officials, Chalmers continued that their Chinese equivalents should be the prime 
targets of any future investigation. Stating that “I feel really sad for the athletes more than 
anything,” she emphasized her belief—which corresponded with that of many others—
that “it’s a [doping] system.”57  
Despite increasingly vociferous calls for a response, Olympic leaders were 
reluctant to take aggressive measures. Having been informed that seven Chinese 
swimmers failed drug tests between 1991 and 1993, for example, the IOC refused to take 
action.58 Following positive indications of drug use by eleven Chinese swimmers at the 
1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima, Japan, de Merode personally discounted the possibility 
of officially sanctioned Chinese doping, stating instead that the results were nothing more 
than “accidents that could happen anywhere.”59 Diverting responsibility from his 
organization over the issue, IOC Director General Francois Carrard additionally argued 
that “Chinese sports authorities are doing their utmost to control the doping problem.”60 
Why the IOC chose not to respond was predictably left unstated. 
 
57 Chalmers and Pells quoted in Randy Starkman, “Athletes Call for Doping Crackdown on Chinese 
Runners,” Toronto Star, August 23, 1993. 
 
58 In an interesting twist to the episode, the International Swimming Federation (FINA) was not given 
information on the tests by Chinese authorities. FINA officials became aware of the information during a 
1995 visit to the PRC. See David Galluzzi, “The Doping Crisis in International Athletic Competition: 
Lessons from the Chinese Doping Scandal in Women’s Swimming,” Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law 10 
(Winter, 2000): 77-78. 
 
59 De Merode quoted in Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails,” 244. Eleven Chinese competitors failed 
drug tests at the competition. See “China to Investigate Doping,” New York Times, December 1, 1994. 
 
60 Carrard quoted in Andrew Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 
234. 
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Leaders in the PRC initially blamed racist sport officials in Japan for 
manufacturing the test results; only slowly did they acknowledge Chinese culpability. 
Even then, governmental officials refused to acknowledge any sort of state-sponsored 
program, preferring instead to blame individual coaches and athletes.61 Nevertheless, the 
PRC’s announcement—however reluctant—that it would initiate an investigation of the 
events in Hiroshima again demonstrated the degree of interest by national governments in 
the aftermath of the Ben Johnson affair. The lukewarm response of the International 
Swimming Federation (FINA), however, mirrored the anemic interest of the IOC in the 
matter. At the conclusion of a 1995 joint visit by FINA and Olympic Council of Asia 
officials to Beijing, the organizations together announced that the controversy was 
“purely individual cases which cannot be generalized for other athletes who have 
performed and shown their talents and abilities in all fairness.”62 Indeed, according to the 
announcement, there was “no evidence that the Chinese are systematically doping 
athletes.”63
Attuned to the fact that Chinese medals meant fewer for their own athletes, 
national sport organizations of other countries were far more aggressive in their reactions. 
The German swimming federation, for example, bypassed IOC officials, whom it 
believed were inadequately addressing the situation, by declaring that it would boycott 
the forthcoming World Cup in Beijing. “We do not want to be a part of an event that is a 
 
 
61 See Bruce Kidd, Robert Edelman, and Susan Brownell, “Comparative Analysis of Doping Scandals: 
Canada, Russia, and China,” in Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement, ed. 
Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2001), 174. The notion of “racist” 
interpretations of Chinese success was also articulated during the 1994 Asian Games by the Olympic 
Council of Asia. The council blamed “racism and the western media for untrue doping slurs against 
Chinese athletes.” Quoted in Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings, 232. 
 
62 Quoted in Kidd, Edelman, and Brownell, “Comparative Analysis of Doping Scandals,” 174. 
 
63 Quoted in Galluzzi, “The Doping Crisis in International Athletic Competition,” 80-81. 
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doping nest,” explained German federation official Ralf Beckman.64 Australian 
swimming officials were even more assertive, insisting that the PRC doping regime 
dictated a four year ban of Chinese swimmers from international meets.65 As a charter 
member of the Pan Pacific Swimming Association, Australia also voted with American, 
Canadian, and Japanese officials against Chinese participation in their organization’s 
1995 championship meet.66 Elaborating on the reasons for the decision, Carol Zaleski, 
president of the U.S. swimming federation, referred to the specter of the GDR doping 
regime in arguing that the strategy “means the Chinese know the world is looking at 
them, and we’re not going to let the history of East Germany repeat itself.”67
Somewhat surprisingly, these activities eventually had an effect on Chinese 
officials, if not Samaranch and the IOC. As a media voice of the PRC’s Communist 
Party, the People’s Daily published a new anti-doping policy in March 1995. In addition 
to proclaiming an official prohibition on performance-enhancing substances, the text 
declared that coaches and athletes would thenceforth be subjected to lengthy suspensions 
for breaches of anti-doping rules; sports administrators and physicians involved with 
doping would also face significant penalties. Soon thereafter, the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress promulgated a National Sports Law to add substance to 
this approach.68 For a time, the policy seemed to work. At the 1996 Olympic Games in 
Atlanta, not a single athlete from the PRC failed a drug test; in an interesting 
 
64 The investigation is addressed in “China to Investigate Doping.”  Beckman’s quote also comes from this 
article.  
 
65 See Galluzzi, “The Doping Crisis in International Athletic Competition,” 80. 
 
66 See “Furthermore [Swimming],” Washington Post, February 13, 1995. 
 
67 Zaleski quoted in Karen Allen, “Group’s Anti-Drug Action ‘Thrill’ U.S. Swimming,” USA Today, 
February 14, 1995. 
 
68 Kidd, Edelman, and Brownell, “Comparative Analysis of Doping Scandals,” 176-177. 
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counterpoint, Chinese swimmers received only one gold medal.69 The irony of these 
positive developments, though, was that IOC authorities had virtually no hand in their 
creation. 
 
1996 ATLANTA GAMES 
 
The 1996 Atlanta Games also sparked an increase in the level of commitment by 
American officials to the fight against doping. Because the United States would host the 
competitions, even the highest levels of the American government expressed interest in 
the matter, perhaps in the hopes of preventing embarrassing circumstances. Attending an 
IOC Executive Board meeting approximately a year prior to the competitions, U.S. Vice 
President Al Gore remarked that the founding philosophy of the Olympic movement 
includes respect for “a healthy body and a healthy mind. It means athletes who are drug 
free.” Praising the IOC’s efforts to combat drugs, he nevertheless provided that “there is 
more we can do” in terms of providing educational and psychological support to athletes. 
As for refining the code of penalties for those caught cheating, Gore announced that “it 
may also be time to apply the same strict penalties – if not more serious ones – to 
coaches, trainers, and administrators who know of, and therefore condone, drug use.”70 
While falling short of proclaiming official federal involvement, Gore’s enthusiasm 
nonetheless set the agenda for a greater commitment to anti-doping by private U.S. sports 
bodies. 
 
69 See Galluzzi, “The Doping Crisis in International Athletic Competition,” 81. 
 




                                                
In April 1996, the USOC passed a code of conduct for its athletes and revised its 
outdated out-of-competition testing protocol that had previously provided forty-eight 
hours prior notice to athletes before drug screens could be conducted. Remarking on the 
organization’s prior focus on irrelevant matters, USOC President LeRoy Walker stated, 
“We have to do what is required. We used to worry about an athlete smoking a cigarette 
or drinking a 3.2 beer. We’ve gone beyond that.”71 Although USOC Executive Director 
Dick Schultz claimed that “we want to set the standard for the world,” the program 
nevertheless had several defects—it would cost $2.8 million a year and would not be 
fully implemented until after the Atlanta Games were concluded.72  
The latter point was made somewhat less disappointing when the testing program 
for the competitions in Atlanta was announced. Indeed, the facilities and personnel to be 
used were more considerable than for previous Games; at a total cost of $2 million, six-
hundred medical staff members would conduct an anticipated 1,800 drug screens using 
several new, highly-sensitive mass spectrometers. The chief medical officer in Atlanta, 
Dr. John Cantwell, who described the anti-doping task as “the equivalent of eight Super 
Bowls a day for 17 days,” accordingly predicted a four-fold increase in the number of 
athletes found using anabolic steroids compared to those caught at the 1992 Games.73 
USOC Vice President Dr. Ralph Hale was far less optimistic. “Our anti-doping 
 
71 Walker quoted in “USOC Passes Stiff Antidrug Program,” USA Today, April 15, 1996. 
 
72 Schultz quoted in Debbie Becker and Dick Patrick, “USOC Control of Testing Might Come after 
Atlanta,” USA Today, October 6, 1995. These policies had been at least a year in the making. In addition to 
the articles cited above, the policy’s progression can be followed in Christine Brennan, “USOC Eyes 
Tougher Tests; Wants No-Notice Drug Tests in All Sports,” Washington Post, September 9, 1995; Athelia 
Knight, “USOC: Atlanta Too Soon for Stronger Drug Testing,” Washington Post, October 6, 1995; Mike 
Dodd, “USOC Ready to Approve No-Notice Drug Testing,” USA Today, April 12, 1996. 
 
73 Cantwell quoted in “Inside the Olympic Medical Tent,” Physician and Sportsmedicine 24, no. 6 (June, 
1996): 28. For the numbers relating to the undertaking, see Thomas Heath, “Drug Testing Performance 
Enhanced; High-Tech Equipment, Better Methods, But Will Abusers Slip Through?,” Washington Post, 
April 23, 1996. 
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campaign,” he lamented, “. . . has been a failure to this point. Many countries have lost 
confidence in our anti-doping effort. I’m not sure we’re doing the right job.”74 In 
scientific matters, Olympic officials were disappointed when several potential methods of 
detecting human growth hormone could not be finalized in time for their implementation 
in Atlanta.75
The prospects of a heightened number of drug disqualifications due to the IOC’s 
enhanced testing instruments nevertheless worried several U.S. sports leaders. As head of 
the U.S. track-and-field federation, Ollan Cassell warned that “to introduce something 
that’s questionable, which hasn’t been proven and there’s so few of these in the world, 
the IOC is taking a big chance.”76 After the new machines detected small amounts of 
several performance-enhancing substances, Casssell’s statement proved remarkably 
prescient. Believing that legal issues constrained the committee’s ability to impose 
penalties, de Merode declared that the screens would be allowed only for “further study.” 
Consequently, the IOC failed to provide substance to the outcomes of this component of 
the Atlanta Games testing program. The integrity of the Olympic movement was again 
subject to public question after facts concerning the episode were released.77
Despite this setback, USOC leaders began in the aftermath of the competitions to 
collaborate with American government officials in an effort to fill in the seams of its 
newly-ambitious anti-doping program. In late-1997, committee president Bill Hybl sent a 
 
74 Hale quoted in Ferstle, “Evolution and Politics of Drug Testing,” 375. 
 
75 See “The Olympian Battle Over hGH (IOC Develops a Test for Human Growth Hormones),” Sports 
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 152
                                                
letter to FBI Director Louis Freeh asking that federal officers initiate an investigation of a 
suspicious internet website claiming to offer illicit performance-enhancing substances. 
Requesting the bureau to “pursue all avenues to determine if this kind of Internet 
advertising can, by any legal means” be obstructed, Hybl stated that “the [USOC] is 
committed to ensuring a level  playing field for all athletes, and this kind of advertising 
has the potential to destroy the careers and health of existing and aspiring Olympians 
alike.”78 For their part, USOC officials subsequently proclaimed that random, out-of-
competition drug screens would begin at each of their training centers.79
 
THE FINAL PUSH FOR UNIFICATION 
 
At the same time, however, a convoluted set of judicial proceedings again 
demonstrated problems caused by the lack of a unified regulatory system by bringing into 
question the legitimacy of both national and international doping decisions. When fifteen-
year-old American swimmer Jessica Foschi was put on probation and then given a two-
year suspension by the U.S. swimming federation after she failed a 1995 steroid screen, 
her family filed suit in a New York state court, alleging that the organization had 
misconstrued its own regulations.80 Arguing that the suspension was mandatory under the 
rules of its international counterpart, U.S. swimming federation president Carol Zaleski 
 
78 Hybl quoted in Robbi Pickeral and Rodney Page, “USOC asks FBI to Investigate Web Site,” St. 
Petersburg Times [Florida], December 9, 1997. 
 
79 See “USOC Imposing Tougher Drug Tests,” St. Petersburg Times [Florida], December 13, 1997. 




                                                
stated, “We are bound by the rules of our international federation. . . . [I]t’s clear that a 
two-year sanction is what is required under the FINA rules.”81  
Further complicating matters, the U.S. swimming federation, under threat of 
Foschi’s lawsuit, later rescinded its decision, leaving the question of a possible 
suspension to FINA officials.82 Still unsatisfied, Foschi then successfully convinced an 
American Arbitration Association panel, operating under the charter of the USOC, to 
additionally remove her probationary status.83 Angry at the interference of American 
judicial bodies, FINA eventually reinstituted the two-year suspension at the international 
level.84 Although a controversy at the 1996 Olympic Games was averted after Foschi 
failed to qualify for the U.S. team, the continuing diffusion of anti-doping policy was 
confirmed when the Court of Arbitration for Sport reduced FINA’s suspension to six 
months, which was itself back-dated to the day of the failed test.85
In a controversial decision at the Atlanta Games, organizational factionalism was 
again exacerbated when the CAS declared that a stimulant manufactured in Russia named 
bromantan was inappropriately included on the IOC’s list of prohibited substances.86 The 
 
81 Zaleski quoted in Steve Berkowitz, “Muddied Waters Cloud Swimmer’s Case; Neither Foschi Nor U.S. 
Swimming Happy with Penalty for Positive Drug Test,” Washington Post, February 11, 1996. 
 
82 See Christine Brennan, “Suspension on Foschi is Lifted; U.S. Officials Reverse Ban on Swimmer,” 
Washington Post, February 24, 1996. 
 
83 See Athelia Knight, “Arbitration Panel Rules for Foschi,” Washington Post, April 9, 1996. 
 
84 See “Sports People: Swimming; Foschi is Banned by International Group,” New York Times, June 25, 
1996. 
 
85 See “Foschi Cleared to Compete,” New York Times, June 19, 1997. 
 
86 The CAS decision regarding bromantan was not published. The case was Korneev & Gouliev v. 
International Olympic Committee (Unreported, CAS Appeal Panel, August 4, 1996). It is referenced in 
note 90 of Kavanagh, “The Doping Cases and the Need for the International Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS),” 742. See also Hoberman, “How Drug Testing Fails,” 247. The Atlanta Games were the first to 
feature a mandatory arbitration agreement for competitors. On their entry forms, athletes signed a provision 
stating, “The decisions of the CAS [would] be final, nonappealable [sic] and enforceable.” Quoted in Mary 
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IOC-imposed disqualifications of five athletes from the former Soviet-bloc who tested 
positive for the substance were according reversed. Explaining the decisions, CAS 
General Secretary Jean-Phillippe Rochat stated, “The experts were not totally sure that 
bromantan was simply used for the sole purpose of enhancing performance.”87 The IOC 
leadership, however, saw the episode as an alarming usurpation of its authority. IOC Vice 
President Pound, for instance, later asserted that by adding to the public disaffection 
begun by the Ben Johnson scandal, the CAS pronouncement “simply reinforced the idea 
that the IOC talked a lot but did nothing to ensure that its own Games were clean.”88 It 
was an historical irony that the most outspoken figure in the Olympic regulatory structure 
with regard to the issue was forced to make this admission. 
Similar disputes in other countries also led several international athletic 
federations to rewrite the punitive clauses of their own regulations. Confronted by a 
growing number of challenges in Asia and Europe that its longstanding policy of four-
year bans for certain doping violations infringed upon athletes’ rights to work, the IAAF 
accordingly announced that the rule “cannot be enforced in a number of countries due to 
conflicting national legislation.” Because national federations could choose to keep the 
suspensions under their own codes, an inequitable regulatory system developed under 
which athletes from some countries faced much harsher penalties than those in others.89 
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Olympics,” Sports Law Journal 7 (Spring, 2000): 238. 
 
87 Rochat quoted in Andy Miller and M.A.J. McKenna, “Atlanta Games; Farewell; Sports; Drugs; Court 
Returns Medals, Changes Doping Scoreboard,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, August 5, 1996. See also 
“Briefly; IOC Says it will Ignore 5 Positive Steroid Tests,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, November 
28, 1996. 
 
88 Richard W. Pound, Inside the Olympics: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the 
Glory of the Games (Etobicoke, Ont. [Canada]: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, 2004), 68. 
 
89 See Jere Longman, “Track and Field; I.A.A.F. Reduces Doping Bans,” New York Times, August 1, 1997. 
 
 155
                                                
On a broader level, the IOC effectively conceded that its plans for a universal anti-doping 
approach had failed. “There is not yet a satisfactory definition of doping,” lamented IOC 
Director General Francois Carrard. For him, the agenda for the forthcoming September 
1997 IOC General Session was therefore clear: “simplify, unify and become more 
effective.”90
Believing likewise that the existing IOC medical code was, as demonstrated by 
the CAS decisions, “impossible for anyone to enforce properly,” Pound worried that 
“once the final decisions moved from the IOC Medical Commission to an independent 
arbiter, the IOC might well find itself without a legal basis for its actions, such as 
disqualification of its athletes.”91 President Samaranch only made matters worse by 
proclaiming that the IOC’s list of banned substances should be reduced by making legal 
everything not detrimental to the health of an athlete.92 The inflammatory effects of this 
apparent attempt to abdicate moral authority over doping issues were, as Pound later 
recounted, “like pouring gasoline on a fire that was already burning.”93  
Within the fracturing IOC leadership, de Merode implicitly criticized Samaranch 
by commenting that “the people who want to reduce the list are the people who want to 
let doping function.”94 After Samarach rescinded his controversial statement, IOC 
authorities initially addressed the problem by focusing upon the creation of a new anti-
doping code. As it became apparent that this was another half-measure, Pound suggested 
 
90 Carrard quoted in “Furthermore,” Washington Post, September 1, 1997. 
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at an emergency 1998 meeting of the IOC Executive Board that there was a need for an 
independent authority to spearhead the battle against performance-enhancing 
substances.95 “This agency will make us stronger than before,” de Merode argued in the 
aftermath of the meeting. “To be united is a key success of the anti-doping fight. We all 
have to be unified in this battle.”96 Even then, the chances for the implementation of a 
different approach would have been negligible without the pubic cynicism regarding the 
IOC that developed out of two additional scandals: the 1998 Tour de France doping 
debacle and allegations of bribery of IOC leaders concerning the right to host the 2002 
Salt Lake City Olympic Games. The possibility of U.S. governmental intervention after 
the latter event led to more openness within the IOC leadership with regard to needed 
reforms.97  
The World Conference on Doping in Sport was therefore scheduled for February 
1999 to address the idea of an independent anti-doping authority. In a marked departure 
from his earlier proposal to minimize the list of prohibited substances, Samaranch, by 
now attuned to the possibility of a final, cataclysmic scandal, declared that the event was 
conceived “so that all the parties concerned can reflect and make a firmer commitment to 
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the fight against doping, which is poisoning the world of sport. We have won several 
battles, but we have not yet won the war.”98 In a reversal from his previous enthusiasm, 
however, de Merode, hoping to lessen the prospects of expensive legal proceedings, 
proposed that punitive measures should be reduced for those caught using banned 
substances. Catalyzing widespread condemnation, this suggestion again sparked the 
interest of national governments. U.S. deputy drug czar Donald Vereen, for instance, 
responded to the Medical Commission chairman that “we are troubled that such a 
compromise could be seen as undermining the strength of purpose with which the IOC is 
determined to tackle the drug use and doping problem.” “It may create,” he continued, “a 
widespread perception that [the] conference lacks the ability and wherewithal to adopt the 
types of strong changes needed to address the problem.”99
In light of the considerable legal, political, ethical, and financial difficulties that 
would attend the consummation of a coordinated approach, the IOC made a point of 
extending invitations to the United Nations and a number of national governments to the 
conference.100 As a result of the meeting, the “Lausanne Declaration” was adopted by the 
delegates, which called for a number of interconnected measures to be instituted. The 
most important of these was the notion of a new anti-doping authority, which the IOC 
promised to support with an initial allocation of $25 million.101 Samaranch initially 
envisioned this agency operating under the IOC umbrella.102 However, this orientation 
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was unacceptable to governmental authorities. Barry McCaffrey, then director of the U.S. 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, for example, asserted at an October 1999 
Congressional hearing that “the I.O.C. is rushing forward to build an institution that we 
cannot support—one that is more public relations ploy than policy solution.”103
Understanding the resulting opportunity for a much more ambitious organization, 
Pound pointed out to Samaranch that “we already know that the Olympic movement is 
incapable of controlling the use of drugs in sport on its own. We do not have the legal or 
the financial means to do so and, frankly, there is little enthusiasm for the struggle itself 
among many of the IFs. He argued on the other hand, “If we bring the governments to the 
table as full partners we will have all the necessary means at our disposal, and we can lay 
off half the costs of the initiative on them”104 Although reluctant to share control over 
doping matters, Samaranch eventually agreed to Pound’s advocacy of an entirely 
different organizational model that gave national governments fifty-percent control in the 
new entity in return for their assuming an equal level of the financial obligation for its 
operation.105
This new organizational approach to doping regulation was effected by the 
creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency on November 10, 1999, with the ambitious 
aim of the agency becoming fully operational by the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.106 
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With Pound as its inaugural president, the agency held its first board meeting on January 
13, 2000, during which an agenda was established for the intermediate future.107 
Speaking at that meeting, Pound expressed his hopes for a revolutionary system that 
could challenge the ongoing proliferation of performance-enhancing activities in elite-
level athletics. Providing perhaps the best elucidation of the principles under which 
WADA should function, he extolled the possibilities afforded by this unique alliance of 
public and private authorities: 
 
Neither the public nor the sports authorities could bring about a complete solution 
to the problem of doping in sport alone; they had to work together with a common 
objective to achieve what no one had achieved to date. WADA was an 
independent agency which had to demonstrate by its actions and commitment that 
it was worthy of public confidence and of the athletes whose integrity it was 
charged with protecting. 
 
With these notions in mind, Pound optimistically predicted that “13th January 2000 
would be looked backed [sic] upon as an important date in sport history.”108 
Developments in the next century of Olympic competition would determine whether 




Building on the catalyzing effects of the 1988 Ben Johnson scandal and the 
subsequent breakdown of the Cold War order, Olympic organizations worked 
 
107 “[Doping] World Anti-Doping Agency,” [IOC] Olympic Review (February-March, 2000). 
 
108 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), January 
13, 2000, p. 1, available online through the WADA internet website: http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/index.ch2 (accessed March 21, 2007).  
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sporadically with governmental bodies throughout the 1990s to institute a new approach 
towards doping. Nevertheless, Olympic officials were reluctant to impose substantive 
reforms. In the end, however, a continuing set of public scandals, ranging from the 
exposure of the GDR doping system to the Salt Lake City bribery episode, required their 
attention. While their actions were slow to bear demonstrable results, this process 
eventually led to a collaborative framework for addressing the subject. The series of 
international conferences through which leaders in both the public and private sectors 
conferred was particularly important in refashioning political perspectives away from the 
longstanding ambivalence to drugs in elite athletics. In producing the type of policy 
environment necessary for the creation of WADA in late 1999, this framework 
demonstrated a newfound commitment to multilateral activities that were absent in 
previous undertakings.  
Although the formerly disjointed system for dealing with the doping problem 
underwent a process of unification during the decade, one wonders why Olympic 
policymakers took so long to reach this point of transition. Even after its creation, a 
number of challenges remained for WADA to confront. Chief among these was the 
consolidation of control required for the type of robust activities envisioned by its 
founders. Given the natural propensity of individual organizations to maintain power 
whenever possible, several of the units in the Olympic governance structure were 
reluctant to surrender their influence over doping policy. At the same time, WADA 
scientists were faced with a multitude of new performance-enhancing substances and 
techniques that required investigation. Indeed, the specter of such possibilities as gene 
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109 A 2004 assessment of WADA addresses the challenges that it faced during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. See Barrie Houlihan, “Harmonising Anti-Doping Policy: The Role of the World Anti-
Doping Agency,” in Doping and Public Policy, ed. John Hoberman and Verner Møller (Odense: University 
Press of Denmark, 2004), 19-30. The position that genetic modification is a natural—and perhaps even 
welcome—step in elite sport is best argued in Andy Miah, Genetically Modified Athletes: Biomedical 
Ethics, Gene Doping and Sport (New York: Routledge, 2005). An alternative, though brief elucidation of 
the future of doping in elite sport is provided in Hoberman, Testosterone Dreams, 274-275. 
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Ch. 5: A New Century, 2000-2007 
By the summer of 2001, President Samaranch, never overly-aggressive in 
advancing performance-enhancing drug regulation, concluded that the battle against 
doping in the Olympics was lost. With his retirement from the IOC leadership looming, 
he felt free to express the cynical belief that “in doping, you can only get partial 
victories.” All was not in vain, in Samaranch’s analysis, however, as his higher goal of 
maintaining the financial viability of the movement was intact: “It was said many times,” 
he explained, “that [the 1988 Ben Johnson affair] would be the end of the Olympic 
movement. . . . In fact the opposite has happened.”1 There was, of course, good reason 
for Samaranch’s pessimism regarding doping control. Although the Olympics were 
reaching record levels of financial success, exemplified by the IOC’s successful 
negotiation of a set of contracts collectively worth $1.3 billion for the broadcast rights of 
the 2000 Sydney Games, a variety of new performance-enhancing techniques were 
coming into use.2 Providing new challenges to Olympic officials, several of these 
practices, including the revolutionary possibilities of gene manipulation, could not yet be 
detected. “As if all the ‘regular’ doping were not bad enough,” lamented Dick Pound in 
2006, “we are about to see genetically modified athletes. I have no doubt that genetic 
manipulation experiments are already underway to improve sport performance.”3 
Fortunately for policymakers in the movement, the decades-long process of power 
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consolidation over doping regulation that culminated in the creation of WADA allowed 
resources to be redirected towards scientific matters. 
The new agency itself benefited from the continuing commitment of public 
authorities to the eradication of prohibited ergogenic aids in elite international athletics. 
This support was best demonstrated by a 2000 study partially funded by the U.S. Office 
of National Drug Control Policy. The report began by elucidating the policy connections 
between governmental involvement and doping in the Olympics. “Because of the 
mutually reinforcing relationships among sports, the family, education, the economy, 
politics and religion, the impact and reach of sports in our society cannot be overstated,” 
it asserted.4 Addressing the negative influence of the still fragmented Olympic 
governance system, the study continued that “the crazy quilt of jurisdictions responsible 
for anti-doping policies and practices . . . assure[s] inconsistency in applying any rules.”5 
While promising, the creation of WADA in November 1999 had not yet changed the 
status quo in that it could only make “recommendations” to the IOC. The challenge 
deriving from this evaluation, according to the report, was therefore to “ensure that an 
independent international organization [WADA] exists with authority over the methods 
of measurement and sanctions for doping in Olympic sports.”6 Policies formulated to 
address the issue within the context of the movement during the first decade of the 
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The inaugural meeting of the WADA Foundation Board, held on January 13, 
2000, in Lausanne, Switzerland, highlighted the degree of both public and private 
dedication to the endowment of WADA with the requisite degree of autonomy to 
eliminate doping in high-performance sport. The effort was crucial, as stated by Canadian 
Secretary of State for Amateur Sport Denis Coderre, in that failure “could be the end of 
the Olympics.”7 The meeting’s impressive list of participants included four physicians, 
several attorneys, a university professor, and nine individuals with prior governmental 
experience. In welcoming them, Pound, the body’s founding president, noted that “this 
was the first time that all the elements required to achieve a solution to the problem of 
doping in sport had come together, [including] the IOC, IFs, NOCs, athletes as well as 
intergovernmental organizations and national governments.”8
Such a multi-lateral approach, in Pound’s view, was the only path to a successful 
strategy in that by operating separately, the participating organizations could do little to 
alter the status-quo; together, they could prove pessimists such as Samaranch wrong. 
“One thing is clear, at least to me,” he later said, “and that is that the fight against doping 
can not be won by the sports world alone. There are many issues, such as the 
harmonization of legal penalties against doping, the trafficking of drugs and so forth that 
can only be resolved by the cooperative intervention of the governments of the world. 
That is why the World Anti-Doping Agency was created.” Paraphrasing Winston 
Churchill’s famous turn of words, Pound ordained that in the struggle against 
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pharmacological cheating one must “never give in, never give in, never[,] never, never. 
Never give in except to convictions of honour and good sense.”9
With both a law degree and certification as an accountant, Pound was considered 
by many to be among the IOC’s most effective administrators. Having played central 
roles in the formation of the IOC’s successful marketing strategy and in the investigation 
of the Salt Lake City bribery scandal, he was a respected figure in both the Olympic and 
governmental communities.10 A former elite swimmer, Pound moreover believed deeply 
in the ideals espoused by the Olympic movement. Describing this philosophy, he wrote: 
 
I am convinced that the Olympic Games and the ethical practice of sport are 
wonderful contributors to the fulfilment [sic] of the youth of all countries. They 
assist in the development of social skills and abilities, and in the creation of a 
healthier society that does not draw on the social net as much as an unhealthy one 
and that can make genuine contributions to peace in the world. I am, in that 
respect, a self-confessed and unrepentant idealist.11
 
If the Canadian IOC member had a weakness, though, it was due to an uncompromising 
personal style similar to Brundage’s autocratic manner. Pound’s ethical and intellectual 
orientations, however, were more flexible than those of Brundage; having been 
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Stephen R. Wenn, “Riding into the Sunset: Richard Pound, Dick Ebersol, and Long-Term Olympic 
Television Contracts,” in Bridging Three Centuries: Intellectual Crossroads and the Modern Olympic 
Movement: Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research, ed. Kevin B. Wamsley, et al. (London, 
Ont.: International Centre for Olympic Studies, September 2000), 37-50. For Pound’s role in the Salt Lake 
City bid scandal, consult Stephen R. Wenn and Scott G. Martyn, “‘Tough Love’: Richard Pound, David 
D’Alessandro, and the Salt Lake City Olympics Bid Scandal,” Sport in History 26, no. 1 (April, 2006): 69-
90. 
 
11 Richard W. Pound, Inside the Olympics: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the 
Glory of the Games (Etobicoke, Ont. [Canada]: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, 2004), x-xi. 
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personally involved in the Ben Johnson crisis, he viewed drugs in athletics as a “disease” 
that must be eliminated.12 He was thus a near perfect match for WADA’s need of an 
aggressive, experienced leader. 
Although the WADA Foundation Board members agreed with the overarching 
notion of a universal approach, they struggled to collectively identify a common set of 
short-term priorities. “The first thing that became clear to me when we started out,” 
Pound later recalled, “was that when all is said and done[,] far more is said than done.”13 
Some delegates accordingly focused on the “pharmacological arms race” between those 
who pursued new doping techniques and those seeking to catch them. Barry McCaffrey, a 
representative from the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, argued, for 
example, that the agency’s focal point should concern the elucidation of a “gold 
standard” for the science of anti-doping. Optimistically asserting that the creation of 
WADA had effectively resolved the political fragmentation that impaired previous efforts 
to control the proliferation of drugs in elite international athletics, he explained that the 
agency would be most effective through a rational “organization of science to deal with 
this complex problem.” Having enormous confidence in the outcomes that could be 
produced in the type of private-public partnership that WADA exemplified, McCaffrey 
cheerfully envisioned a quick resolution of the matter. “Doping,” he rationalized, “was an 
easily resolvable issue in the coming decade if the science issue was focused upon.”14  
Those with more experience in the nuances of Olympic governance, however, 
realized that McCaffrey’s indifference to the deep-seated political, organizational, and 
 
12 Pound, Inside Dope, 2. 
 
13 Pound quoted in Michael McCarthy, “Profile: Richard W. Pound, QC-Chairman of WADA,” Lancet 366 
(December, 2005): S20. 
 
14 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), January 13, 
2000, Lausanne, Switzerland, p. 5. 
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more recently legal problems that plagued the movement was imprudent. “Once the 
agency was established,” Pound later explained, “it became apparent quite early on that 
one of the greatest difficulties in the fight against doping in sport was the huge variations 
between the rules in different sports and different countries—and the level of their 
enforcement.”15 “The rules were all over the ballpark,” he stated. “One sports 
organisation had a life ban for the first positive test and another had a 2-week ban that 
you could serve between Christmas and New Years.”16 Calling for a separation of elite 
sport from public judicial oversight, Paul Henderson, the International Sailing 
Federation’s delegate to the Foundation Board meeting, presented a similar concern that 
“the biggest problem in the fight [against doping] was, upon finding a positive test, 
getting it upheld in the various levels of courts.” “There would,” according to him, 
consequently “have to be a major legal aspect to the body [WADA] to ensure that what 
was done was defended properly in the courts.”17 Also perceiving the prospects for active 
participation by WADA at the quickly approaching 2000 Sydney Games as doubtful, 
Henderson stated that “one hundred per cent of the responsibility for making sure that its 
athletes were clean lay with the country sending the athlete”; only at the conclusion of the 
competitions would WADA be in a position to assert itself.18
In the end, the Board chose multiple points of emphasis for its first year. 
Eschewing Henderson’s warning against an overly-demanding timeline, the delegates 
concluded that they would begin developing drug protocols in coordination with the 
 
15 Pound, Inside Dope, 94-95. 
 
16 Pound quoted in McCarthy, “Profile: Richard W. Pound, QC-Chairman of WADA,” S20. 
 
17 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), January 13, 
2000, Lausanne, Switzerland, p. 10. 
 
18 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), January 13, 
2000, Lausanne, Switzerland, p. 13.  
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various international federations for pre-competition drug screens. Governments also 
played important roles in their plans in that they would be asked to increase their efforts 
to interdict the trafficking of illicit drugs in the time period preceding the opening of the 
Games. Most important, though, was the Board’s realization of how crucial it was to 
implement a universal set of anti-doping policies. In this regard, a number of issues, 
ranging from the list of prohibited substances and the accreditation of testing laboratories 
to a doping results management system and the creation of a new Anti-Doping Code, 
required synchronization. Accordingly, the delegates declared that they would 
immediately “initiate the process of harmonizing anti-doping rules in sport and national 
legislation.”19 Two working groups were established as a result of the meeting; the first 
would begin review of a doping results management system for the competitions in 
Sydney while the second would concentrate on drafting WADA’s policies regarding 
conflicts of interests and public disclosure of the organization’s activities.20  
With an eye towards precluding disillusionment should the agency not achieve 
immediate success, Pound began the next meeting of the WADA Foundation Board by 
noting the considerable obstacles faced in the nascent stages of such a large undertaking. 
Remarking that while efficiency was crucial, the delegates should make sure to “bear in 
mind that not all of WADA’s objectives would be achieved at the current meeting and 
that it would take time for what were ambitious goals to be realized.” Jesting regarding 
the enormity of their challenge, he concluded that “the only way to eat an elephant was 
 
19 Fourteen decisions were made at the meeting. The most important of these for historians was the 
agency’s determination to make the minutes of its meetings publicly available on the WADA website. The 
decisions of the initial meeting are provided in the Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of the 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), January 13, 2000, Lausanne, Switzerland, p. 18. 
 
20 See the IOC’s description of the meeting in “[Doping] World Anti-Doping Agency,” [IOC] Olympic 
Review (February-March, 2000), 6. 
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one bite at a time.”21 For issues that required immediate attention, the group, insisting 
that participation in Sydney was still realistic, concentrated on putting in place a pre-
competition protocol to begin in April 2000. The absence of a detailed budget constrained 
future planning, however, although members expressed hope that the creation of an 
eleven member Executive Board would streamline the agency’s day-to-day operations. In 
order to amplify the commitment of athletes to the agency’s future anti-doping 
framework, an additional working group was empowered to consider the novel 
suggestion of a “doping passport” for Olympic competitors.22  
While the agency hoped to provide some 10,000 drug screens before the opening 
of the events in Sydney, the various international federations, which, after all, remained 
in control of the Olympic sports, still needed to be convinced of WADA’s merits. 
Although optimistic regarding the plans for pre-competition tests, WADA official Harri 
Syväsalmi feared, for example, that “we have very little time. We still have some job to 
do to persuade 15 federations to act on this issue.”23 As the opening of the Games neared, 
the detrimental effects of the remaining divisions in the Olympic regulatory structure 
became increasingly apparent. Indeed, the obstacles to a harmonious system were so high 
that by the June 2000 WADA Executive Committee meeting, the sizable number of tests 
previously proposed had been reduced to a quarter of their original total.24 The desired 
degree of autonomy for the agency was also proving evasive as the drug tests at the actual 
 
21 Minutes of the Meeting of the Foundation Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, March 22, 2000, 
Lausanne, p. 1. 
 
22 Minutes of the Meeting of the Foundation Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, March 22, 2000, 
Lausanne, pp. 30, 34-35, 32, 24. 
 
23 Syväsalmi quoted in Natasha Bita, “10,000 To Be Tested Ahead of Games,” The Australian, March 23, 
2000. 
 
24 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the World Anti-Doping Agency, June 20, 2000, 
Lausanne, p. 4. 
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Olympic competitions would be conducted not by WADA, but through the other 
organizations in the international sport system.25  
Criticizing the notion that WADA remained subservient to the other bodies in the 
Olympic organizational structure, Executive Board member Norman Moyer lamented 
that “the reason WADA had been created was precisely because the system in place had 
not delivered the level of credibility required.”26 Although himself irritated by the 
difficulties caused by the convoluted anti-doping system, Pound maintained his position 
that while still crucial, the process of consolidating authority in the new agency would 
not be quick or painless. He therefore suggested that the Board members maintain their 
course by continuing to bear in mind that “WADA was a new organization dealing with 
IFs, which had their own autonomy.” For him, it was therefore far better to focus on what 
was realistically attainable in the few months before the competitions in Sydney 
commenced; afterwards, the members “could look at what had happened, and what could 
be done to improve things.”27
 
2000 SYDNEY OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
Despite the growing pains experienced by the agency, many policymakers 
believed that the Sydney Olympics would be the “cleanest” in the history of the 
movement. Rob Housman, the assistant director of strategic planning for the White 
 
25 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the World Anti-Doping Agency, June 20, 2000, 
Lausanne, p. 5. 
 
26 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the World Anti-Doping Agency, June 20, 2000, 
Lausanne, p. 7. 
 
27 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the World Anti-Doping Agency, June 20, 2000, 
Lausanne, p. 8. 
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House drug policy office, stated, for instance, that “there will be a new reality in Sydney. 
“Any athlete who is thinking about cheating,” he elaborated, “has to think that if he does, 
he might get caught. Managing the tests and the results will be aboveboard and above 
reproach.”28 A new procedure for detecting instances of “blood doping” also gave hope 
to those who feared that novel performance-enhancing techniques might undermine the 
Games. Announcing a combined urine and blood screen for erythropoietin, Samaranch 
stated, “The scientists have decided that the tests may be implemented. . . . I’m very 
optimistic because the panel [of experts recommending it] was unanimous.”29 IOC Vice 
President Kevan Gosper was even more pleased: “I think,” he declared, “[that] it will be a 
very good impact [sic] on the many athletes who do not cheat. . . . For those who do 
cheat, I hope it scares the heck out of them.”30
More concerned with the precedent that might be set should the IOC succeed in 
framing itself as the catalyst for the implementation of the tests, several members of the 
WADA Executive Committee worried, however, that their future control over doping 
issues might be undermined. During an early August 2000 conference call, Canadian 
committee member Denis Coderre argued that “this kind of announcement on doping 
should be made by WADA itself,” and not by the IOC Medical Commission. After all, “it 
was WADA,” he reasoned, “which should have the last word on whether tests such as 
these were performed or not. WADA’s credibility was based on the word world in its 
 
28 Housman quoted in Jere Longman, “Olympics; New Olympic Doping Accusations Cast Shadow,” New 
York Times, June 22, 2000. 
 
29 Samaranch quoted in Amy Shipley, “IOC Moves to Close Drug-Testing Gap; Medical Panel Approves 
New Procedure for Detecting Endurance-Enhancing Drug Erythropoietin,” Washington Post, August 2, 
2000. The methods for detecting erythropoietin are outlined in Evanthia Diamanti-Kandarakis et al., 
“Erythropoietin Abuse and Erythropoietin Gene Doping: Detection Strategies in the Genomic Era,” Sports 
Medicine 35, no. 102005): 832-834.  
 
30 Gosper quoted in Amy Shipley, “IOC Adds New Drug Test; Field for 2008 Games Narrowed to Five 
Cities,” Washington Post, August 29, 2000. 
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title, which indicated that it [and not the IOC] enjoyed the trust of the people.”31 
Advocating a less confrontational approach, Pound responded that the new screens 
should be welcomed with a strong endorsement by the agency. WADA, after all, did not 
yet have the political strength to openly contest the Medical Commission’s authority. 
Successfully pointing out the benefits of his alternative position, Pound reassured his 
counterparts that the agency should bide its time and gradually establish a broad base of 
support for its supremacy in regards to the subject.32
To maintain a presence at the Games, WADA instituted an Independent 
Observers Program, whose fifteen anti-doping experts would monitor the various doping 
control procedures at the competitions. Although prepared to state at the conclusion of 
the events that these were “the best Games ever,” the body cited several problems in its 
post-competition report. The ongoing diffusion that characterized the anti-doping 
framework of the movement was still troubling in that, as the report stated, “issues were 
raised at times with respect to the I.O. [Independent Observer] role and its relation to the 
role of the IOC, its Medical Commission, and the Games Organising Committee.” 
Describing the protectionist inclinations of a few members of the international sport 
community, the report continued that “it was not surprising that some considered the 
proposal one which could lead to interference with the work of the IOC’s Medical 
Commission.”33 Athletes in Sydney were also bewildered by the increased number of 
anti-doping authorities there. Describing the pre-competition screens sponsored by 
 
31 Emphasis in original. Minutes of the Conference Call of the Executive Committee of the World Anti-
Doping Agency, August 2, 2000, Lausanne, p. 7. 
 
32 Minutes of the Conference Call of the Executive Committee of the World Anti-Doping Agency, August 
2, 2000, Lausanne, p. 7.  
 
33 “The best Games ever,” quoted from Harri Syväsalmi, “Preface,” WADA Independent Observer Report, 
Olympic Games 2000, Sydney, Australia, available online through the WADA website: http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/ (accessed March 21, 2007). The subsequent quoted are from pages 1 and 2 of the report. 
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WADA, Foundation Board member Bob Ctvrtlik stated that while the competitors “were 
supportive of the programme in general . . . there had been some confusion between the 
different number of agencies that could test the athletes.”34  
Even with WADA’s relegation to “observer” status, the conviction of sports 
officials to implement an effective anti-doping program in Sydney was demonstrated 
when the International Weightlifting Federation suspended the entire Romanian 
weightlifting team after three of its members failed drug screens prior to the Games.35 
During the actual competitions, a similar episode occurred when the Bulgarian 
weightlifting team was told to leave after several of its lifters were disqualified for using 
prohibited diuretics.36 As for its own efforts, the first year of WADA’s out-of-
competition testing program resulted in twenty-three positive indications of prohibited 
drug use, out of which ten were likely to produce penalties.37
 
CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Fissures in the domestic U.S. sports framework contributed to the volatile 
environment that characterized the evolving Olympic anti-doping system. In the summer 
prior to the Sydney Games, Wade Exum, the director of the USOC’s drug-control 
 
34 Ctvrtlik quoted from Minutes of the World Anti-Doping Agency Foundation Board Informal Meeting, 
September 15, 2000, Sydney, p. 4. 
 
35 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Two Flunk IOC Drug Tests; Silver Medalist Among Ejected,” Washington Post, 
September 20, 2000. 
 
36 The Bulgarian lifters who tested positive were women’s gold-medalist Izabela Dragneva, men’s bronze-
medalist Sevdalin Minchev, and men’s silver-medalist Ivan Ivanov. See “Olympic Notebook; Entire 
Bulgarian Team Suspended,” Washington Post, September 22, 2000. Ivanov’s suspension is noted in 
Chandrasekaran, “Two Flunk IOC Drug Tests; Silver Medalist Among Ejected.” 
 
37 See Minutes of the Foundation Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, November 14, 2000, Oslo, 
Norway, p. 7. 
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activities, resigned his position in part because he believed the committee was 
“deliberately encouraging” doping by U.S. competitors.”38 Combining this assertion with 
claims of racial discrimination on the part of the committee, Exum filed a lawsuit in a 
U.S. federal district court, alleging that approximately half of the instances in which 
athletes tested positive for performance-enhancing activities had not been addressed by 
the organization.39 He further claimed that because the USOC implemented “absolutely 
no sanction” in many doping cases, such performance-enhancing substances as 
testosterone “continued to be routinely abused.” As a result of this neglect, he continued, 
“The USOC actually encourages fringe performance enhancing and/or potential doping 
practices . . . on USOC premises” and asserted that the “USOC’s Drug Control program 
lacks a credible international and national reputation.”40 Responding to the accusations, 
USOC official Mike Moran asserted that any previous lapses in U.S. anti-doping efforts 
were, on the contrary, due to Exum’s own incompetence. After all, Moran stated, Exum 
was the one in charge of the committee’s anti-doping activities.41
A longstanding tension between international sports authorities and American 
officials also became apparent in Sydney as the former accused the latter of hypocrisy in 
their conduct concerning instances of doping by U.S athletes. Shortly before the opening 
of the Games, several members of the American swimming team blamed WADA for an 
 
38 Exum also alleged that he was the subject of racial discrimination at the USOC. See Amy Shipley, “Drug 
Chief Resigns, Blasts USOC,” Washington Post, June 15, 2000. 
 
39 See “Former Drug Testing Chief Sues USOC,” Physician and Sports Medicine 28, no. 9 (September, 
2000): 15. 
 
40 Quoted in John M. Hoberman, Testosterone Dreams: Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 256-257. “Lacks a credible international and national reputation” 
from Exum complaint, p. 11, John Hoberman personal research archive, University of Texas at Austin. 
Hoberman served as an expert witness for Exum.  
 




                                                
unexplained drop in the number of drug screens at international events.42 Matters were 
made worse when Barry McCaffrey, the U.S. national director of drug policy and a 
member of the WADA Foundation Board, refused to endorse a plan to underwrite 
WADA. “Since we already pay huge amounts of money to the IOC,” he asked, “to what 
extent, if any, is additional funding required?” In response, Pound threatened to rescind 
the promise of governmental inclusion in the Agency’s decisions with the comment that 
“the deal is, if you want 50 percent of the seats on the board, you pay 50 percent of the 
pot.”43
The accusations regarding the conduct of American officials arose from a 
perception that USA Track and Field (which governed the sport in America) was 
deliberately concealing positive drug screens by its athletes. When a report was published 
that shot-putter C.J. Hunter—husband of the famous American sprinter Marion Jones—
tested positive for the anabolic steroid nandrolone in July 2000, IOC officials made a 
point of criticizing their American counterparts. Having listened to U.S. denigration of 
his own organization, Norwegian IOC delegate Gerhard Heiberg blatantly accused 
American sports leaders of hypocrisy. “Yes, it’s O.K. to criticize,” he said, “[but] [a]t the 
same time we feel your house is not in order. We feel you do not tell us the truth [about] 
what is happening in the United States.” “You want us to be open,” Heiberg continued, 
“instead of sweeping everything under the carpet. That has to go for the U.S. as well. 
We’re a little irritated.”44 More specifically, Dr. Arne Ljungqvist, serving as the chief 
medical officer of the International Amateur Athletic Federation, condemned USA Track 
 
42 See Catriona Dixon, “Drop in Testing Alleged,” Sydney Daily Telegraph, September 6, 2000. 
 
43 McCaffrey and Pound quoted in Amy Shipley, “U.S. Won’t Underwrite Anti-Doping Agency; America 
Already Gives Enough, McCaffrey Says,” Washington Post, September 13, 2000. 
 
44 Heiberg quoted in Jere Longman, “Sydney 2000: Drug Testing; U.S. Goes On Offensive Over Tests for 
Drugs,” New York Times, September 27, 2000. 
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and Field for failing to report in a timely on a number of failed tests by athletes under its 
jurisdiction.45 “We have no reason why,” he said. “The Americans have taken the 
privilege on themselves to exonerate without informing us who [the athletes] are, and 
saying this is confidential.”46
The disagreements between these rival national and international authorities 
quickly evolved into open discord among domestic U.S. sports bodies. Although initially 
claiming that criticisms of his federation were “gratuitous shots from people who have no 
idea what the facts are,” USA Track and Field leader Craig Masback eventually asked 
WADA to assume command of his body’s anti-doping efforts.47 Because the U.S. Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA) held the contract for these activites, the proposal caused 
USADA Chairman Frank Shorter to sarcastically comment, “Oh, so he wants USADA 
not to exist.” “The ability to oversee testing is with the United States Olympic 
Committee,” Shorter asserted. “We have an agreement with the USOC to do their testing. 
. . . You can only contract away rights that you have. USATF doesn’t have the right to 
contract out the testing, because they’ve already given it away through the USOC to 
USADA.”48  
Perceiving an opportunity to consolidate WADA’s authority over both national 
and international doping activities, Pound initially sided with Masback. “Ultimately,” he 
 
45 See Ibid. 
 
46 Ljungqvist quoted in “IAAF: U.S. Not Coming Clean,” Washington Post, October 2, 2000. 
 
47 Masback quoted in Amy Shipley, “U.S. Track Official Defends Handling of Drug Tests,” Washington 
Post, September 29, 2000. The proposal that WADA assume control of USA Track and Field’s anti-doping 
efforts is outlined in Amy Shipley, “Overseer of Track Drug Plan Sought,” Washington Post, September 
30, 2000; Richard Sandomir, “Sydney 2000: Roundup; Track Group Proposes Compromise on Testing,” 
New York Times, September 29, 2000. 
 
48 Shorter quoted in John Meyer, “U.S. Drug Issue Grows Agencies Disagree Over Testing Control,” 
Denver Post, September 29, 2000. 
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explained, “that’s probably the best way for all this to be played out—that all testing, for 
all national and international federations and national Olympic committees, be handled 
by an independent third party [WADA].”49 When the WADA Foundation Board 
deliberated on the problem, however, Pound backpedaled, explaining that while he had a 
positive view of the idea, WADA was not yet in a position to assume the financial costs 
of the additional tests. Although they endorsed a supervisory role for WADA regarding 
the matter, the Board eventually acquiesced to this position by deciding that—at least for 
the time being—the USA Track and Field protocols were best left in the hands of the 
USADA.50 Two years later, though, Pound resumed his critique of American officials 
and even called for the expulsion of the U.S. track-and-field federation from the IAAF; 
“kick them out,” he said. “It’s [anti-doping policy] not rocket science. You can’t have 
them flouting the rules.”51
The USOC was also quick to realize in the aftermath of the Sydney Games that it 
must resolve the public controversy over its anti-doping policies that was sparked by 
Exum’s accusations that the committee had permitted drug usage among its athletes. Still 
perceiving the matter as a public relations issue rather than an ethical or organizational 
crisis, the USOC, though, responded by instituting an expansive marketing campaign to 
reverse the damage to its image. “Our image needs to be more clearly defined and 
brought to life in a compelling way for consumers,” Chief USOC Marketing Officer 
Matthew Mannelly explained. Elaborating on the effort, interim USOC Chief Executive 
 
49 Pound quoted in Shipley, “Overseer of Track Drug Plan Sought.” 
 
50 Minutes of the Meeting of the Foundation Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, November 14, 
2000, Oslo, pp. 23-24. A short description of the decision is also provided in “USA Track and Field 
Criticized,” Washington Post, November 15, 2000. 
 
51 Pound quoted in Duncan Mackay, “Athletics: Doping Chief Calls for US to be Expelled,” London 
Guardian, February 5, 2002. 
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Officer Scott Blackmun added that “if we don’t overcome the doping issue, the very basis 
that we distinguish ourselves from other sports properties disappears. . . . All of a sudden, 
Olympic athletes are perceived as cheaters, which clearly,” he deliberately exaggerated, 




In the aftermath of the 2000 Summer Olympic Games, policymakers dealing with 
issues concerning performance-enhancing drugs focused on how best to address several 
organizational and scientific developments that were coming into play. Within WADA, a 
decision was made to increase the number of staff employees to keep pace with the goal 
of becoming the paramount international authority on the subject; the related need to 
maintain relations with public administrators, for instance, led to the establishment of a 
new position for a government liaison officer.53 While pleased with the surprising level 
of success that the agency had achieved in its first year of operation, Executive 
Committee members remained worried by what they perceived to be an unwarranted 
focus on short-term matters. Looking over the program for the November 2000 
committee meeting, for instance, Australian delegate Amanda Vanstone posited that “she 
did not see any discussion [scheduled] regarding where the Executive Committee wanted 
WADA to go, nor did the agenda indicate any strategy discussion. These were important 
issues.” Despite the fact that the committee was entitled to “be almost euphoric with the 
 
52 Mannelly and Blackmun quoted in Thomas Heath, “USOC Plans to Polish Its Image,” Washington Post, 
December 2, 2000. 
 
53 See “Decisions” and comments by Denis  Coderre in Minutes of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
Foundation Board Informal Meeting, September 15, 2000, Sydney, p. 4. 
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achievements that WADA had made over the past 12 months, they now needed,” she 
continued, “a strategy to take them up to [the 2002 Games in] Salt Lake City, in addition 
to a long-term strategy.”54
WADA’s still developing relationships with the international federations also 
required careful cultivation if the agency’s out-of-competition testing program was to 
continue. In addition to outlining the need for a renewal of the agency’s contract with the 
federations, Legal Committee spokesperson David Howman sketched out a significant 
flaw in the new erythropoietin screens. “At present,” he said, “very few IFs had the 
power within their constitution[s] to conduct EPO blood testing, and for WADA to 
continue any out-of-competition testing with any emphasis on EPO testing, it would need 
to make sure that the IFs had their rules in place first.” At a higher level, Howman 
continued, “They [Legal Committee members] were also looking at making approaches 
to governments so that they could have in place protocols and ways of proceeding to 
allow out-of-competition testing to take place without complication.” As such, his 
committee “aimed to increase formal relationships with individual governments.”55
Several scientific developments also required thought. The anticipated completion 
of the mapping of the structure of human DNA through the Human Genome Project had 
the potential to eradicate a host of medical disorders that had plagued mankind since its 
beginnings, to facilitate criminal investigations, and to increase food sources for a 
growing world population.56 Along with such benefits, however, came problems related 
 
54 Vanstone remarks in Minutes of the WADA Executive Committee Meeting, November 13, 2000, Oslo, 
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to the possible application of genomics to elite athletics.57 The IOC had long been aware 
of such prospects; describing the debates at the Centennial Olympic Congress held in 
1994, IOC member Robert Parienté, for example, wrote that one question considered at 
the conference involved “how to prevent genetic manipulation . . . and thwart the 
maneuvers of those scientists who work for doping in greater numbers than those fighting 
against the scourge.”58 By now worried that new frontiers in performance-enhancement 
were imminent, Olympic authorities planned a conference dedicated to a frank discussion 
of the matter. As put by IOC Medical Director Dr. Patrick Schamasch in May 2001, “For 
once we want to be ahead, not behind.”59 Lauding this cooperative approach, IAAF 
official Dr. Arne Ljunqvist likewise stated, “For the first time, a substantial group of 
people involved in sports administration, sports science and genetic science will sit 
around the same table and discuss a common potential problem.”60 “The issue of gene 
therapy,” he explained to the WADA Executive Committee, “was a very important one, 
and it was necessary to be prepared for when it arose.”61
While some in the sports community undoubtedly perceived the ethical principles 
involved with genetic manipulation as easily resolvable, others worried that the subject 
was far less clear. U.S. Olympic champion Maurice Greene wondered, for instance, about 
the propriety of penalties in cases of pre-birth or childhood applications of genetic 
 
57 See Andy Miah, Genetically Modified Athletes: Biomedical Ethics, Gene Doping and Sport (New York: 
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enhancement; after all, he stated, “You [as an athlete] didn’t have anything to do with 
it.”62 At a meeting held to discuss the subject in March 2002, Pound avoided such 
intellectual challenges by maintaining that a firm stand should be taken regardless of 
these arguments because, under his conception, “sports are designed by people for 
people—people are not designed for a particular sport.” In terms of substantive policies 
toward the subject, Pound asserted that new scientific techniques must be acquired in that 
“the best way to deal with it is to prevent it and move quickly to the forefront of the 
technology.”63 Adding a degree of urgency to this prescription, the increasing use of 
human growth hormone among elite athletes had not yet led to the development of an 
effective screen for the substance. Even when a test was implemented at the 2004 Athens 
Games, limitations regarding its “detection window” demonstrated the need for scientific 
innovation.64
With the Olympics having instituted a new schedule during the 1990s, in which 
the Summer and Winter Games alternated every two years, WADA stayed focused on 
bolstering its relative influence over doping issues in the short time before the next 
competitions.65 By the November 2000 WADA Executive Board meeting in Oslo, 
Norway, seven of the international federations controlling winter sports had already 
 
62 Greene quoted in Longman, “Pushing the Limits - A Special Report; Someday Soon, Athletic Edge May 
Be From Altered Genes.” 
 
63 Pound quoted in Richard Sandomir, “Olympics; Athletes May Next Seek Genetic Enhancement,” New 
York Times, March 21, 2002. Although relatively non-specific, Pound’s recollections of the meeting are 
provided in Pound, Inside Dope, 181-183. 
 
64 See M. Saugy et al., “Human Growth Hormone Doping in Sport,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 40, 
no. 1, Supplement I (July, 2006): i35-i39. 
 
65 Beginning in 1924, the summer and winter Olympic Games were held during the same year; the 1992 
Lillehammer Games signaled a new scheduling format, in which summer and winter Games alternated 
every two years. 
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agreed to participate in the agency’s out-of-competition testing program.66 Still, much 
worked needed to be done. Returning to the theme of coordinated action, Board member 
Hein Verbruggen provided a damning critique of the previous anti-doping framework 
that spread authority to several levels of the Olympic governance system: 
 
The problem was far too complex for the IFs to handle alone, and most IFs did 
not have the resources to perform tests or create education programmes. Also, the 
work done by the IFs was approximately 90% volunteer work. Previous research 
had been too scattered. The jurisdiction of the IFs was also far too limited for any 
decisive action where doping was concerned. [Verbruggen] therefore 
recommended that WADA have a role of coordination, harmonization, 
organization and supervision. . . .67
 
Also realizing that WADA needed a permanent home if it was to become a 
credible organization, the agency initiated the process of identifying an acceptable 
location for its headquarters.68 Because Lausanne, Switzerland, remained the IOC’s host-
city, several Executive Committee members believed that it should be removed from 
consideration. Speaking at the November 2000 meeting of that body, Canadian 
representative Norman Moyer thus stated, “WADA had made an important point 
regarding the visible and real separation of WADA from the IOC, and it seemed . . . that 
the decision to locate the WADA headquarters in Lausanne was incompatible with the 
 
66 Four of the seven had already signed contracts with WADA. These were the International Ski 
Federation, the International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation, International Luge Federation, and 
International Biathlon Federation. See Minutes of the Foundation Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, 
November 14, 2000, Oslo, Norway, p. 7. 
 
67 Minutes of the Foundation Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, November 14, 2000, Oslo, 
Norway, p. 20. 
 
68 Discussions regarding a permanent headquarters were first made at the inaugural meeting of the WADA 
Foundation Board: Minutes of the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), January 13, 2000, 
Lausanne, pp. 22-23. 
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discussions that they had had around the table.”69 Supporting this conclusion, Coderre 
later explained that “if we really want to be efficient, neutral, independent and 
transparent, we cannot have in the same city the headquarters of the International 
Olympic Committee and the headquarters of the World Anti-Doping Agency.”70 
Eventually, this point of departure led to a continental aversion, as Montreal was chosen 
over five European-based competitors.71
Within the IOC leadership, Juan Antonio Samaranch retired from the movement’s 
presidency in July 2001 with a decidedly mixed legacy. He had, one the one hand, steered 
the Olympics through the last years of the Cold War, during which the IOC’s coffers 
were supplemented with an unprecedented $12 billion in television revenues. 
Samaranch’s leadership failed, however, to enact and enforce responsible, comprehensive 
doping reforms. Remarking on Samaranch’s neglect of the former GDR doping system, 
Australian IOC member Phil Coles remarked, for instance, that “that episode in sport was 
a black one.”72
In seeking a replacement for Samaranch, the IOC had an opportunity to elect a 
more committed leader with regard to the doping issue. If this was indeed a priority, the 
 
69 Minutes of the WADA Executive Committee Meeting, November 13, 2000, Oslo, p. 14. 
 
70 Coderre quoted in James Christie, “Montreal Ideal for Drug Watchdog, Experts Say; World Anti-Doping 
Agency has Chance to Break European Mould in HQ Selection,” Globe and Mail [Canada], August 21, 
2001. 
 
71 The six finalists for the WADA headquarters were Vienna, Austria, Bonn, Germany, Lille, France, 
Lausanne, Switzerland, Stockholm, Sweden, and Montreal. Reference to them is made in Minutes of the 
Foundation Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, November 14, 2000, Oslo, Norway, p. 9. The final 
vote for Montreal is provided in Minutes of the WADA Foundation Board Meeting, August 21, 2001, 
Tallinn, Estonia, p. 7. 
 
72 Coles quoted in Jere Longman, “On the Olympics; Samaranch’s Complex Legacy,” New York Times, 
July 10, 2001. As its title suggests, this article also provides a succinct analysis of Samaranch’s legacy. See 
also Harry Gordon, “Samaranch and History . . . An Inheritance Very Different From the One He 
Received,” Journal of Olympic History 9, no. 3 (September, 2001): 5-6. 
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obvious choice was Dick Pound; as an IOC vice president, he had been a strong voice for 
the creation of WADA, and had even chaired the new agency since its inception. While 
he may have been the logical choice given the widespread public concern over doping, 
Pound, as put by an anonymous IOC member, was nevertheless “seen perhaps as too 
strong. He makes decisions without asking others.”73 A strong anti-American bias also 
worked against Pound, who, as a Canadian, was unfairly perceived as a mouthpiece for 
the meddlesome U.S. media and government.74 While Pound did become a finalist, the 
more subtle Belgian IOC member Jacques Rogge eventually won in part because he 
advocated a less quarrelsome position toward such critical subjects as doping. “I think 
Jacques represents the right way to interpret the value of Olympism,” said Italian IOC 
member Mario Pescante. “We need to stop a moment to reflect. Things have been 
running too fast in the past year.”75  
Fortunately, though, Rogge’s victory was not altogether negative for the struggle 
against doping in the Olympic movement: first, the new president did have a more 
progressive outlook than Samaranch toward the need to resolve the issue; more 
importantly, it also allowed Pound to remain in office at WADA. Once elected, Rogge, 
who was an orthopedic surgeon, certainly seemed enthusiastic about the medical reforms 
that were needed; in an editorial for the IOC’s Olympic Review, he thus wrote, “Of the 
major problems that we must deal with, I must cite first of all the fight against doping and 
 
73 Quoted in Jere Longman, “Olympics; 3 Who Head Field in Competition to Lead the Olympic 
Movement,” New York Times, April 5, 2001. 
 
74 See Ibid. 
 
75 Pescante quoted in Amy Shipley, “IOC Leaning Toward Rogge; Belgian has Broad Support,” 
Washington Post, July 15, 2001. A post-election sketch of the new IOC president is provided in Miguel 
Tasso, “Jacques Rogge: In the Name of Sport and Ethics (Portrait),” [IOC] Olympic Review (August-
September, 2001), 35-38. 
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against corruption in sport.”76 Nevertheless, such rhetorical attestations of commitment 
had often been heard from previous IOC presidential administrations, including that of 
Samaranch. Rogge’s sincerity was affirmed when he urged Pound to remain at WADA; 
“Dick has done an outstanding job as chairman of [the World Anti-Doping Agency],” he 
said, “and I think the continuation of his chairmanship is of a vital importance for the 
momentum that WADA has achieved now.”77
Later remarking on such a surprising level of support by his former political 
opponent, Pound enthused, “One of the reasons I agreed to stay on in this position, I had 
a talk with Jacques and said this thing has to be driven by the IOC and WADA together, 
and if you are not 100 percent in favor it is not going to work. . . . He said, ‘I am 110 
percent in favor’ and he has been consistent and supportive.” As for the sharp contrast 
between Rogge and Samaranch, Pound expressed that “it was the difference between the 
old school and the new school.” “Samaranch thought a positive test was a failure in some 
way, a failure of the Olympics to be pure. The newer generation says, ‘You don't 
understand, it is exactly the opposite. We have found someone cheating and taken that 
person out of the Games.’ That is a successful program.”78
 
2002 SALT LAKE CITY GAMES 
 
 
76 Jacques Rogge, “[Editorial] Towards Greater Universality,” [IOC] Olympic Review (August-September, 
2001), 3. 
 
77 Rogge quoted in James Stevenson, “Pound Returns to Anti-Doping Agency: IOC President Jacques 
Rogge Also Asking His Former Rival to Come Back as Marketing Chief,” Montreal Gazette, August 4, 
2001. 
 
78 Pound quoted in Christopher Smith, “Pound Praises Rogge on Doping Position,” Salt Lake [City] 
Tribune, February 15, 2002. 
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In January of 2002, WADA also received news that several governmental bodies 
had finally agreed to fulfill their funding obligations to the new agency. With an 
additional $8.5 million from these sources, of which the U.S. and Canadian governments 
each contributed $800,000, WADA expected that its yearly budget would grow to $25 
million by 2006. Because the new erythropoietin screens cost between $1,000 and $1,200 
for each test, these funds allowed for an even more aggressive pre-competition anti-
doping program. As athletes grappled with the decision as to whether they should risk the 
tests by competing, Pound lauded the effort; “All of a sudden,” he described, “a number 
of very important athletes around the world remembered they had left their iron on at 
home, and decided to stay there so there was no fire.” “To me, that was a sign that it is a 
deterrent.”79 Echoing similar statements by sports officials, these prospects led WADA to 
proclaim that the Salt Lake City Olympics would be “the cleanest competition ever.”80
By the end of the month, 2,600 of the anticipated 3,500 pre-Games drug screens 
(including over two-hundred erythropoietin tests) had been carried out, which 
collectively resulted in twenty-four positive indications of drug use.81 The IOC 
nevertheless remained in control of the tests conducted during the Winter Olympics, 
although WADA, serving as an independent oversight body, was given equal access to 
the results of its program.82 At the competitions, several skiers were suspended after an 
 
79 In addition to information concerning governmental funds, Pound’s quote is from Amy Shipley, “Like 
Athletes, Anti-Doping Agency Gears Up for Games,” Washington Post, January 18, 2002. 
 
80 Quoted in William Booth, “Officials Promise ‘Cleanest’ Games Ever,” Washington Post, February 10, 
2002. 
 
81 See Shipley, “Like Athletes, Anti-Doping Agency Gears Up for Games.” 
 
82 See Richard Sandomir, “Olympics; Tests Have Been Started For Banned Substances,” New York Times, 
January 18, 2002; Janet Rae Brooks, “Doping Rears Its Ugly Head at Winter Games,” Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 166, no. 6 (March, 2002): 794. 
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erythropoietin analogue named darbepoietin was found in their systems.83 Weaknesses 
remained in the protocols, however, at least in the opinion of participating athletes. After 
Pavle Jovanovic, a member of the U.S. bobsled team, failed a doping screen and was 
suspended, for instance, American sled driver Todd Hays blamed anti-doping authorities 
for failing to provide enough information on nutritional supplements. “[The] USADA and 
the IOC is [sic] very knowledgeable about what’s in these supplements,” he argued. “The 
problem is, the IOC and USADA fail to educate us on this. Apparently, they test several 
hundred supplements and find 25 percent of them contain banned supplements. The 
problem is, they won’t release the names of these companies.”84 When the case was 
heard on appeal, however, the Court of Arbitration for Sport found that Jovanovic was 
himself to blame for failing to consult anti-doping authorities on issues related to 
nutritional supplements.85
Although they were less extensive than at many previous competitions, such 
episodes continued to affect Olympic anti-doping authorities in Salt Lake City. In 
 
83 See “[Field Notes] New Doping Agent Made Olympic Debut,” Physician and Sports Medicine 30, no. 4 
(April, 2002). 
 
84 Jovanovic was suspended after testing positive for an anabolic steroid at the U.S Olympic trials in 
December 2001. See Skip Knowles, “Bobsledder Suspended for Games,” Salt Lake [City] Tribune, January 
28, 2002. Hays quoted in John Henderson, “Sliders Livid at Federations Claim that Information Not 
Specific,” Denver Post, February 10, 2002. Although it does not address the use of supplements by athletes 
competing in the Salt Lake City Games, supplement use by Canadian athletes at the 1996 Atlanta and 2000 
Sydney Olympics is examined in Shih-Han Huang, Karin Johnson, and Andrew L. Pipe, “The Use of 
Dietary Supplements and Medications by Canadian Athletes at the Atlanta and Sydney Olympic Games,” 
Clinical Journal of Sport Medicine 16, no. 1 (January, 2006): 27-33. In Atlanta, sixty-nine percent of the 
those who participated in interviews used some form of dietary supplements; this figure had grown to 
seventy-four percent by the Sydney Games (see p. 27). 
 
85 The arbitration ruling stated, “We were unimpressed by, and do not accept, (Jovanovic’s) evidence as to 
the care he took about the taking of supplements. He did not approach the (U.S. federation), or any other 
body, for guidance. He did not take medical advice. He relied only upon his own research, which, as we 
have found, was considerably less thorough than he would have had us believe. He ignored warnings about 
the dangers of contamination given by a number of bodies. He expressed no contrition, and accepted 
no blame, but sought to blame the IOC, WADA (World Anti-Doping Agency) and USADA but not himself 
for the predicament in which he now finds himself.” Quoted in John Henderson and John Meyer, “February 
8,” Denver Post, February 8, 2002. 
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contrast to the firm stance taken against Jovanovic, Latvian bobsledder Sandis Prusis was 
permitted to participate in the Games despite the fact that he tested positive for an 
anabolic steroid a year earlier; once again, the fragmented Olympic governance system 
was to blame. When WADA found traces of the prohibited substance nandrolone in his 
system during a November 2001 pre-competition drug screen, Prusis received a three 
month suspension from the International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation, which 
would expire only six days before the first bobsled event in Utah. Alarmed that this 
would erode public confidence in its more aggressive policies, the IOC Executive Board 
withdrew Prusis’s eligibility to compete. After hearing the case on appeal, the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport overturned the IOC ruling due to the fact that international 
federations retained command of punitive measures for the athletes competing under their 
jurisdictions; in other words, the IOC could regulate federations, but could not directly 
control their decisions regarding individual athletes.86 Angry at the result, Pound 
commented that “It’s not fair, it’s not right and it taints the performance of that athlete in 
the Games.”87
 Likewise, after Estonian cross country skier Kristina Smigun’s “A” specimen 
signaled the presence of the prohibited substance norandrosteron in a December 2001 
drug screen, a test of her “B” sample was automatically conducted at a different 
laboratory. When it failed to produce a similar positive result, rumors swirled that her 
 
86 See Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (OWG Salt Lake City 2002) 001, Prusis & the Latvian Olympic 
Committee (LOC) / International Olympic Committee (IOC), award of February 5, 2002, in Matthieu Reeb, 
ed., Digest of CAS awards / Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), vol. 3 (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2004), 573-580. The most pertinent text of the CAS opinion stated: “In the Panel’s opinion, if 
autonomy is to have any real meaning that meaning must be that it is a matter for the relevant International 
Federation to decide how it deals with doping offences which come within its jurisdiction and what 
sanctions to impose. If it were otherwise, the International Federation’s autonomy would be illusory.” The 
IOC, on the other hand, “can withdraw a sport, a discipline or an event . . , or it can even withdraw 
recognition from that International Federation” (p.577). 
 
87 Dale Brazao, “Pound Upset After Bobsledder Reinstated,” Toronto Star, February 8, 2002. 
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screens had been illegally manipulated. Canadian national team coach David Wood 
subsequently sent an email to the International Ski Federation that questioned the 
integrity of the protocols. “Is the testing process accurate or relevant?” he demanded. If 
such was the case, he continued, “Is the lab that conducted these tests incompetent, 
corrupt or both?”88 Because the International Ski Federation rather than WADA had 
authority over the initial test, others continued to express disappointment in the still 
fragmented doping control system. Writing to Pound, Canadian skier Beckie Scott asked, 
“Does it not seem just a little bit suspect . . . that the same organization we have been 
taking aim at for illegal behavior has now just conducted a test of their own that clears 
Kristina Smigun in time for the Olympics?”89
Unfortunately, WADA itself was affected by internal discord regarding its 
growing anti-doping initiatives. Beginning at the December 2001 Executive Committee 
meeting, difficulties arose as to the necessary components of the new erythropoietin 
screens. Committee member Hein Verbruggen, who was also a member of the IOC and 
president of the International Cycling Union, asserted that an effective protocol was 
produced through sole reliance on urine samples; WADA scientists Arne Ljungqvist and 
Bengt Saltin argued, on the other hand, that blood specimens must also be analyzed.90 
“It’s beyond me,” Verbruggen asserted, “why Bengt Saltin and Arne Ljungqvist didn’t 
speak out earlier if UCI’s urine test couldn’t stand alone. . . . To assert that the urine test 
is obsolete is a load of bullshit.” Verbruggen, however, saved his most scathing remarks 
for Saltin: “He just sat on his fat arse for several months without saying a word until 
 
88 Wood quoted in Brian Maffly, “Anti-Doping Agency Accused After Clearing Estonian Athlete,” Salt 
Lake [City] Tribune, February 3, 2002. 
 
89 Scott quoted in Ibid. 
 
90 See Minutes of the WADA Executive Committee Meeting, December 2, 2001, Lausanne, p. 7-11. See 
also Minutes of the WADA Foundation Board Meeting, December 3, 2001, Lausanne, p. 6-9.  
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Nov[ember] 6 [2001] when WADA’s medical commission, solely on the basis of Bengt 
Saltin’s recommendation, submitted its proposal to the board for an Olympic EPO test 
consisting of a combination of urine samples and blood screens. I was speechless.”91  
Unwilling to sit still after hearing such criticism, Ljungqvist responded with an 
equal degree of contempt. “The argument against me and Bengt Saltin of having blocked 
urine-based EPO tests is idiotic,” he said. “Verbruggen’s theory of a conspiracy . . . 
against urine testing is absolutely ridiculous. He’s very rude and has written threatening 
letters to both of us. I would only laugh at this if it were not a personal attack on my 
scientific integrity. It’s irresponsible for an influential sports leader like Hein Verbruggen 
to do this, especially since his career is rising within the IOC.”92 After the competitions 
in Salt Lake City had concluded, a new form of erythropoietin, which was difficult to 
distinguish from substances normally found in the human body, only made the situation 
worse. Disappointed at the corrosive effects of the argument, Pound remarked that the 
controversy was analogous to a situation in which “we sit in the car arguing while thieves 
are stealing the wheels.”93
Adding to the anxiety caused by the dispute, government funding for the new 
agency remained below the levels that had been originally promised. Specifically 
addressing the tardiness of European payments at an international sport conference in 
Brussels, IOC Director General Francois Carrard said, “There are some differences of 
opinion as to whether the European part of the budget should be financed by the 
 
91 Verbruggen quoted in Mihir Bose, “Cycling Leader’s Scathing Attack on Top Scientists for ‘Blocking’ 
Tests on EPO,” London Daily Telegraph, February 15, 2002. 
 
92 Ljungqvist quoted in Ibid. 
 
93 Pound quoted in Mihir Bose, “Unseemly Squabbles Threaten the Fight to Ride World Sport of Drug 
Menace,” London Daily Telegraph, March 22, 2002. 
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[European Union] or by the individual [countries]. They failed to resolve this matter at 
the meeting and it will be discussed at a further meeting.”94
Despite these problems, the 2002 Olympic competitions were perceived as an 
important step in the effort to create a universal regulatory system. “I think Salt Lake City 
was a sign of how far we’ve come,” said Pound. Here the Russian cross-country skiers 
were using a new drug they thought no one could detect and they were laughing at us. 
Well, they’re not laughing any more.”95 At the same time, however, the continuing 
diffusion of anti-doping powers remained a significant obstacle for policymakers. 
According to the WADA Independent Observers report for the competition, for instance, 
the IOC’s Anti-Doping Code conflicted with several passages of the Salt Lake City 
Doping Control Guide. Because the different bodies in the Olympic governance 
framework still retained their own regulations, the report recommended that “the 
protocols for blood collection and analysis must be harmonised and scientifically secure.” 
Elaborating on the problems caused by the current regime, it described that “for example, 
at Salt Lake City competitors were still allowed to compete in skating events after a high 
blood count whereas, according to the protocols, similar counts would have rendered 
them ineligible to compete in skiing events.”96
 
THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL UNIFICATION 
 
 
94 Carrard quoted in Ibid. 
 
95 Pound quoted in Jack Todd, “Working to Clean Up Olympics: Rogge Makes Symbolic Peace with 
Pound at Anti-Dope Agency Opening,” Montreal Gazette, June 2, 2002. 
 
96 World Anti-Doping Agency, “Independent Observers Report: 2002 Olympic Games, Salt Lake City,” p. 
88, 89. 
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In pursuit of the long-suggested harmonized regulatory system, WADA advocated 
the creation of a new anti-doping code that, in contrast to the existing set of often 
contradictory rules, was to be universally applicable. For his part, Rogge contributed the 
weight of his power as the new IOC President to the undertaking. Seeking to mend the 
longstanding rift between the committee and serious anti-doping officials, he attended the 
opening of the permanent WADA headquarters in Montreal with promises of support. 
“Jacques will come, which is good,” Pound asserted. “He has been very supportive of 
WADA all along, far more unequivocal about his support than Samaranch ever would 
have been.”97 By then, the WADA chairman had also convinced a substantial number of 
sports leaders, including two hundred national Olympic committees, an equal number of 
national governments, and fifty international federations, to endorse the agency’s plan for 
a more robust anti-doping code.98 Describing the anticipated effect of the agreement, 
Pound optimistically declared, “This is a tough code. If, by the [2004 Olympic] Games in 
Athens, you’re not signed on, your country won’t be there, or your sport won’t be there. 
It’s got teeth.”99
The process of acquiring this degree of commitment from both private and pubic 
policymakers nevertheless remained complicated. Having first been substantially 
discussed at a December 2001 WADA Executive Committee meeting, outlines of the 
code were distributed at a series of international doping conferences over the next year, 
including the Harmonisation Congress in the Netherlands and, in Kuala Lumpur, the 
 
97 Pound quoted in Todd, “Working to Clean Up Olympics: Rogge Makes Symbolic Peace with Pound at 
Anti-Dope Agency Opening.” 
 
98 See Ibid. 
 
99 Pound quoted in James Christie, “Tough Drug Code Faces Sport Bodies,” Globe and Mail (Canada), 
June 5, 2002. 
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International Intergovernmental Consultative Group Against Doping in Sport.100 A 
complete version of the legislation was subsequently presented to the WADA Foundation 
Board in June 2002, and was then subjected to an international process of review. Over 
the next several months, two more drafts were written, circulated, and revised. After 
much work, the code was finally scheduled for presentation at the World Conference on 
Doping in Sport, which was to be held in March 2003 in Copenhagen.101  
The Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport was subsequently adopted 
at the conference, which asserted in part that because the participants were “aware that 
public authorities and sports organizations have complementary responsibilities to 
combat doping in sport. . . . [they] [d]etermined to take further and stronger cooperative 
action aimed at the reduction and eventual elimination of doping in sport.”102 WADA, 
under the declaration, would thereafter be recognized as the central anti-doping 
regulatory mechanism; in addition, the World Anti-Doping Code was to be adopted by 
the signatories “as the foundation in the world wide fight against doping in sport.”103  
While these were promising developments, Pound, as he later wrote, understood 
that much work still needed to be done in terms of the implementation of this agreement. 
“It was little short of a miracle that the process had brought us this far this quickly,” he 
remarked. “But WADA’s adoption of the code was only the beginning. The code meant 
nothing until the sports movement and governments acted to incorporate it into their own 
 
100 See Minutes of the WADA Executive Committee Meeting, December 2, 2001, Lausanne, p. 4-7. It 
should be noted, however, that the idea of a WADA Code had been in existence since the creation of the 
new agency. For the Harmonisation Congress, see The Meeting in Kuala Lumpur is discussed in S. Selvam, 
“Anti-Doping Gets Good Response,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), April 24, 2002. 
 
101 This process is discussed in World Anti-Doping Agency 2002 Annual Report, p. 6-8.  
 
102 Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport, adopted at World Conference on Doping in Sport in 
Copenhagen, March 2003, available on WADA website. 
 
103 Copenhagen Declaration, sections 2, 3, & 4. 
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rules.”104 To his credit, IOC President Rogge promised that adoption of the Code was not 
to be considered optional. “There should be no place in the Olympic Games for 
international federations or national Olympic committees who refuse to implement the 
code,” he said at the start of the Copenhagen conference. “Likewise,” he continued, “no 
organization of the Olympic Games should be awarded to a country whose government 
has neglected or refused to implement the code.”105 The Copenhagen Declaration 
therefore called for the creation of an additional international convention that would bind 
national governments to its points; this document, under the declaration’s timeline, was to 
be adopted by the 2006 Winter Olympics.106 Although the “binding” convention 
remained for future discussion, the World Conference on Doping in Sport in Copenhagen 
took the single most important step in the history of Olympic doping policy in terms of 
the creation of a universal regulatory system.  
The IOC replaced its own medical code with the World Anti-Doping Code in July 
2003, and pressure was subsequently placed on the various international federations to do 
the same by the opening of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.107 After threatening to 
prohibit WADA’s involvement at its 2003 world championships after a document was 
“leaked” during that year’s Tour de France, the International Cycling Union was given a 
deadline by Pound to adopt the Code. “There’s a provision in the Olympic charter,” he 
stated, “which by and large is hot off the press that says the world anti-doping code is 
 
104 Pound, Inside Dope, 98-99. 
 
105 Rogge quoted in “Rogge Puts Weight of IOC Behind Anti-Doping Code,” Ottawa Citizen, March 4, 
2003. 
 
106 Copenhagen Declaration, section 2.4. Athletic organizations were given an even more aggressive 
schedule. They were to adopt the World Anti-Doping Code by the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens. See 
Susanna Loof, “IOC Approves Global Anti-Doping Code: Decision Means World’s Countries Face 
Uniform Rules,” Ottawa Citizen, July 5, 2003. 
 
107 See Ibid. 
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obligatory for the whole Olympic movement.” Therefore, Pound explained, “they 
[International Cycling Union officials] have to adopt the code in the next 10 months.”108
With these steps completed, all that remained for the political unification of 
Olympic doping policy was an international convention that would formally bind national 
governments to the World Anti-Doping Code. The lack of interest in the matter shown by 
the American government was particularly irksome for WADA officials. Specifically 
pointing out that the United States—along with Italy and the Ukraine—was still late in 
fulfilling its funding obligations, Pound asserted that the American team might face 
sanctions at the 2004 Summer Olympics; it might even cost New York the chance of 
hosting the 2012 Games. Angry at the George W. Bush U.S. presidential administration, 
he thus said, “There’s just a complete vacuum and void there as far as we’re 
concerned.”109  
Nevertheless, the idea was presented to the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), where it was unanimously approved by all 191 
member countries.110 Proud that his government had been a leader in pushing for the 
international agreement, Stephen Owen, the Canadian Minister of State with authority 
over athletics, stated, “The adoption of the convention will ensure that governments 
worldwide continue to work together to create an environment that enables athletes to 
compete on a fair and equal playing field.”111 The UNESCO International Convention 
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20, 2005. 
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against Doping in Sport, as the agreement was formally termed, would not come into 
effect, however, until at least thirty governments ratified it.112 On November 25, 2005, 
Sweden became the first country to ratify the document; Pound hoped that twenty-nine 
more would do the same by the opening of the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy.113
By February 2006, though, only seven national governments had ratified the 
convention, sparking IOC President Rogge to say, “We express the hope that the 
governments who have promised to adopt the code by the first day of the Olympic Games 
will accelerate their efforts.”114 Unfortunately, the goal was not met, and anti-doping 
authorities were consequently forced to deal with the issue in the absence of an 
enforceable treaty. The convention finally came into effect in February 2007.115 With the 
process of formally uniting political authority over the subject completed, Pound 
cheerfully elucidated the agency’s astonishing success: 
 
[If] I was to say to you [when WADA was created in 1989 that] within 5 years 
we’re going to have an international code that will apply to all countries, all 
sports, in place, adopted by 202 national Olympic committees, 75 international 
sports federations, the IOC, and we’d have an international convention under the 
umbrella of UNESCO unanimously approved, you’d look at me and say, ‘you’re 
out of your mind’.116
 
 
112 See Ibid. 
 
113 See “Doping: Sweden Ratifies Convention,” Ottawa Citizen, November 27, 2005. 
 
114 The seven to ratify were Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Monaco. 
This information, as well as Rogge’s quote from “IOC’s Rogge Presses for Approval of Doping Code; 
Olympics,” Seattle Times, February 8, 2006. 
 
115 The date for the convention to become effective was rescheduled for February 1, 2007. See “Govt[.] to 
Ratify Treaty Against Sports Doping; Signing Seen as Key to 2016 Olympic Bid,” Tokyo Daily Yomiuri, 
December 24, 2006. 
 
116 Pound quoted in McCarthy, “Profile: Richard W. Pound, QC-Chairman of WADA,” S20. 
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A NEW GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN DOPING 
 
While their deliberate pace in ratifying the UNESCO convention may have led to 
perceptions that national governments were disinterested in WADA, many, in fact, 
demonstrated surprising levels of commitment to the eradication of drugs in sport. 
Indeed, several governmental efforts were too aggressive for Olympic officials, who 
worried that they might destabilize the traditional autonomy of their movement. There 
was thus a fine line, in the analysis of Olympic officials, between helpful public 
involvement and destructive political intrusion. Because Italy maintained legislation 
under which doping in athletics was criminal, the IOC sent a letter to the Italian 
government asking that the law be suspended for the Torino Games.117 Although IOC 
member—and Italian Under Secretary for Sport—Mario Pescante sought a moratorium 
on the law, the country’s legislature refused to comply with the IOC’s request. 
Describing his failure, Pescante thus said, “Members of Parliament consider this 
moratorium a sign of weakness. . . . I was very isolated.”118 Nevertheless, Italian 
authorities did concede that they would allow IOC and WADA officials to conduct the 
in-competition drug screens and that police forces would not be permitted to carry out 
random searches of athletes’ quarters.119
In the United States, the national Congress, recognizing the broader public policy 
implications across all of athletics, has called for additional reforms along the WADA 
 
117 See Vicki Michaelis, “IOC Asks Italy for Criminal Doping Waiver During Games,” USA Today, 
February 11, 2005. 
 
118 Pescante quoted in Nathaniel Vinton, “I.O.C. Ends Opposition to Italy’s Doping Laws,” New York 
Times, October 29, 2005. 
 
119 See Amy Shipley and Liz Clarke, “Italian Authorities Still Plan to Prosecute Substance Abuse Cases,” 
Washington Post, February 7, 2006. 
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model.120 President Bush, perhaps wishing to draw attention away from other 
controversial issues in his administration, addressed doping in his 2004 State-of-the-
Union Address.121 The recognition of this issue on the national policy agenda represents 
a potential paradigm shift away from the Olympic organizational inertia that hampered 
anti-doping regulation for five decades. Additional public and scholarly attention is 
requisite to inculcating a new ethical culture across the global spectrum of sport 
regarding the use of performance-enhancing drugs. 
 
120 For the U.S. Congress’s interest in anti-doping, see U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, 
Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Steroid Use 
in Professional Baseball and Anti-Doping Issues in Amateur Sports, One Hundred Seventh Congress, 
Second Session, June 18, 2002 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005); U.S. House, 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, The Drug Free Sports Act of 2005, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, 
May 18 & 19, 2005 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005); U.S. Senate, Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. 529, To Authorize Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping 
Agency, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, May 24, 2005 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2005); U.S. House, Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, Restoring 
Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball’s Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use, One 
Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, March 17, 2005 (Washington D.C.), available online: 
http://gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html (accessed July 25, 2006); U.S. Senate, Hearing before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. 1114, The Clean Sports Act of 2005, and S. 
1334, The Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First 
Session, September 28, 2005 (Washinton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006). 
  
121 President Bush remarked, “To help children make right choices, they need good examples. Athletics 
play such an important role in our society, but, unfortunately, some in professional sports are not setting 
much of an example. The use of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball, football, and other 
sports is dangerous, and it sends the wrong message – that there are shortcuts to accomplishment, and that 
performance is more important than character. So I tonight I call on team owners, union representatives, 
coaches, and players to take the lead, to send the right signal, to get tough, and to get rid of steroids now.” 
George W. Bush, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 20, 
2004, available online through the University of California at Santa Barbara American Presidency Project 
Website: http://presidency.ucsb.edu.ws/print.php?pid=29646 (accessed April 26, 2006). 
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Conclusion 
If, as was mentioned in the introduction to this work, elite sport has developed as 
a “vast, loosely coordinated experiment upon the human organism,” then the efforts to 
regulate doping within that experimentation have been decidedly dysfunctional.1 Since 
the subject first became an issue of public concern in the 1960s, Olympic policymakers, 
whichever the individual organization to which they belonged, confronted doping issues 
on ad-hoc bases with little long-term planning; substantive measures were, as a 
consequence, rarely undertaken outside times of crisis. This was in part due to the diffuse 
governance system under which the Olympic movement operated; regulatory power over 
doping was divided among several levels of international and national federations, 
national Olympic committees, and organizing bodies for individual competitions. At the 
same time, failures among public and private policymakers to recognize the saliency of 
the doping issue and to fulfill responsibilities for its effective regulation ensured that this 
structure remained intact for multiple decades.  
To be fair, there were successes in the struggle to curtail performance-enhancing 
drugs in the Olympics; at the same time, not every individual in the Olympic community 
was personally culpable for the movement’s failures. Few would argue, as an example, 
that Dick Pound was willing to overlook controversial subjects for individual or 
organizational gain. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Olympic leaders with Pound’s 
integrity remained far too few for much too long. During his presidency of the IOC, for 
instance, Avery Brundage was too enmeshed in notions of amateurism to spend much 
time on “insignificant” matters like doping; his successor, Lord Killanin, bumbled his 
 
1 John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport (New 
York: Free Press, 1992), ix. 
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way through eight years of leadership, accomplishing little; perhaps worst of all, Juan 
Antonio Samaranch chose to largely ignore the issue in pursuit of ever more lucrative 
economic rewards. Even during the last several years, those willing to take a stand 
against the status quo were often punished; it was no accident that Dick Pound finished 
third in the 2001 IOC presidential election. If one wished to dampen the prospects for 
success in the battle against doping, organizational decentralization, venality, and 
individual indifference therefore provided a potent mixture.  
Even when progress was made, plans for reform were usually prepared only after 
the occurrence of some “focusing event” that frightened policymakers into action. This 
shortcoming was perhaps best articulated at a November 2000 meeting of the WADA 
Foundation Board by member Paul Henderson, who observed, “No good lesson was ever 
learnt except through the eyes of disaster.”2 Although the use of performance-enhancing 
drugs in the Olympics was known to occur prior to 1960, serious dialogue regarding the 
subject did not begin until the death of Knud Jensen in that year’s Rome Olympic Games. 
While regulations against doping were gradually instituted over the next decade, the 
powers to enforce them remained dispersed among the various components of the 
movement’s governance system. Despite periodic efforts at reform, this framework was 
maintained until public authorities threatened to intervene after Canadian sprinter Ben 
Johnson tested positive for an anabolic steroid at the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, 
South Korea. Even then, it took policymakers over a decade to implement a more 
integrated regime through the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 
1999. 
 




                                                
To their credit, anti-doping authorities, freed from the problems created by the 
previously fragmented regulatory system with the creation of WADA and the ratification 
of the World Anti-Doping Code, began to plan in advance for the scientific advances that 
will collectively constitute the future of doping. During the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, for example, several conferences were held regarding the possible applications 
of genomics to athletic enhancement. Speaking to the anticipated benefits of this early 
start, WADA member Theodore Friedmann thus asserted, “There is a much greater level 
of awareness, and that’s the starting point.”3 The World Anti-Doping Code even included 
a provision that “the use of genetic transfer technology to dramatically enhance sport 
performance should be prohibited as contrary to the spirit of sport even if it is not 
harmful.”4
The tragedy is that however admirable, these developments are too late to 
definitively “win” the war against doping in the Olympics. The fact is that we live in a 
performance-enhanced society. Examples of this abound: the stimulant dexedrine was 
used by military pilots in the Gulf War of 1990, college students regularly take 
amphetamine-based psychiatric drugs in pursuit of higher grade-point averages and an 
increasing number of non-elderly individuals are prescribed testosterone and human 
growth hormone to counteract the effects of aging.5  In the Olympics, this “medicalized” 
environment has led to acceptable forms and levels of “soft doping.” Under current 
WADA guidelines, for example, a competitor’s testosterone to epitestosterone ratio must 
 
3 Friedmann quoted in “Sports and Drugs: Are Stronger Anti-Doping Policies Needed?,” Congressional 
Quarterly Researcher 14, no. 26 (July 23, 2004): 624. 
 
4 World Anti-Doping Code, 2003, subsection 4.3.2 comment, available online through the WADA internet 
website: http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v3.pdf (accessed April 11, 2007). 
 
5 A useful summary of these points is provided in John Hoberman, “The Doping of Everyday Life,” Boston 
Globe, August 21, 2006. Clipping from John Hoberman personal papers, University of Texas at Austin. My 
thanks to Dr. Hoberman for providing me with a copy of this article. 
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exceed 4.0 before a urine sample is submitted to isotopic ratio mass spectrometry. 
Because this ratio far exceeds that which is ordinarily found in the human body, athletes 
are consequently allowed to “cheat” within arbitrarily-constructed limits.6 The genetic 
revolution will only make matters worse; alluding to novelist Aldous Huxley’s gloomy 
vision of the human future, Pound thus stated, “The drug problem is the devil we know    
. . . and here we are at the beginning of a brave new world.”7
The dilemmas presented by these prospects were perhaps best put in March 2002 
by Joseph Glorioso, director of the Pittsburgh Human Gene Therapy Center, in a question 
that cut to the heart of the future of doping. “How do we distinguish enhancement from 
treatment?” he wondered.8 Elucidating the answer will be the central challenge for future 
Olympic policymakers. 
 
6 The accepted ratio of testosterone to epitestosterone is described in C. Saudan et al., “Testosterone and 
Doping Control,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 40, no. 1, Supplement I (July, 2006): i23. 
 
7 “Sports and Drugs: Are Stronger Anti-Doping Policies Needed?,” 624. 
 
8 Glorioso quoted in Sandomir, “Olympics; Athletes May Next Seek Genetic Enhancement.” 
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Appendix A 
DOPING CONTROL FOR 1968 OLYMPIC GAMES IN GRENOBLE, FRANCE 
a) Sympathomimetic Amines (e.g. amphetamine), ephedrine and similar 
substances, 
b) Stimulants of the central nervous system (strychnine) and analeptics, 
c) Narcotics and analgesics (e.g. morphine), similar substances, 
d) Anti-depressants (e.g. IMAO), imipramine and similar 
substances, 
e) Major tranquillisers (e.g. Phenothiazine).1
 
1 Adapted from “Medical Commission,” [IOC] Newsletter (February 1968), 71. 
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Appendix B 
WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 2007 SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED LIST 
SUBSTANCES AND METHODS PROHIBITED AT ALL TIMES (IN- AND OUT-
OF-COMPETITION): 
S1. ANABOLIC AGENTS 
Anabolic agents are prohibited.  
1. Anabolic Androgenic Steroids (AAS) a. Exogenous* AAS, including: 1-
androstendiol (5α-androst-1-ene-3β,17β-diol ); 1-androstendione (5α-androst-1-ene-3,17-
dione); bolandiol (19-norandrostenediol); bolasterone; boldenone; boldione (androsta-
1,4-diene-3,17-dione); calusterone; clostebol; danazol (17α-ethynyl-17β-hydroxyandrost-
4-eno[2,3-d]isoxazole); dehydrochlormethyltestosterone (4-chloro-17β-hydroxy-17α 
methylandrosta-1,4-dien-3-one); desoxymethyltestosterone (17α-methyl-5α-androst-2-en-
17β-ol); drostanolone; ethylestrenol (19-nor-17α-pregn-4-en-17-ol); fluoxymesterone; 
formebolone; furazabol (17β-hydroxy-17α-methyl-5α-androstano[2,3-c]-furazan); 
gestrinone; 4-hydroxytestosterone (4,17β-dihydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one); mestanolone; 
mesterolone; metenolone; methandienone (17β-hydroxy-17α-methylandrosta-1,4-dien-3-
one); methandriol; methasterone (2α, 17α-dimethyl-5α-androstane-3-one-17β-ol); 
methyldienolone (17β-hydroxy-17α-methylestra-4,9-dien-3-one); methyl-1-testosterone 
(17β-hydroxy-17α-methyl-5α-androst-1-en-3-one); methylnortestosterone (17β-hydroxy-
17α-methylestr-4-en-3-one); methyltrienolone (17β-hydroxy-17α-methylestra-4,9,11-
trien-3-one); methyltestosterone; mibolerone; nandrolone; 19-norandrostenedione (estr-4-
ene-3,17-dione); norboletone; norclostebol; norethandrolone; oxabolone; oxandrolone; 
oxymesterone; oxymetholone; prostanozol ([3,2-c]pyrazole-5α-etioallocholane-17β-
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tetrahydropyranol); quinbolone; stanozolol; stenbolone; 1-testosterone (17β-hydroxy-5α-
androst-1-en-3-one); tetrahydrogestrinone (18a-homo-pregna-4,9,11-trien-17β-ol-3-one); 
trenbolone and other substances with a similar chemical structure or similar biological 
effect(s).b. Endogenous** AAS: androstenediol (androst-5-ene-3β,17β-diol); 
androstenedione (androst-4-ene-3,17-dione); dihydrotestosterone (17β-hydroxy-5α-
androstan-3-one); prasterone (dehydroepiandrosterone, DHEA); testosterone and the 
following metabolites and isomers: 5α-androstane-3α,17α-diol; 5α-androstane-3α,17β-
diol; 5α-androstane-3β,17α-diol; 5α-androstane-3β,17β-diol; androst-4-ene-3α,17α-diol; 
androst-4-ene-3α,17β-diol; androst-4-ene-3β,17α-diol; androst-5-ene-3α,17α-diol; 
androst-5-ene-3α,17β-diol; androst-5-ene-3β,17α-diol; 4-androstenediol (androst-4-ene-
3β,17β-diol); 5-androstenedione (androst-5-ene-3,17-dione); epi-dihydrotestosterone; 3α-
hydroxy-5α-androstan-17-one; 3β-hydroxy-5α-androstan-17-one; 19-norandrosterone; 
19-noretiocholanolone. Where an anabolic androgenic steroid is capable of being 
produced endogenously, a Sample will be deemed to contain such Prohibited Substance 
where the concentration of such Prohibited Substance or its metabolites or markers and/or 
any other relevant ratio(s) in the Athlete’s Sample so deviates from the range of values 
normally found in humans that it is unlikely to be consistent with normal endogenous 
production. A Sample shall not be deemed to contain a Prohibited Substance in any such 
case where an Athlete proves that the concentration of the Prohibited Substance or its 
metabolites or markers and/or the relevant ratio(s) in the Athlete’s Sample is attributable 
to a physiological or pathological condition. In all cases, and at any concentration, the 
Athlete’s sample will be deemed to contain a Prohibited Substance and the laboratory 
will report an Adverse Analytical Finding if, based on any reliable analytical method (e.g. 
IRMS), the laboratory can show that the Prohibited Substance is of exogenous origin. In 
such case, no further investigation is necessary. If a value in the range of levels normally 
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found in humans is reported and the reliable analytical method (e.g. IRMS) has not 
determined the exogenous origin of the substance, but if there are indications, such as a 
comparison to endogenous reference steroid profiles, of a possible Use of a Prohibited 
Substance, further investigation shall be conducted by the relevant Anti-Doping 
Organization by reviewing the results of any previous test(s) or by conducting subsequent 
test(s), in order to determine whether the result is due to a physiological or pathological 
condition, or has occurred as a consequence of the exogenous origin of a Prohibited 
Substance. When a laboratory has reported a T/E ratio greater than four (4) to one (1) and 
any reliable analytical method (e.g. IRMS) applied has not determined the exogenous 
origin of the substance, further investigation may be conducted by a review of previous 
tests or by conducting subsequent test(s), in order to determine whether the result is due 
to a physiological or pathological condition, or has occurred as a consequence of the 
exogenous origin of a Prohibited Substance. If a laboratory reports, using an additional 
reliable analytical method (e.g. IRMS), that the Prohibited Substance is of exogenous 
origin, no further investigation is necessary and the Sample will be deemed to contain 
such Prohibited Substance. When an additional reliable analytical method (e.g. IRMS) 
has not been applied and a minimum of three previous test results are not available, a 
longitudinal profile of the Athlete shall be established by performing a minimum of three 
no advance notice tests in a period of three months by the relevant Anti-Doping 
Organization. If the longitudinal profile of the Athlete established by the subsequent tests 
is not physiologically normal, the result shall be reported as an Adverse Analytical 
Finding. In extremely rare individual cases, boldenone of endogenous origin can be 
consistently found at very low nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL) levels in urine. When 
such a very low concentration of boldenone is reported by a laboratory and the 
application of any reliable analytical method (e.g. IRMS) has not determined the 
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exogenous origin of the substance, further investigation may be conducted by subsequent 
tests. When an additional reliable analytical method (e.g. IRMS) has not been applied, a 
longitudinal profile of the athlete shall be established by performing a minimum of three 
no advance notice tests in a period of three months by the relevant Anti-Doping 
Organization. If the longitudinal profile of the Athlete established by the subsequent tests 
is not physiologically normal, the result shall be reported as an Adverse Analytical 
Finding. For 19-norandrosterone, an Adverse Analytical Finding reported by a laboratory 
is considered to be scientific and valid proof of exogenous origin of the Prohibited 
Substance. In such case, no further investigation is necessary. Should an Athlete fail to 
cooperate in the investigations, the Athlete’s Sample shall be deemed to contain a 
Prohibited Substance. 
2. Other Anabolic Agents, including but not limited to: Clenbuterol, tibolone, 
zeranol, zilpaterol. For purposes of this section: * “exogenous” refers to a substance 
which is not ordinarily capable of being produced by the body naturally. ** 
“endogenous” refers to a substance which is capable of being produced by the body 
naturally. 
S2. HORMONES AND RELATED SUBSTANCES 
The following substances, including other substances with a similar chemical 
structure or similar biological effect(s), and their releasing factors, are prohibited: 
1. Erythropoietin (EPO); 
2. Growth Hormone (hGH), Insulin-like Growth Factors (e.g. IGF-1), 
Mechano Growth Factors (MGFs); 




Unless the Athlete can demonstrate that the concentration was due to a 
physiological or pathological condition, a Sample will be deemed to contain a Prohibited 
Substance (as listed above) where the concentration of the Prohibited Substance or its 
metabolites and/or relevant ratios or markers in the Athlete’s Sample so exceeds the 
range of values normally found in humans that it is unlikely to be consistent with normal 
endogenous production. If a laboratory reports, using a reliable analytical method, that 
the Prohibited Substance is of exogenous origin, the Sample will be deemed to contain a 
Prohibited Substance and shall be reported as an Adverse Analytical Finding. The 
presence of other substances with a similar chemical structure or similar biological 
effect(s), diagnostic marker(s) or releasing factors of a hormone listed above or of any 
other finding which indicate(s) that the substance detected is of exogenous origin, will be 
deemed to reflect the use of a Prohibited Substance and shall be reported as an Adverse 
Analytical Finding. 
S3. BETA-2 AGONISTS 
All beta-2 agonists including their D- and L-isomers are prohibited. As an 
exception, formoterol, salbutamol, salmeterol and terbutaline when administered by 
inhalation, require an abbreviated Therapeutic Use Exemption. Despite the granting of 
any form of Therapeutic Use Exemption, a concentration of salbutamol (free plus 
glucuronide) greater than 1000 ng/mL will be considered an Adverse Analytical Finding 
unless the Athlete proves that the abnormal result was the consequence of the therapeutic 
use of inhaled salbutamol. 
S4. AGENTS WITH ANTI-ESTROGENIC ACTIVITY 
The following classes of anti-estrogenic substances are prohibited: 
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1. Aromatase inhibitors including, but not limited to, anastrozole, letrozole, 
aminoglutethimide, exemestane, formestane, testolactone. 
2. Selective Estrogen Receptor Modulators (SERMs) including, but not limited to, 
raloxifene, tamoxifen, toremifene. 
3. Other anti-estrogenic substances including, but not limited to, clomiphene, 
cyclofenil, fulvestrant. 
S5. DIURETICS AND OTHER MASKING AGENTS 
Masking agents are prohibited. They include: Diuretics*, epitestosterone, 
probenecid, alpha-reductase inhibitors (e.g. finasteride, dutasteride), plasma expanders 
(e.g. albumin, dextran, hydroxyethyl starch) and other substances with similar biological 
effect(s). Diuretics include: acetazolamide, amiloride, bumetanide, canrenone, 
chlorthalidone, etacrynic acid, furosemide, indapamide, metolazone, spironolactone, 
thiazides (e.g. bendroflumethiazide, chlorothiazide, hydrochlorothiazide), triamterene, 
and other substances with a similar chemical structure or similar biological effect(s) 
(except for drosperinone, which is not prohibited). * A Therapeutic Use Exemption is not 
valid if an Athlete’s urine contains a diuretic in association with threshold or sub-
threshold levels of a Prohibited Substance(s). 
 
PROHIBITED METHODS 
M1. ENHANCEMENT OF OXYGEN TRANSFER 
The following are prohibited: 
1. Blood doping, including the use of autologous, homologous or heterologous 
blood or red blood cell products of any origin. 
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2. Artificially enhancing the uptake, transport or delivery of oxygen, including but 
not limited to perfluorochemicals, efaproxiral (RSR13) and modified haemoglobin 
products (e.g. haemoglobin-based blood substitutes, microencapsulated haemoglobin 
products). 
M2. CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL MANIPULATION 
1. Tampering, or attempting to tamper, in order to alter the integrity and validity 
of Samples collected during Doping Controls is prohibited. These include but are not 
limited to catheterisation, urine substitution and/or alteration. 
2. Intravenous infusions are prohibited, except as a legitimate medical treatment. 
M3. GENE DOPING 
The non-therapeutic use of cells, genes, genetic elements, or of the modulation of 
gene expression, having the capacity to enhance athletic performance, is prohibited. 
 
SUBSTANCES AND METHODS PROHIBITED IN-COMPETITION 
In addition to the categories S1 to S5 and M1 to M3 defined above, the following 
categories are prohibited in competition: 
PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES 
S6. STIMULANTS 
All stimulants (including both their (D- & L-) optical isomers where relevant) are 
prohibited, except imidazole derivatives for topical use and those stimulants included in 
the 2007 Monitoring Program*. Stimulants include: Adrafinil, adrenaline**, 
amfepramone, amiphenazole, amphetamine, amphetaminil, benzphetamine, 
benzylpiperazine, bromantan, cathine***, clobenzorex, cocaine, cropropamide, 
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crotetamide, cyclazodone, dimethylamphetamine, ephedrine****, etamivan, 
etilamphetamine, etilefrine, famprofazone, fenbutrazate, fencamfamin, fencamine, 
fenetylline, fenfluramine, fenproporex, furfenorex, heptaminol, isometheptene, 
levmethamfetamine, meclofenoxate, mefenorex, mephentermine, mesocarb, 
methamphetamine (D-), methylenedioxyamphetamine, 
methylenedioxymethamphetamine, pmethylamphetamine, methylephedrine****, 
methylphenidate, modafinil, nikethamide, norfenefrine, norfenfluramine, octopamine, 
ortetamine, oxilofrine, parahydroxyamphetamine, pemoline, pentetrazol, 
phendimetrazine, phenmetrazine, phenpromethamine, phentermine, 4-phenylpiracetam 
(carphedon), prolintane, propylhexedrine, selegiline, sibutramine, strychnine, 
tuaminoheptane and other substances with a similar chemical structure or similar 
biological effect(s). * The following substances included in the 2007 Monitoring Program 
(bupropion, caffeine, phenylephrine, phenylpropanolamine, pipradol, pseudoephedrine, 
synephrine) are not considered as Prohibited Substances. ** Adrenaline associated with 
local anaesthetic agents or by local administration (e.g. nasal, ophthalmologic) is not 
prohibited. *** Cathine is prohibited when its concentration in urine is greater than 5 
micrograms per milliliter. **** Each of ephedrine and methylephedrine is prohibited 
when its concentration in urine is greater than 10 micrograms per milliliter. A stimulant 
not expressly mentioned as an example under this section should be considered as a 
Specified Substance only if the Athlete can establish that the substance is particularly 
susceptible to unintentional anti-doping rule violations because of its general availability 
in medicinal products or is less likely to be successfully abused as a doping agent. 
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S7. NARCOTICS 
The following narcotics are prohibited:buprenorphine, dextromoramide, 
diamorphine (heroin), fentanyl and its derivatives, hydromorphone, methadone, 
morphine, oxycodone, oxymorphone, pentazocine, pethidine. 
S8. CANNABINOIDS 
Cannabinoids (e.g. hashish, marijuana) are prohibited. 
S9. GLUCOCORTICOSTEROIDS 
All glucocorticosteroids are prohibited when administered orally, rectally, 
intravenously or intramuscularly. Their use requires a Therapeutic Use Exemption 
approval. Other routes of administration (intraarticular /periarticular/ peritendinous/ 
epidural/ intradermal injections and inhalation) require an Abbreviated Therapeutic Use 
Exemption except as noted below. Topical preparations when used for dermatological 
(including iontophoresis/phonophoresis), auricular, nasal, ophthalmic, buccal, gingival 
and perianal disorders are not prohibited and do not require any form of Therapeutic Use 
Exemption. 
 
SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED IN PARTICULAR SPORTS 
P1. ALCOHOL 
Alcohol (ethanol) is prohibited in-competition only, in the following sports. 
Detection will be conducted by analysis of breath and/or blood. The doping violation 
threshold (haematological values) for each Federation is reported in parenthesis. • 
Aeronautic (FAI) (0.20 g/L) • Archery (FITA, IPC) (0.10 g/L) • Automobile (FIA) (0.10 
g/L) • Boules (CMSB, (0.10 g/L) IPC bowls) • Karate (WKF) (0.10 g/L) • Modern 
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Pentathlon (UIPM) (0.10 g/L) for disciplines involving shooting • Motorcycling (FIM) 
(0.10 g/L) • Powerboating (UIM) (0.30 g/L). 
P2. BETA-BLOCKERS 
Unless otherwise specified, beta-blockers are prohibited in-competition only, in 
the following sports. • Aeronautic (FAI) • Archery (FITA, IPC) (also prohibited out-of-
competition) • Automobile (FIA) • Billiards (WCBS) • Bobsleigh (FIBT) • Boules 
(CMSB, IPC bowls) • Bridge (FMB) • Curling (WCF) • Gymnastics (FIG) • 
Motorcycling (FIM) • Modern Pentathlon (UIPM) for disciplines involving shooting • 
Nine-pin bowling (FIQ) • Sailing (ISAF) for match race helms only • Shooting (ISSF, 
IPC) (also prohibited out-of-competition) • Skiing/Snowboarding (FIS) in ski jumping, 
freestyle aerials/halfpipe and snowboard halfpipe/big air • Wrestling (FILA) Beta-
blockers include, but are not limited to, the following: acebutolol, alprenolol, atenolol, 
betaxolol, bisoprolol, bunolol, carteolol, carvedilol, celiprolol, esmolol, labetalol, 




“Specified Substances”* are listed below: 
• All inhaled Beta-2 Agonists, except salbutamol (free plus glucuronide) greater 
than 1000 ng/mL and clenbuterol; • Probenecid; • Cathine, cropropamide, crotetamide, 
ephedrine, etamivan, famprofazone, heptaminol, isometheptene, levmethamfetamine, 
meclofenoxate, p-methylamphetamine, methylephedrine, nikethamide, norfenefrine, 
octopamine, ortetamine, oxilofrine, phenpromethamine, propylhexedrine, selegiline, 
sibutramine, tuaminoheptane, and any other stimulant not expressly listed under section 
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S6 for which the Athlete establishes that it fulfils the conditions described in section S6; • 
Cannabinoids; • All Glucocorticosteroids; • Alcohol; • All Beta Blockers.  
* “The Prohibited List may identify specified substances which are particularly 
susceptible to unintentional anti-doping rule violations because of their general 
availability in medicinal products or which are less likely to be successfully abused as 
doping agents.” A doping violation involving such substances may result in a reduced 
sanction provided that the “…Athlete can establish that the Use of such a specified 
substance was not intended to enhance sport performance…”2
 
2 Adapted from World Anti-Doping Agency, “The World Anti-Doping Code: The 2007 Prohibited List 
International Standard” (September 16, 2006): 1-11. Available online through the World Anti-Doping 
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